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The crisis-related  scal expansions and the ageing of European Union’s population raise questions 
about the sustainability of the Member States’ public  nances. As the share of working age people 
in the population falls and the share of the old increases, economies are faced with lower economic 
growth and higher costs associated with providing services for the ageing population. This results 
in pressure on the public  nances; bold measures will be necessary to ensure that they return to a 
sustainable footing before the full effect of ageing is felt.
Sustainability relates to the ability of a government to assume the  nancial burden of its debt 
currently and in the future. While there is no one clear-cut de nition of a sustainable  scal position,
this chapter de nes two sustainability gap indicators which are most widely used in the EU to 
measure the sustainability challenges that Member States face. These are:
The S1 indicator shows the durable adjustment to the current primary balance required to reach a 
target debt of 60% of GDP in 2060, including paying for any additional expenditure arising from an 
ageing population.
The S2 indicator shows the durable adjustment of the current primary balance required to ful l the 
in nite horizon intertemporal budget constraints, including paying for any additional expenditure 
arising from an ageing population.
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EDITORIAL 
The European economy is showing signs of entering a phase of recovery after a deep crisis. Thanks to 
effective and substantive policy action since autumn 2008, coordinated in the context of the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), a financial meltdown and a generalised loss of confidence has been 
avoided. However, uncertainty remains high, and there are still risks of negative feedback loops between 
the financial sector and the real economy. Given the output losses in previous quarters, economic activity 
is set to shrink by 4 percent this year, followed by a gradual recovery in 2010.  
Fiscal policymaking has been successfully targeted to the need and urgency of pulling the economy out of 
the recession. Discretionary fiscal stimulus and unfettered automatic stabilisers have provided a cushion 
to economic activity and contributed to the recent signs of improvement, but have led to a substantial 
deterioration in government accounts. From a deficit of 0.8 percent of GDP in 2007 – the best result for 
thirty years – the government deficits in the EU are forecast to average 6 percent of GDP in 2009 and 
around 7 percent in 2010. In the three years to 2010, the gross debt ratio for the EU as a whole is 
increasing by more than 20 points. Moreover, very large contingent liabilities may translate into actual 
costs over the coming years, although some costs in support of the banking sector may be recouped. 
The sustainability of public finances in a longer-term perspective must not be ignored. Though the debt 
and deficit increases are by themselves quite impressive, the projected impact on public finances of 
ageing populations is anticipated to dwarf the effect of the crisis many times over. The fiscal costs of the 
crisis and of projected demographic development compound each other and make fiscal sustainability an 
acute challenge. The available projections show that, in the absence of ambitious efforts to implement 
structural reforms and consolidate government accounts, there would be large increases in expenditure on 
debt interest and public pensions, as well as on healthcare and long-term care during the coming decades. 
Rising government expenditure and prospects of an ever-increasing debt would be an obstacle to a 
sustained and recovery and balanced economic growth in the longer run. 
Successful fiscal expansion to counter recession and longer-term fiscal sustainability are not 
incompatible. Fiscal measures to increase confidence and support demand are only successful if they are 
perceived by the markets and public opinion as temporary and consistent with long-term sustainability. 
Otherwise, if economic agents expect a durable widening of debt, fiscal support will lose its effectiveness 
and can become counterproductive, in particular when the crisis climax has been overcome and one enters 
a phase of recovery. 
Fiscal exit strategies aiming at achieving ambitious and realistic medium-term objectives need to be 
designed now, and implemented in a coordinated manner as soon as recovery takes hold, taking into 
account the specific situations of individual countries.  To support the required reforms and enhance the 
credibility of fiscal adjustment – which inevitably stretches over a number of years – Member States may 
also need to develop further their own budgetary frameworks. In the Stability and Growth Pact context, 
debt sustainability should get a very prominent and explicit role in surveillance procedures. 
 Marco Buti 
 Director General 
Economic and Financial Affairs 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Alongside households and firms, governments too have to meet their 
financial obligations over time. The concept of the sustainability of the public 
finances concerns the ability of a government to finance its current debt and 
expected expenditure. There is no one clear-cut definition of a sustainable 
fiscal position; instead there are alternative theoretical and practical 
approaches to assessing the sustainability of public finances. In general, it 
can be stated that, at first instance, a sustainable position involves a debt level 
that does not entail interest payments so large that they cannot be paid. Thus, 
the sustainability of the public finances considers the ability of a government 
to service the costs of its debt through future revenues. Sustainability of 
public finances is therefore a long-term concept and differs from solvency 
which is concerned with the immediate (short run) ability of a country to 
finance its expenditure.  
This report takes into account the crisis context and its impact on public 
finances at the moment when the first signs of stabilisation become apparent. 
As long as the recovery is not sustained and the discretionary measures 
deployed by governments are not withdrawn, the effect of the crisis on public 
finances cannot be fully determined. However, given the large impact of the 
crisis on public debt, it provides a timely input at a stage where fiscal policies 
must progressively be reoriented towards sustainability and exit strategies 
need to be designed now and implemented in a coordinated manner as soon 
as the recovery takes hold, taking into account the specific situation of 
individual countries. 
The fiscal costs of the crisis and of projected demographic developments 
compound each other and make fiscal sustainability an acute challenge. The 
available projections show that, in the absence of ambitious efforts to 
implement structural reforms and consolidate government accounts, there 
would be very large increases in expenditure on debt interest and public 
pensions, as well as on healthcare and long-term care during the coming 
decades.  
The assessment of the long-term sustainability of fiscal policy is now a well 
established part of budgetary surveillance in the EU. However, in a context of 
crisis and recovery, the sustainability assessment is undertaken under larger 
than usual uncertainty. On the one hand, it is difficult to correctly judge the 
initial structural fiscal position. This is related to the uncertainty on the 
potential output and the output gap, but also on the way that tax revenue has 
been affected by the crisis, as well as on the durable or temporary nature of 
the support measures adopted by governments. On the other hand, the crisis 
may constitute a structural break in our economies and have a protracted 
impact on the way these economies will grow over the next decades.  
Population ageing is a phenomenon that the Member States are already 
familiar with, but whose consequences are yet to be felt in full force. 
Already, the European Union has experienced an ageing of its population 
through an increase in life expectancy and a fall in fertility rates. Over the 
next 50 years the EU population is expected to age further – this will have 
consequences for the public finances and their sustainability. The economic 
and budgetary consequences of the expected change in population structure 
stem mainly from a reduction in the working age population and an increase 
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in the number of elderly people requiring support. A lower number of 
economically active people leads to lower economic growth and lower taxes, 
while a higher number of retired people entails additional public provision of 
age-related transfers and services.  
On the basis of current policies, age-related public expenditure is projected to 
increase on average by 4.3 percentage points of GDP by 2060 in the EU. The 
increase is mainly due to pension, healthcare and long-term care spending. As 
there are significant differences in both the structure of ageing and the social 
security systems that provide support for the elderly across the Member 
States, the projected increase in public expenditure also varies by country.  
In order to asses the sustainability of fiscal policy in each Member State, a 
number of indicators have been developed. In general, these indicators 
assume a continuation of current revenue and expenditure policies over a 
finite or infinite timescale, usually taking the expected development of 
population size and structure into account. More specifically, these indicators 
reflect the projected development of main tax revenues (usually direct and 
indirect taxes and social contributions) and expenditure (i.e. pensions, health 
care, long-term care etc.) under current policy over a very long horizon. The 
sustainability indicators quantify the gap that must be closed to ensure the 
public obligations can be financed in the future. 
In this report – in line with previous assessments – two main sustainability 
gap indicators are derived: the S1 and S2 indicators. Both S1 and S2 show 
the size of the permanent budget adjustment required to ensure that the public 
budget constraints are met. The S1 indicator shows the adjustment to the 
current primary balance required to reach a target government gross debt of 
60% of GDP in 2060, including paying for any additional expenditure arising 
from an ageing population. The S2 indicator shows the adjustment to the 
current primary balance required to fulfil the infinite horizon intertemporal 
budget constraint, including paying for any additional expenditure arising 
from an ageing population. Thus, the difference between S1 and S2 is the 
length of the time horizon taken into account when assessing the 
sustainability of the public finances. In both cases, non-age related and non-
interest spending is assumed to remain constant as a share of GDP in the 
relevant time period. In addition to those two indicators, the required primary 
balance (RPB) is also used to illustrate the sustainability situation. The RPB 
indicates the starting budgetary position which, if attained, ensures the 
sustainability of the public finances under no policy change assumptions. The 
RPB can then be used to compare the actual or planned budgetary strategy 
with the structural primary balance required for fulfilling the inter-temporal 
budget constraint. The major inputs into S1, S2 and RPB indicators are the 
current levels of gross government debt, the structural primary balance (i.e. 
public budget balance excluding interest payments on public debt, cyclical 
factors and one-off transactions) and the expected additional costs arising 
from population ageing. 
A positive value of the gap indicators like S1 and S2 signifies the permanent 
adjustment to the fiscal policy that is necessary to ensure sustainability. The 
analysis is undertaken on the basis of current policy continuing in the future; 
this does not imply that it is realistic to assume that these policies will 
continue, but serves to quantify the necessary magnitude of the change in 
2 
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policy in order to inform the debate. Indeed, the greater the value of the 
indicator the greater adjustment that is required to restore the sustainability of 
public budgets. On the contrary, a negative value indicates that fiscal policy 
is sustainable. The value of S1 and S2 can be further decomposed into parts 
characterising the required adjustment given the initial budgetary position 
(IBP), required adjustment given the long-term change in expenditure (LTC) 
and, in case of S1, the effect of the starting level of debt relative to the 60% 
target for 2060 (DR) to allow consideration and comparison of the 
contribution these components make to sustainability. Still, the indicators do 
not in themselves provide any guide as to how the adjustment should take 
place as the necessary adjustments could occur as result of an increase in 
government receipts or a reduction in its spending, or structural reforms. 
The value of the S2 indicator shows a sustainability gap of 6.5% of GDP for 
the whole EU and of 5.8% of GDP for the euro area, albeit with wide 
variation between countries. The S1 indicator shows a sustainability gap for 
the EU countries and for the euro area, of 5.4% and 4.8% of GDP 
respectively. The decomposition results show that for the EU-27 countries, 
the IBP is responsible for 3.3 points of the S2 gap and 3.1 points for the S1 
gap. This means that even without taking the cost of ageing into account,  
that is assuming that age-related expenditure in government accounts 
remained constant as a share of GDP, European countries should tighten their 
fiscal stance (in terms of the structural primary balance) by an average of 
3.3% of GDP, or adopt structural reforms, for their public finances to return 
to a sustainable path. The long term cost of ageing (LTC) contributes 3.2 
points to the S2 gap and 2 points to the S1 gap, with the figures being 3.5 and 
2.4 points respectively for the euro area. This shows that the LTC has a 
significant fiscal impact on average. For the S1 gap, the requirement to reach 
a debt level of 60% of GDP by 2060 (DR) adds an adjustment of 0.2 points 
for the EU-27 and 0.3 points for the euro area. 
Overall, the baseline results in this report differ significantly from those 
presented three years ago in the 2006 Sustainability Report. While the EU-25 
average sustainability gap was estimated at 3.4% of GDP on S2, the current 
estimates are for 6.5% of GDP. On average, the sustainability gap has 
increased by 3.1% of GDP for the 25 countries that were members of the EU 
in 2006. While four Member States (Hungary, Portugal, Italy and Germany) 
show a lower sustainability gap than in the 2006 exercise, the remaining 
Member States show deterioration. Of these, in all cases expect Greece, 
Luxembourg and Malta, the deterioration is essentially due to the crisis-
related weakening of the initial budgetary position rather than to an increase 
in the age-related costs and the delay in the required adjustment that leads to 
a higher LTC. For Spain, Greece, Ireland, Latvia and the UK the weakened 
initial budgetary position is responsible for an increase of the estimated 
sustainability gap of over 5% of GDP.  
The financial and economic crisis has added to countries' sustainability 
difficulties, through the significantly worse than expected macro-economic 
and fiscal developments in 2008 and 2009 it has led to. In addition, there is 
marked uncertainty regarding economic growth in the medium and long-term 
perspective. As a consequence, a number of alternative macroeconomic 
scenarios were produced to look at the impact of the crisis. In a lost decade 
scenario, pension expenditure is 0.9% of GDP higher in 2060 relative to the 
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baseline, while total age related expenditure is 1.4% of GDP higher, with the 
most of the increases occurring between 2007 and 2020.  
Although the crisis has added to the sustainability problems, the recovery is 
not likely to solve all the difficulties on its own. For some Member States the 
current deficits may return to surplus when the recovery comes, but where 
this is not the case budgetary consolidation will be necessary and should be 
undertaken as soon as the time is right in order to reduce long-term risks to 
public finance sustainability. Projections based on a scenario of growth 
returning to the long-term path of before the crisis show that without 
consolidation, the gross debt-to-GDP ratio for the EU as a whole could reach 
100 percent as early as 2014, and keep on increasing. A consolidation effort 
of 0.5 percent of GDP per year until the Member States’ MTOs are reached 
will only stabilise the debt ratio at around 100 percent of GDP if growth takes 
time to return to the pre-crisis trend. Thus, although fiscal support must be 
maintained until recovery is secured, fiscal policies must progressively be 
reoriented towards sustainability. Exit strategies need to be designed now and 
implemented in a coordinated manner as soon as recovery takes hold, taking 
into account the specific situations of individual countries.   
Of course, the estimates presented in the report are partly determined by the 
underlying assumptions made. To assess the robustness of the sustainability 
indicators and to better understand the long-term sustainability risks in each 
country, the Sustainability Report quantifies the impact of changes in main 
assumptions on the sustainability indicators. In particular, alternative 
assumptions are presented for life expectancy, labour productivity, 
participation of older workers in the labour market, total employment, 
migration and the interest rate. For all these elements there is considerable 
uncertainty when predicting into the future, so considering the response of 
sustainability results to the underlying assumptions is important. Again, the 
final change of S2 as a response to a change in some of the mentioned 
parameters may differ country-by country as eligibility and indexation rules 
for age related expenditure are country specific. 
On the basis of the sustainability indicators, as well as a number of other 
factors (including debt and assets, average pensions and tax burden), the EU 
Member States are classified in three categories depending on the degrees of 
long-term risk they face. Overall, only five countries are classified as low-
risk countries, nine countries are classified as facing medium long-term risk, 
while thirteen countries are exposed to higher long-term risks. 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland and Sweden have relatively stronger 
budgetary positions and have undertaken comprehensive pension reforms in 
recent years. Though the crisis is leading to a deterioration in government 
balances and a substantial increase in government debt ratios of each of these 
countries, their structural fiscal positions remain sounder than in most other 
EU countries, and present therefore a low long-term risk. In Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia and Sweden, the increase in age-related expenditure over 
the next decades is projected to be well below the EU average. Note, 
however, that the projections for Bulgaria and Estonia do not include any 
strengthening of social protection in the coming decades that may be 
necessary for their systems to converge with other EU countries. In Finland, 
the projected increase in expenditure is substantial and the fiscal cost of the 
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crisis has been large. However, the large stock of financial assets in the social 
security portfolio provides a cushion to absorb a deterioration in government 
accounts.  
Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg, Austria, Poland 
and Portugal are countries with very different characteristics in relation to 
their initial budgetary position and age-related expenditure. Belgium, 
Germany and Austria are projected to bear costs of ageing close to, or above, 
the EU average, but their initial budgetary positions are relatively sound, 
provided that the crisis-related deterioration in government accounts does not 
become structural. Though medium-term consolidation will improve the 
sustainability indicators, reforms to address rising age-related costs will be 
indispensable. For Belgium, the debt ratio – which is returning to above 100 
percent of GDP – constitutes a burden and a specific risk. The projected 
increase in the age-related expenditure in Luxembourg is the highest of the 
whole EU; however, this risk is cushioned by the currently low debt and large 
government-owned financial assets. In general, for this group of countries, 
the long-term sustainability risk is medium. For France, Italy, Hungary, 
Poland and Portugal, the long-term costs of ageing are not projected to be 
particularly high. However, their initial budgetary positions imply that fiscal 
policy is unsustainable even without considering any increase in age-related 
expenditure. In all these countries, the crisis and the support to recovery are 
leading to a very fast increase in debt ratios, quickly offsetting the 
consolidation gains achieved in recent years. For Poland, projections indicate 
a fall in age-related expenditure over the long term because of the shift of 
pension provision to funded schemes; however, the projected reduction in 
expenditure is also related to a large cut in benefit ratios. This may raise 
issues of social sustainability by increasing old-age poverty. For France, 
ambitious fiscal consolidation, once the recovery is firmer, is indispensable 
and will constitute a major step to improve sustainability. In Portugal, a 
recent pension reform have done much to improve sustainability; however, 
the structural budgetary position remains largely unbalanced. In the case of 
Italy, fast fiscal consolidation once the recovery takes hold is indispensable to 
ensure a steady reduction in the very high debt ratio.  The low sustainability 
gap of Hungary results from pension reform and recent fiscal consolidation; 
however, the correction in structural imbalances in recent years needs to be 
pursued further in order to reduce debt. 
The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom have sustainability gaps above 6 percent of GDP; over double that 
level in Ireland, Greece, Spain, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. In nearly 
all of these countries, the sustainability gaps are the result of a very large 
projected increase in age-related expenditure, compounded in most cases by 
large initial imbalances, and hence they are exposed to higher long-term 
risks. This indicates that closing their gaps will require both ambitious 
consolidation programmes that reduce debts and deficits in the coming years, 
and profound reforms of social protection. This is particularly the case for 
Greece, which faces the second highest increase in age-related expenditure of 
the entire EU, while its very high debt ratio adds to the concerns on 
sustainability. The possible continuing effects of the crisis on the budgetary 
position and on medium-term growth are a serious concern for most of the 
countries exposed to high long-term sustainability risks – in particular, 
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Ireland, Greece, Latvia, Spain and United Kingdom – for whom avoiding 
exponentially increasing debts is a policy challenge already in a medium-
term perspective. 
The report is structured as follows. Chapter I introduces the concept of 
sustainability and discusses how it will be measured. It introduces the 
additional difficulties that demographic changes and the fiscal costs of the 
crisis poses to sustainability. Chapter II presents data on projected 
demographics in the EU for the years until 2060, and the projected increases 
in a number of age-related expenditure categories. Chapter III presents the 
results of the sustainability analysis in the form of the S1 and S2 indicators 
and breaks the results down in their constituent parts. It compares the results 
with those presented in the 2006 Sustainability Report and considers the cost 
of delaying action. Chapter IV considers the effect that the economic crisis 
might have on sustainability and by presenting the effect that alternative post-
crisis macroeconomic scenarios might have. It considers the impact that 
consolidation in line with the existing medium term budgetary objectives 
would have, if undertaken once the economies are firmly in the recovery 
phase. Finally it presents a sensitivity analysis which considers how different 
underlying assumptions would affect the value of the S2 indicator. Chapter V 
discusses other factors that affect sustainability but which do not directly 
enter the calculation of the indicators. These are the additional risk of debt 
and the value of government assets, the level of pensions and the social and 
political risks that these may entail, the role of contingent liabilities and the 
implications that different levels of existing tax ratios have for governments' 
policy choices. Chapter VI presents an overall classification of countries 
according to the long-term sustainability risks that they face, while detailed 
data, and discussion of the results, for each Member State is set out in 
Chapter VII. 
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The crisis-related fiscal expansions and the ageing 
of European Union's population raise questions 
about the sustainability of the Member States' 
public finances. As the share of working age 
people in the population falls and the share of the 
old increases, economies are faced with lower 
economic growth and higher costs associated with 
providing services for the ageing population. This 
results in pressure on the public finances; bold 
measures will be necessary to ensure that they 
return to a sustainable footing before the full effect 
of ageing is felt. 
Sustainability relates to the ability of a government 
to assume the financial burden of its debt currently 
and in the future. While there is no one clear-cut 
definition of a sustainable fiscal position, this 
chapter defines two sustainability gap indicators 
which are most widely used in the EU to measure 
the sustainability challenges that Member States 
face. These are: 
The S1 indicator shows the durable adjustment to 
the current primary balance required to reach a 
target debt of 60% of GDP in 2060, including 
paying for any additional expenditure arising from 
an ageing population. 
The S2 indicator shows the durable adjustment of 
the current primary balance required to fulfil the 
infinite horizon intertemporal budget constraints, 
including paying for any additional expenditure 
arising from an ageing population. 
The sustainability indicators quantify the required 
permanent budgetary adjustment (e.g. a durable 
reduction of non age-related public expenditure as 
a share of GDP or a constant increase in public 
revenue as a share of GDP) to ensure the 
sustainability of the public finances. The 
sustainability indicators provide a firm basis to 
identify the size and the main source of risks to 
public finance sustainability in the EU Member 
States in a long-term perspective.  
They can be decomposed into a part that relates to 
the starting fiscal position and a part that relates to 
the additional costs of an ageing population. 
Decomposing them in this way gives additional 
information about the nature of the policy response 
that is appropriate. In particular, where the costs of 
ageing are a significant risk factor to the 
sustainability of the public finances, the case for 
reforming the social protection systems becomes 
strong. The sustainability indicators also provide 
information on the cost that would result from a 
delay in addressing the long-term sustainability 
issues.  
The analysis in this report uses the projected 
changes in age-related expenditure from the 
Commission and EPC’s 2009 Ageing Report. It 
considers the additional expenditure on pensions, 
healthcare and long-term care that population 
forecasts entail, as well as the potentially offsetting 
effect of changes to education expenditure and 
unemployment benefits. The different social 
protection structures and demographic trends of 
the Member States mean that such expenditure is 
expected to evolve in very different ways across 
countries. 
The analysis undertaken in this report takes the 
2009 fiscal position as a basis and projects the 
trajectory of the public finances on a partial 
equilibrium basis. All projections are done on a 
‘no policy change’ assumption, whereby it is 
assumed that already approved legislation 
continues to apply, but that most tax receipts and 
spending stay constant as a share of GDP over the 
long term. This assumption of unchanged polices 
over the whole projection period is not adopted for 
reasons of realism, but because it is the assumption 
that allows a robust assessment of the required 
remedial action to avoid that the EU public 
finances enter in an exponentially increasing debt 
spiral. 
1. DEFINING SUSTAINABILITY 
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1.1. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE SUSTAINABILITY 
OF THE PUBLIC FINANCES 
The concept of the sustainability of the public 
finances relates to the ability of a government to 
assume the financial burden of its debt currently 
and going forward. There is no clear-cut definition 
of a sustainable fiscal position, though the concept 
is rather intuitive. At a first instance it involves a 
debt level that does not entail – either now or in 
the foreseeable future – interest payments so large 
that they cannot be paid.  
A first way of writing down the widest definition 
of sustainability is to look at the solvency 
condition for the general government through the 
government’s inter-temporal budget constraint. (1) 
This considers the ability of the government to 
meet the costs of its debt through future revenues. 
The intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied if 
the projected outflows of the government (current 
public debt and the discounted value of all future 
expenditure, including the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure) are covered by the 
discounted value of all future government revenue. 
This is equivalent to saying that the government 
must run sufficiently large primary surpluses 
(receipts minus spending excluding interest 
payments) going forward to cover the cost of 
servicing its debt.  
The intertemporal budget constraint is most often 
considered over an infinite horizon with no 
implications about when the primary surpluses 
should be larger or smaller, nor what balance of 
expenditure and receipts they should be driven by. 
Nor does it imply that that the debt should stand at 
a particular finite value at any given point in time. 
As such it could, theoretically, be satisfied by very 
high levels of debt and, therefore, very high 
interest payments, in the short term or at any time 
horizon, as long as there is reason to believe that 
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where Dt0 is gross debt as a share of GDP in the year before 
the long-term projections, PBt is the structural primary 
balance (receipts minus spending excluding debt interest 
payments) at time t and r  is the differential between the 
nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP growth rate.  
sufficiently large primary surpluses will be 
achieved afterwards. 
While the infinite horizon gives a comprehensive 
picture of the sustainability of the public finances, 
it can prove weak from a policy point of view due 
to its lack of immediacy and raises issues of time 
consistency. Alternatively, a finite version of the 
budget constraint can be defined, by setting a 
target date and a target debt level and considering 
whether and how this can be achieved. The choice 
of target date reflects the aim of the exercise in 
terms of how it is expected to guide policy. By 
picking a short timescale, the requirements placed 
on the government are stronger as there is little 
possibility of adjusting the fiscal position in the 
future to ensure that this budget constraint is met, 
though some challenges (such as the demographic 
developments and potential growth after the target 
date) are disregarded. Conversely, the further away 
the target date, the more abstract the exercise 
becomes as a guide to policymakers, and the more 
relevant time consistency issues become. By 
choosing too high a target debt level, there is the 
possibility that sustainability is compromised in 
the period beyond the target date, while choosing 
too low a debt level can implicitly impose an 
undue burden on current taxpayers versus those in 
the more distant future. In this report, the target 
date is 2060 – ten years more than 2050, the target 
date in the Commission’s previous Sustainability 
Report. (2) The target level of debt is 60 % of 
GDP, which is the threshold for the general 
government gross debt in the EC Treaty. 
The analysis presented in this report aims to 
provide an estimate of whether the current 
budgetary position in the Member States presents a 
sustainability gap going forward, once the effects 
of an ageing population are taken into account. 
The analysis aims to aid the understanding of the 
choices the governments of the Member States 
face over the long term and to inform the debate 
about the magnitude of changes that need to be 
considered.  
(2) ‘Long-Term Sustainability of Public Finances in the EU,’ 
European Economy, 4/2006 and respective Commission 
communication , COM (2006) 574 final, 12 October 2006.  
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1.2. DEFINING THE SUSTAINABILITY 
INDICATORS 
In this report sustainability is assessed using 
current levels of gross government debt, the 
primary balance in structural terms (i. e. the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance and removing 
one-off transactions) and expected additional costs 
arising from ageing to see whether an infinite and 
a finite version of the intertemporal budget 
constraint are met. The greater the expected costs 
of ageing, the harder it is for the intertemporal 
constraints to be met, other things being equal, as 
the current primary balance will need to be 
sufficiently large to account for these additional 
future costs. Corresponding to each version of the 
budget constraint – over an finite or infinite 
horizon – two sustainability gap indicators are 
derived, showing the size of the permanent budget 
adjustment required to ensure that the constraints 
are met.  
The S1 indicator shows the durable adjustment to 
the structural primary balance required to reach a 
target debt of 60% of GDP in 2060, including 
paying for any additional expenditure from now to 
the target date, arising from an ageing population. 
The choice of the debt target for the S1 indicator is 
in line with the debt threshold in the Treaty. The 
timescale has been chosen to be long enough to 
allow the impact of ageing to be analysed in a 
meaningful way, while still remaining within the 
sights of current taxpayers and policy makers. 
The S2 indicator shows the adjustment to the 
structural primary balance required to fulfil the 
infinite horizon intertemporal budget constraint, 
including paying for any additional expenditure 
arising from an ageing population. 
1.3. INTERPRETING THE SUSTAINABILITY 
INDICATORS 
The sustainability indicators quantify the gap that 
must be closed to ensure the sustainability of the 
public finances. The larger the value of the gap 
indicators, the greater is the necessary adjustment 
to the structural primary balance to ensure 
sustainability. A negative value indicates that the 
intertemporal budget constraint is met; even 
deterioration in the primary balance could allow 
the constraint to be met. 
The indicators do not provide any guide as to how 
the adjustment should take place. Although  the 
sustainability indicators are sometimes referred to 
as tax gaps, the necessary adjustments could occur 
as result of an increase in government receipts 
(usually through higher direct or indirect taxes), a 
reduction in non age related spending, or through 
policy responses aimed at reducing the cost of 
ageing. The choice of measure, or combination of 
measures, may itself have an impact on the 
economy or on fiscal sustainability. For example, a 
large increase in the tax burden to fill the 
sustainability gap may itself lead to deterioration 
in the economy’s growth prospects, with 
consequences for sustainability. 
The sustainability gap indicators are one way of 
presenting the results of the sustainability analysis. 
An alternative would be to look at the future level 
of debt assuming no policy action in response to 
the sustainability imbalances. This exercise is also 
presented later in the report, showing a more 
cumulative or ‘stock assessment’ of the challenge 
faced by each Member State. 
The required primary balance (RPB) is another 
indicator used to present the sustainability 
situation. The RPB indicates the starting budgetary 
position which, if attained, ensures the 
sustainability of the public finances under no 
policy change assumptions. Unlike the S2 
indicator, it is a level for the budgetary position, 
rather than a gap. It is important to note that the 
RPB is not a static indicator. For a country that has 
reached its RPB (so with a S2 gap which is zero 
and which is projected to remain zero), the actual 
and required primary balance will progressively 
deteriorate given the increase in ageing-related 
expenditure, though sustainability is ensured. 
Where the actual (or planned for the medium term) 
budgetary balance is equal or more positive than 
the RPB, the public finances are sustainable. The 
opposite is true where the actual or planned 
budgetary balance is smaller or more negative than 
the RPB. In practice, the RPB is often calculated 
as the projected average structural primary balance 
over several years. In this report it is given for the 
first five years after the Commission Spring 2009 
forecast horizon (2011–15). Like the sustainability 
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gaps (S1 and S2), the RPB does not provide firm 
guidance on which policy measures (such as tax 
increases, spending cuts or reforms in social 
protection) are required to return to sustainable 
public finances. However, when the RPB is so 
large that it is not realistic, medium-term fiscal 
consolidation via tax or spending measures will 
not be enough and reform of the demographic-
driven spending categories (notably public 
pensions and healthcare) appear indispensable. 
1.4. OTHER CONCEPTS OF SUSTAINABILITY 
Depending on the public policy interest, other 
concepts of sustainability exist. For example, 
concepts of political or social sustainability or of 
inter-generational equity would be assessed using a 
different approach to that pursued in this report. 
Debt involves the deferral of payments to future 
taxpayers and restricts choice about how to spend 
the products of their labour and investment.  
Questions about inter-generational equity, 
therefore, also need to be considered by policy 
makers. It might, for example, be informative to 
look at the marginal benefit to future taxpayers of 
the expenditure financed through debt whose 
repayment may fall on them. For small economies 
outside the monetary union, the currency 
denomination of debt and whether debt is held 
internally or externally may also be important. 
Moreover, while a given level of debt may not be 
unbearable, the budgetary pressures caused by the 
debt burden can create political incentives for 
governments to default on their debt, either 
explicitly or through inflation. The EU, and in 
particular, the euro area countries, is well equipped 
to resist pressures to inflate away government 
debts. 
2. DERIVING THE SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS 
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The sustainability indicators, S1 and S2, show the 
gap between the current budgetary position 
expressed in terms of the structural balance and 
that required to ensure sustainability.  
Table II.2.1 breaks the indicators down into the 
three factors that the gap depends on, and the three 
corresponding components of the indicators. It 
shows that the initial budgetary position and the 
long term costs of ageing affect both indicators 
directly, while the S1 indicator is also directly 
affected by the starting level of debt relative to the 
60% target for 2060. In the results shown in later 
sections of this report, the contribution of these 
three components is considered in detail. 
2.1. REQUIRED ADJUSTMENT GIVEN THE 
INITIAL BUDGETARY POSITION 
Irrespective of the increase in government 
expenditure due to projected demographic 
developments, the public finances of a given 
country may be unsustainable if the initial 
structural primary balance, the projected interest 
payments and economic growth imply an ever 
increasing debt ratio. Thus, the first component of 
the S1 and S2 indicators corresponds to the gap 
between the initial structural primary balance and 
the debt-stabilising primary surplus. This 
component is referred to as the required 
adjustment given the initial budgetary position, or 
simply IBP. (3) 
In order to correctly account for the contribution of 
the budget balance at the starting year, it is 
important to consider the underlying fiscal 
position, rather than the actual value of the 
government surplus or deficit published by the 
statisticians. This means adjusting the starting 
balance for the effect of the business cycle and 
temporary measures, such as one-off expenditure 
(3) As the size of this component depends on expected growth 
and interest rates, it is not necessarily the case that it will 
have the same magnitude in the S1 and S2 indicators, as 
expected growth and interest rates might vary over time. 
However, in practice IBP (S1) an IBP (S2) are quite close 
to each other. Moreover, also because of the expected 
movements in growth and interest rates, including those of 
a cyclical nature, the concept of ‘debt stabilisation’ should 
be understood in a long-term perspective and not year by 
year. 
and revenues, to derive the structural balance. This 
report usually uses the forecasts for 2009, as 
published in the European Commission 2009 
spring Forecasts, for the starting position of the 
both the structural balance and debt level. 
Correctly estimating the structural balance requires 
an estimation of the position of the economic 
activity relative to its potential, the so-called 
output gap, and an estimation of the effect of the 
economic cycles on government revenues and 
spending. (4) Cyclical adjustment always entails a 
certain level of imprecision. However, under the 
current circumstances, with the European economy 
in the early phases of recovery after a deep 
financial and economic crisis, the inherent 
difficulties are unusually large. First, it is difficult 
to correctly judge the position of the output gap. In 
the light of possible structural changes, the 
potential output of today, as well as its trajectory in 
the future contains a substantial element of 
uncertainty. These factors act to compound the fact 
that tax elasticities tend to vary over the economic 
cycle and that they are implicitly affected by asset 
price changes which are difficult to model or 
predict. The nature of the crisis has been such that 
the element of uncertainty linked to judging the 
initial budgetary position and its contribution to 
sustainability over time is of particular 
significance.   
The forecast trajectory of economic growth over 
the medium- and long-term is a crucial factor in 
determining the impact of the initial budgetary 
position and debt on sustainability, and the 
required adjustment given the initial budgetary 
position. As this trajectory is particularly uncertain 
given the economic and financial crisis, Chapter 
IV derives alternative estimates for the 
sustainability indicators under alternative scenario.
(4) Cycles in assets prices may also be relevant in estimating 
the structural balance, though they are usually not 
considered explicitly in most structural adjustment 
methods. 
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2.2. THE DEBT REQUIREMENT BY 2060 
The starting level of debt enters the definition of 
both indicators through the initial budgetary 
position, as it determines the size of interest 
payments on government debt that must be 
covered. In the case of the S1 indicator only, the 
size of adjustment required also directly depends 
on the debt requirement set at end of the time
period (60% of GDP in 2060). For countries with
starting government gross debt above 60% of GDP
the required adjustment to reach the target debt by 
2060 (DR) term will increase the size of the
indicator as the effort of debt reduction by 2060
needs to be considered. For countries with current
debt of below 60%, the DR component will be 
negative and reduce the S1 indicator.  
The current financial and economic crisis, adds an
element of uncertainty to the DR estimate too. The 
estimates presented later in the report use debt
from 2009 as the base. Yet with the historically 
large deficit ratios being recorded in several
European countries, in some cases up to 10% of 
GDP, the increase in debt likely to be seen over the 
next couple of years could lead to very different
estimates of the contribution of the debt
component to the S1 indicator. Moreover, the
accumulation of financial assets – such as shares, 
other equity or loans, as part of the bail out of
banks and other entities heavily hit by the crisis –
by governments also implies that the government 
gross debts of several countries are increasing 
much faster than implicit by the deficit (5). 
2.3. THE REQUIRED ADJUSTMENT GIVEN THE 
INCREASE IN AGE-RELATED COSTS 
Finally, both S1 and S2 include a component 
which corresponds to the required adjustment due
to the long-term changes in government
expenditure (or simply, LTC). The third
component of both indicators is the additional
adjustment required as a result of these expenses 
either to 2060 or over an infinite horizon. The 
magnitude of the LTC component depends on both
the demographic outlook for countries and their
social protection arrangements. The LTC 
component represents either the change required to
pay for the additional expenses or the size of a 
structural reform (6) to social protection schemes 
to avoid the increase that would otherwise ensue. 
The size of this component is likely to vary
between the S1 and S2 indicators. The larger the
part of the expected ageing of the population that 
is to occur in the short- rather than medium-term 
(5) See European Commission (2009), ‘Public Finances in
EMU-2009’, chapter II-1, European Economy, 5, for more 
details on how government transactions to bail out banks
and other entities hit by the crisis are recorded in 
government accounts – in particular with respect to the 
government deficit and debt. See also Eurostat News 
Release 103/2009 of 15 July 2009: ‘The statistical 
recording of public interventions to support financial 
institutions and financial markets during the financial 
crisis.’  
(6) The size of a structural reform to social protection schemes
(such as public pensions and healthcare) means here the 
discounted sum of the spending savings implied by that 
reform.
Table I.2.1: Summarising the indicators 
 Required adjustment given the
initial budgetary position (IBP)
Required adjustment to reach
debt to GDP ratio of 60% in
2060 (DR)
Required adjustment due to
long-term changes in the 
primary balance (LTC)
S1= Gap to the debt-stabilising 
primary balance
+ Additional adjustment required 
to reach a debt target of 60% 
of GDP in 2060
+ Additional adjustment required 
to finance the increase in 
public expenditure due to
ageing up to 2060
S2= Gap to the debt-stabilising 
primary balance
+ 0 + Additional adjustment required 
to finance the increase in
public expenditure due to
ageing over an infinite horizon
Source: Commission services 
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future, the larger the impact on the S1 indicator 
relative to the S2 indicator. Conversely, if the costs 
of an ageing population are mainly borne closer to 
2060 than now, the larger the relative impact of 
ageing on the S2 indicator.  
The economic crisis has an impact on LTC in so 
far as the crisis leads to a durable fall in potential 
growth, and indirectly on several government 
outlay that somehow depend on growth. Moreover, 
the shock to asset prices and asset returns also 
impact on the net costs of providing pension for 
the pension schemes that control large assets. 
2.4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The decomposition of the indicators allows an 
analysis of the driving forces behind the results 
summarised by the indicators. The same overall 
sustainability gap may be the result of either the 
current fiscal position (see IBP), the level of debt 
(see DR) or the expected increase in ageing-related 
expenditure (see LTC). In relation to the latter, 
comparing LTC components in S1 and S2 (i.e. the 
finite- and infinite-horizon versions of the 
sustainability indicators) also allows identification 
of the urgency in addressing the demographic-
related sustainability issues. 
An optimal policy response requires an 
understanding of these issues. For example, a 
sustainability gap arising primarily from an 
imbalanced initial budgetary position being 
insufficient or one that is insufficient to stabilise 
debt might be easier to rectify politically through 
tax increases or spending cuts, than one due 
primarily to the costs of ageing. In the latter case, 
costs on government budgets might only become 
directly visible in the future and anticipatory 
remedial action may be more difficult to 
implement. The overall efficiency of fiscal 
consolidation approach (increasing taxes or cutting 
expenditure) or of approaches based on structural 
reforms of social protection also depends on the 
source (IBP, DR or LTC) of the sustainability 
imbalances. 
3. ESTIMATING THE COST OF AGEING 
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3.1. PROJECTING AGE-RELATED EXPENDITURE 
An ageing population puts pressure on a country’s 
finances primarily through its effects on the labour 
market and hence economic growth and age-
related expenditure. With fewer people being of 
working age, the potential growth rate of the 
economy is reduced. These changes affect each of 
the components of the S1 and S2 indicators, 
through changes in the estimated rate of economic 
growth.  
The direct costs of ageing involve increases in age-
related expenditure. This report uses the estimates 
of the fiscal impact of these changes as presented 
in the 2009 Ageing Report. (7) As the aim is to 
provide an estimate of the long-term effect on 
sustainability of ageing, the analysis takes the 
figures for age-related costs starting in 2010. The 
projections are made on a basis of no-policy 
change assumption where it is assumed that 
current tax and spending arrangements continue in 
the future. 
The Ageing Report considers the public cost of 
ageing using five expenditure categories. This 
report uses the projected changes to these 
categories to quantify the impact of ageing on the 
sustainability of the public finances. 
Public pensions' expenditure increases with an 
older population. This category consists of old age 
pensions and survivors' pensions, early retirement 
funding, various disability benefits and other items 
of public expenditure that provide support for 
those unable to work. The extent to which such 
expenditure increases depends on both the degree 
of ageing – the number of retirees and the average 
length in retirement, which is directly linked with 
longevity – but also very significantly on the 
retirement age and the structure of the pension and 
support systems in place. Such systems typically 
constitute a significant portion of the public 
budget, but their structures vary widely, in terms of 
(7) ‘2009 Ageing Report’ joint report of the European 
Commission and the EPC, European Economy, 2, and 
Commission Communication ‘Dealing with the Impact of 
an Ageing Population in the EU,’ COM (2009) 180 final, 
21 April 2009. 
their current generosity and of their dynamic 
properties.  
Healthcare expenditure is also affected by the 
age structure of the population and the way total 
health-related costs are split between the 
government, patients or private insurance bodies. 
However, the link between age and the cost of 
healthcare is much less linear than for pensions. 
Although there is evidence that the consumption of 
healthcare services by the elderly is substantially 
larger than that by prime-age adults, an increase in 
life expectancy is typically also accompanied by 
an increase in the average number of healthy years 
and so healthcare costs need not increase in a 
linear fashion. The reference scenario from the 
Ageing Report which is used in the baseline results 
in this report assumes that half the increase in life 
expectancy is spent in good health. 
Long-term care expenditure relates to the costs 
associated with helping people carry out daily 
living activities. This is also expected to increase 
with an ageing population. The increase depends, 
as with the healthcare expenditure, on the ‘quality’ 
of the ageing, but also crucially on the government 
support available for individuals less able to look 
after themselves. There is large variation between 
Member States in terms of their reliance on 
informal care (usually provided by family 
members) which might be difficult to maintain 
going forward. 
Education expenditure as a share of GDP tends 
to fall as the population ages, as young people 
make up a smaller share of the population.  In 
order to estimate the size of this change, the 
Ageing Report considers the impact of the change 
in the number of children and young people on 
total staff compensation, other costs (such as 
educational infrastructure) and the cost of direct 
and indirect transfers to students and their 
households. 
Unemployment benefits and other benefits for 
those outside the labour market are also expected 
to put relatively less pressure on government 
balances, as the higher dependency ratio is likely 
to result in lower levels of unemployment amongst 
labour market participants and greater incentives to 
participate in the labour market for working age 
individuals. 
Chapter I 
Sustainability of public finances 
The social protection systems in place determine 
how a change in the population translates into 
costs for government accounts. The projections 
used for the analysis are presented in Chapter II. 
Sensitivity scenarios in Chapter IV show the 
uncertainty involved in projections for these 
variables and the implications on the different 
measures of sustainability gaps. 
Neither the Ageing Report nor this report make 
any normative judgement about the efficiency or 
desirability of Member States' social protection 
systems – it merely assesses their expected costs. 
Nor are the second-order effects of these policies 
on the economy taken into account. For example, 
inadequate healthcare may reduce the labour 
market participation of individuals who might 
otherwise be able and willing to work to an older 
age. Higher education standards may require 
higher expenditure but increase the efficiency of 
labour force and potential output in the medium to 
long term. Inadequate provision of formal long-
term care may adversely effect the labour market 
participation of women, which in turn would have 
a knock-on effect on economic growth.  
3.2. A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
The sustainability indicators presented in this 
report are derived on the basis of a partial 
equilibrium analysis. A number of assumptions are 
therefore necessary for estimation to be possible. 
On the real side of the economy, the growth path 
uses the demographic profile to estimate future 
labour input by making assumptions about the total 
population, employment rate, the share of the 
working age population and the average hours 
worked. This is combined with assumptions about 
total factor productivity (TFP) and capital 
deepening to reach a forecast of potential GDP, 
using a production function approach. This 
depends on demographic developments (i.e. on 
working age population) but is exogenous relative 
to public finance and therefore fiscal policy 
developments. The growth projection does not, 
therefore, consider the impact that unsustainable 
fiscal policies or the increase in tax burden to close 
sustainability gaps may have on economic activity. 
In the same manner, the real interest rates are set in 
an exogenous manner at 3% for all Member States, 
irrespective of the government debt developments 
in the EU, the euro area and globally. 
3.3. UNCHANGED POLICY ASSUMPTION 
The projections assume that social protection 
arrangements remain unchanged going forward,  
and that nearly all government revenues and non-
age related expenditure stays constant as a share of 
GDP. This no-policy change assumption is a 
purely technical assumption. It does not mean that 
such a scenario is realistic. However it is a 
necessary assumption, given that the purpose of 
the exercise is to identify unsustainable fiscal 
policies and to measure the size of the required 
remedial action. 
Two components of government revenue form an 
exception to the constant share assumption.  
Projections for revenues from pension taxation and 
property income are modelled separately. In the 
former case it is because revenues from pension 
taxation as themselves a consequence of ageing. It 
is modelled using elasticities of personal income 
tax revenues with respect to the tax base. This is a 
technical improvement as compared to the 2006 
Sustainability Report where such modelling was 
not undertaken.  
Moreover, in the 2006 Sustainability Report 
property income was assumed to remain constant 
as a share of GDP. In addition no accumulation of 
financial assets (or other components of the stock-
flows adjustment (SFA)) were incorporated in the 
long-run so that the evolution of nominal debt was 
only driven by the actual government 
deficit/surplus. These two assumptions are, 
however, not mutually consistent. A constant ratio-
to-GDP of property income would have required a 
regular accumulation of financial assets, with 
implications for gross debt developments.  
Therefore the assumption of constancy of property 
income as ratio to GDP in the Sustainability 
Report of 2006 was, therefore, abandoned.  
The assumption of no accumulation of financial 
assets and, therefore, no SFA assumption is kept in 
this report. It implies that the nominal value of 
government-owned financial assets remains 
constant and so there is a decrease of the share of 
those assets in GDP.  Under the assumption that 
nominal returns on assets are constant over time, 
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property income from those assets also decreases 
as a share of GDP. This is clearly the case for 
interest-bearing assets (bonds) but also applies to 
shares and other equity. (8) 
The increases in age-related expenditure due to 
demographic change are added to a constant level 
of other public spending as a share of GDP. For 
the years beyond 2060 – the horizon of the 
available demographic projections – further 
assumptions are also necessary in relation to the 
infinite-horizon budgetary constraint and the S2 
indicator.  
(8) Returns on assets that are currently owned by government 
are recorded as property income, and therefore included in 
government revenue reducing the general government 
deficit. This is why the change in the primary balances 
implied by the property income projections is included in 
the required adjustment given the initial budgetary position 
(IBP) term of the sustainability indicators. More details on 
property income projections and revenue projections from 
pension taxation are included in an appendix. 
Beyond that year it is assumed that government 
revenue and primary expenditure, including age-
related expenditure, remain constant as a share of 
GDP, while interest payments evolve in line with 
debt developments. In so far as the EU population 
keeps ageing beyond 2060, this assumption 
implies underestimating the sustainability gap 
(S2), though the size of such a projection error is 
minimised by the discounting of all future flows. 
Chapter II 
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An increase in life expectancy, alongside a fall in 
fertility rates is leading to an accelerated ageing of 
the population in the EU and other parts of the 
world. Over the years to 2060, the time period 
covered by this report, the EU population is set to 
age further. Aside from the social consequences, 
population ageing has significant economic 
consequences due to a reduction in the working 
age population and an increase in government 
expenditure related to ageing. 
Population ageing is not a new phenomenon in the 
European Union. Already, increased life 
expectancy and falling fertility rates have led to a 
change in the demographic structure. Over the next 
50 years, the phenomenon of an ageing population 
is projected to intensify with life expectancy 
increasing by 7 years for women and 8 ½ years for 
men, on average. Alongside this, fertility rates are 
projected to pick up somewhat from their current 
level of 1.5 children per woman, to 1.6. They will 
therefore remain well below the stable population 
level of 2.1, thus contributing to a falling 
population. A continuation of net migration into 
the European Union should alleviate some of the 
effects of increased longevity and low birth rates, 
but this too is projected to slow, albeit with great 
uncertainty underpinning the projections. 
These changes in the population structure have 
significant economic consequences, stemming 
mainly from a reduction in the working age 
population and an increase in the number of 
elderly people requiring support. Overall, the old 
age dependency ratio defined as the population 
aged 65 or over as a percentage of the population 
aged 15 to 64, is projected to increase from 25% in 
2007 to 54% in 2060. In parallel, the number of 
individuals aged 15 to 64 is set to fall from 332 
million in 2007 to 283 million by 2060. 
A decrease in the number of people of working age 
reduces the potential economic growth rate of a 
country. For the EU – before considering any 
durable impact on medium- to long-term growth of 
crisis which is discussed in chapter IV – potential 
growth is forecast to fall from 2.4% per annum 
over 2007–20 to 1.3% over 2041–60. 
Aside from the effect on economic growth, an 
ageing population also entails additional 
government expenditure in terms of public 
provision of age-related transfers and services. The 
fiscal impact of ageing is therefore projected to be 
substantial in almost all Member States; these 
costs will accelerate significantly over the course 
of the next decade.  
An elderly population requires support in the form 
of pensions, healthcare and long-term care. Of 
these, old-age pension provision is currently the 
most significant budget item, although its share of 
GDP varies widely, ranging from 5% in Latvia to 
14% in Italy. By 2060, the Member States' public 
finances would face spending increases of 2.3 
percentage points of GDP, on average, on the basis 
of current pension structures. The size of the 
increase differs significantly across Member States 
and pension reforms enacted in a number of 
countries are bringing positive results in terms of 
expenditure containment and sustainability of 
public finances. Almost all Member States have 
tightened the eligibility requirements for receiving 
a public pension, mainly by raising the retirement 
age and restricting access to early retirement 
schemes.  
Once projected spending on healthcare and long-
term care has been added, and the decreases in 
unemployment benefit and education expenditure 
have been netted out, age-related expenditure over 
the EU is forecast to rise by 4½  percentage points 
of GDP by 2060, from a base of 23¼% of GDP 
(projected for 2010). However, while Poland is 
expecting a reduction in age-related expenditure, 
Greece and Luxembourg are forecast to have 
increases of over 15 percentage points of GDP, 
with all other countries lying between these two 
extremes. 
1. THE EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES 
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An increase in life expectancy, alongside a fall in 
fertility rates is leading to an accelerated ageing of 
the population in the EU and other parts of the 
world. Over the years to 2060, the time period 
covered by this report, the EU population is set to
age further. Aside from several social 
consequences, population ageing has significant 
economic consequences due to a reduction in the 
working age population and an increase in
government expenditure. 
This chapter looks at population projections that 
underpin this report and considers the way in
which they are likely to affect the economies of the 
Member States of the European Union.  
1.1. POPULATION AGEING 
Population ageing is a phenomenon that the 
Member States are already familiar with, but
whose consequences are yet to be felt in full force. 
Already, the European Union has experienced an
ageing of its population through an increase in life 
expectancy and a fall in fertility rates. This can be
seen in graphs II.1.1 and II.1.2. 
Graph II.1.1: Life expectancy at birth, 1960 to 2008, selected 
countries (males and females) 
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Graph II.1.1 shows life expectancy at birth for 
eight selected EU Member States from 1961 to 
2008. Although there is variation between
countries the overall trend is clear. The overall 
effect is set to intensify over the years to 2060, the 
years covered by this report. The figures
underpinning the analysis in this report are the 
Eurostat population projections EUROPOP 
2008. (9) 
Life expectancy is projected to continue changing
over the next 50 years (see Table II.1.1),
continuing the trend of increases in life expectancy 
in all Member States for several decades. Life 
expectancy at birth for women is projected to
increase from 82.1 years in 2008 to 89.0 years by
2060, while for men it is set to increase from 76.0 
years to 84.5. Overall, it is in countries that
currently have lower life expectancy that the
increase is projected to be greatest as the
projections assume a catching up in life
expectancy. 
Graph II.1.2: Fertility rates, 1960-2008, selected Member States 
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Fertility in the EU has declined sharply in past 
decades. The total fertility rate, defined as the 
average number of births per woman, has fallen 
from a ‘baby boom’ level of 2.5 in the late 1960s 
to 1.5 in 2008, on average for the EU as a whole. 
Graph II.1.2 shows the evolution of fertility rate in 
eight selected EU Member States over the years
1961 to 2008; the decline over the years is evident 
to see.  
(9) See Giannakouris, K. (2008), ‘Ageing characterises the 
demographic perspectives of the European societies’,
Eurostat Statistics in Focus, 78/2008..
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Table II.1.1: Demographic projections for the EU countries 
2008 2060 2008 2060 2008 2060 2008 2060
BE 1.8 1.8 82.3 88.9 76.7 84.4 0.5 0.2
BG 1.4 1.6 76.7 86.5 69.7 81.6 0.0 0.0
CZ 1.3 1.5 80.2 87.8 73.9 83.2 0.2 0.2
DK 1.9 1.9 81.0 88.4 76.4 84.3 0.2 0.1
DE 1.3 1.5 82.6 89.1 77.3 84.9 0.2 0.2
EE 1.6 1.7 78.7 87.5 68.0 80.8 0.0 0.0
IE 1.9 1.9 81.9 89.2 77.5 85.2 1.4 0.1
EL 1.4 1.6 82.6 88.7 77.4 84.8 0.4 0.2
ES 1.4 1.6 83.9 89.6 77.4 84.9 1.4 0.3
FR 2.0 1.9 84.3 90.1 77.5 85.1 0.2 0.1
IT 1.4 1.6 84.2 90.0 78.5 85.5 0.4 0.3
CY 1.5 1.6 81.7 88.7 78.2 85.2 1.2 0.4
LV 1.4 1.5 76.7 86.8 66.0 80.5 0.0 0.0
LT 1.4 1.5 77.4 86.9 65.9 80.5 -0.1 0.0
LU 1.7 1.7 81.2 88.5 76.3 84.5 0.9 0.4
HU 1.4 1.5 78.1 87.3 69.7 81.9 0.2 0.2
MT 1.4 1.6 81.1 88.6 76.0 84.3 0.2 0.2
NL 1.7 1.8 82.2 88.9 77.9 84.9 0.0 0.1
AT 1.4 1.6 82.9 89.2 77.4 84.9 0.4 0.2
PL 1.3 1.5 79.9 88.0 71.4 82.5 0.0 0.0
PT 1.4 1.5 82.4 88.8 75.8 84.1 0.5 0.3
RO 1.3 1.5 76.6 86.6 69.8 81.9 0.0 0.0
SI 1.3 1.5 81.9 88.8 74.7 83.7 0.3 0.1
SK 1.3 1.5 78.7 87.4 70.9 82.0 0.1 0.1
FI 1.8 1.8 83.1 89.3 76.1 84.3 0.2 0.1
SE 1.9 1.9 83.1 89.3 79.0 85.4 0.5 0.1
UK 1.9 1.8 81.5 88.9 77.4 85.0 0.3 0.1
EU-27 1.5 1.6 82.1 89.0 76.0 84.5 0.3 0.2
EA 1.5 1.7 82.3 89.0 76.6 84.6
Males
Life expectancy at birthFertility rate
Females(briths per woman)
Net annual migration flow (as 
% of population)
Source: Eurostat, EUROPOP 2008.
Graph II.1.3: Population pyramids (in thousands) for EU27 in 2008 and 2060
Source:   Eurostat, EUROPOP 2008
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The fertility rates for all the countries in the 
European Union are shown in Table II.1.1, 
including the Eurostat projections for 2060. It 
shows that in all countries in the EU, the fertility 
rate is currently below the population replacement 
rate of 2.1 (the fertility rate that keeps the 
population constant), but is set to increase in most 
countries, to reach a slightly higher average 
fertility rate of 1.6 by 2060. Despite the projected 
increase, fertility is projected to remain below the 
replacement rate for all countries.  
The third factor in population projections is 
migration. Over time, Europe has become a 
destination for migrants, although there have been 
marked differences in the trends between 
countries. While the large Western European 
countries were the traditional destinations for 
migrants, in recent years some traditional 
emigration countries in Southern Europe have 
become receiving countries, while many countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe are currently source 
and destination countries. 
Although migration flows are the hardest to 
predict, as they depend not only on the socio-
economic situation in the EU, but also in third 
countries, projections for net migration are also 
presented in Table II.1.1 By 2060, migration into 
the EU is set to fall from a net annual inflow of 
0.3% of the EU population to 0.2%. Overall, 
cumulative net migration is projected to add up to 
59 million people from 2008 to 2060, of which 46 
million are expected to arrive in the 16 countries 
that currently constitute the euro area. 
While the demographic developments differ from 
country to country the overall size of the EU 
population is projected to remain the same in 2060 
as today, due to the slight rebound in fertility and 
relatively dynamic immigration flows. The age 
distribution of the population is forecast to differ 
markedly however. 
The population distribution is shown in the age 
pyramids in Graph II.1.3, while the projected 
change of main population groups are shown in 
more detail by Member State in Graph II.1.4. 
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Graph II.1.4: Projected change of main population groups (in % change over the period 2008-2060)
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1.2. LABOUR FORCE PROJECTIONS 
The economic consequences of the expected 
change in population structure stem mainly from a 
reduction in the working age population and an 
increase in the number of elderly people requiring 
support. Overall, the old-age dependency ratio, 
defined as the population aged 65 or over as a 
percentage of the population aged 15 to 64, is 
projected to increase from 25% in 2007 to 54% in 
2060. In parallel, the number of individuals aged 
15 to 64 is set to fall from 331.9 million in 2007 to 
283.3 million by 2060. 
Graph II.1.5 shows the projected trajectory of the 
working age population and total employment for 
2007 to 2060. The figures come from the 2009 
Ageing Report, which calculates the economic 
consequences of an ageing population for the years 
until 2060. The data provided in that report forms 
the basis for analysis the impact of ageing on the 
public finances in this report. 
The graph shows that the working age population 
is forecast to increase until 2013 and then start to 
fall. The labour market participation rate is 
projected to increase from 70½% in 2007 to 74% 
in 2060 for the EU as a whole, most of which will 
materialise before 2020. The gap between male 
and female participation rates is expected to 
narrow gradually, especially in countries where it 
is currently large. Overall, employment rates are 
expected to increase from 65½% in 2007 to about 
70% in 2060. Within this total, the employment 
rate of older workers is expected to grow 
substantially as a result of reforms aimed at 
prolonging working life in many Member States, 
and the projected improvement in health 
conditions of those above 65. These reforms have 
been enacted to counter some of the increase in 
costs that will materialise as the population ages. 
Overall, however, employment in the EU is 
projected to shrink by about 19 million people by 
the year 2060. Increasing labour force participation 
rates in most countries and higher net immigration 
levels in some will only moderate the fall in 
employment due to the shrinking working age 
population over the period from 2020 to 2060. 
1.3. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND POTENTIAL 
GROWTH 
Economic growth is determined by the increase in 
the number of people in production and the 
increase in their productivity. A slow down or 
decrease in employment will therefore act to lower 
economic growth unless productivity accelerates.  
Graph II.1.6 shows the forecast for potential 
economic growth in the EU from 2007 to 2060, 
broken down into three time periods.  (10). In the 
baseline scenario, the forecast is for potential GDP 
growth to average 2.4% for the years 2007–20, of 
which 0.6% is due to the forecast increase in 
employment. Thereafter, the decrease in the 
working age population and employment acts to 
reduce GDP growth and the only source of 
economic growth will be productivity 
improvements. Of course, in the light of the 
financial crisis, the outlook for at least the short 
term is now likely to be considerably lower than 
the baseline.  
As a result of declining labour input, productivity 
will eventually be the only source of future 
economic growth. The assumption used in the 
potential GDP forecasts is that Member States' 
labour productivity growth would converge to a 
long-term historical average in the EU of 1¾% per 
annum, close to that recorded in the US and the 
EU over the very long term. As a result, the annual 
potential GDP growth rate would decline 
significantly on account of the shrinking working-
age population, which will act as a drag on growth 
and on per capita income. By the 2041–60 period, 
GDP growth is forecast to average 1.3% per 
annum. 
(10) The figures do not take account any durable impact of the 
financial crisis on medium- to long-term potential growth, 
which is discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
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Graph II.1.5: Population of working-age and total employment, EU27 
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Graph II.1.6: Decomposition of GDP growth, EU27, ( annual average growth rate) 
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Graph II.1.6 also shows GDP growth per capita. It 
shows that over the three time periods displayed, 
this goes from being lower than overall growth 
until 2020, to being higher after 2040. This is 
because the overall population falls and results in 
living standards growing by more than the 
headline GDP growth figures indicate.   
1.4. BUDGETARY PROJECTIONS 
Aside from the effect on economic growth, an 
ageing population also entails additional 
government expenditure in terms of public 
provision of age-related transfers and services. The 
fiscal impact of ageing is therefore projected to be 
substantial in almost all Member States; these 
costs will accelerate significantly over the course 
of the next decade.  
In the absence of changes to policy, public pension 
expenditure is projected to increase significantly in 
most Member States due to the demographic 
trends with more people retiring and spending 
more years in retirement thanks to the increase in 
longevity. However, pension reforms enacted in a 
number of Member States are bringing positive 
results in terms of expenditure containment and 
sustainability of public finances. Almost all 
Member States have tightened the eligibility 
requirements for receiving a public pension, 
mainly by raising the retirement age and restricting 
access to early retirement schemes. Reforms are 
also leading to a gradually smaller share of public 
pension benefits in overall pension provision. 
Alongside reforming public pensions systems, 
many countries have introduced, and/or are 
planning to expand, supplementary funded pension 
schemes. Overall, public pension spending is set to 
increase by 2.3 percentage points GDP by 2060, 
from a base of 10.2% of GDP. This is shown in 
Table II.1.2 along with the change to other age-
related expenditure items and their projected levels 
from 2010 on. 
As Table II.1.2 shows, public expenditure on 
health care is projected to grow by 1.4 percentage 
points of GDP in the EU by 2060 from a base of 
just under 7% of GDP. The increase in living 
standard conditions is an important driver of 
healthcare costs, affecting the demand for 
healthcare mainly through higher expectations on 
quantity and quality of care to be provided or 
financed by government.  
Analysis of past trends in healthcare expenditure 
suggests that technological developments – new 
and better treatments (11) – are responsible for a 
significant part of overall costs growth, which may 
result in a significant increase in spending which is 
not fully captured in the projection. (12) However, 
technological advancement may also have positive 
effects on reducing costs of medical treatments 
through efficiency gains (faster and better 
treatments). There is large uncertainty as to which 
factor will dominate in the future.  
Based on current policies, public spending on 
long-term care is projected to increase by 1.1
percentage points of GDP by 2060 due to the fact 
that the very old (aged 80+) will be the fastest 
growing age class of the population in the future. 
But there are upside risks to these costs due to 
changes in family structures, higher labour force 
participation of women and increased geographical 
mobility.  
Public expenditure on education is also in part 
determined by demographics. The baseline 
scenario suggests a small decrease in the public 
education expenditure ratio over the projection 
period results solely from changes in the 
demographic composition (fewer children in the 
future). However, aside from demographic factors, 
other factors also affect education spending and it 
may be that ambitions to increase attainment 
dominate the savings that demographics can offer. 
(11) Of course, these new and better treatments are also one of 
the reasons explaining the increases in longevity over the 
last decades and projected for the future.
(12) Sensitivity tests in the 2009 Ageing Report suggest that 
increases in health care expenditure as a share of GDP 
could be as much as four times higher than in the baseline 
scenario which is presented above over 2010–60. 
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The projections on unemployment benefit 
expenditure are based solely on the evolution of 
the unemployment rates, which stem from the 
macroeconomic and labour market assumptions. In
the EU, expenditure on unemployment benefits is 
projected to fall from 0.8% of GDP in 2007 to
0.6% of GDP in 2060, though large fluctuations
may be expected over such a long period. This
reduction is mainly driven by the assumption that
unemployment rates in all countries with 
unemployment rates above the EU15 average
would converge to the EU15 average by 2020. 
Indeed, after 2020, only small changes are
projected.    
Overall, on the basis of current policies, age-
related public expenditure is projected to increase 
on average by 4.3 percentage points of GDP by
2060 in the EU – especially through pension,
healthcare and long-term care spending. There are
however marked differences in the impact of 
ageing across Member States: 
• The increase in government spending in 
ageing-related categories is likely to be very 
significant (7 percentage points of GDP or
more) in nine EU Member States 
(Luxembourg, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and 
Ireland), although for some countries the large 
increase will be from a fairly low level. 
• For a second group of countries – Belgium,
Finland, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
the United Kingdom, Germany and Hungary – 
the cost of ageing is more limited, but still very 
high (between 4 and 7 percentage points of
GDP). 
• Finally, the increase is more moderate, 4
percentage points of GDP or less, in Bulgaria, 
Sweden, Portugal, Austria, France, Denmark, 
Italy, Latvia, Estonia and Poland. Most of these 
countries have implemented substantial
pension reforms, in several cases also involving 
a partial switch to private funded pension 
schemes (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Poland,
and Sweden). 
The projected increase for the EU as a whole is
slightly higher than in the long-term 
projections, considered in the 2006 
Table II.1.2: Increase in age-related expenditure, 2010-2060, % of GDP 
2010
Change
2010 to 
2060 2010
Change
2010 to 
2060 2010
Change
2010 to 
2060 2010
Change
2010 to 
2060 2010
Change
2010 to 
2060
BE 10.3 4.5 7.7 1.1 1.5 1.3 7.3 -0.3 26.8 6.6
BG 9.1 2.2 4.8 0.6 0.2 0.2 3.0 0.2 17.1 3.2
CZ 7.1 4.0 6.4 2.0 0.2 0.4 3.3 0.0 17.0 6.3
DK 9.4 -0.2 6.0 0.9 1.8 1.5 8.0 0.1 25.2 2.2
DE 10.2 2.5 7.6 1.6 1.0 1.4 4.6 -0.4 23.3 5.1
EE 6.4 -1.6 5.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 3.2 0.3 14.8 -0.1
IE 5.5 5.9 5.9 1.7 0.9 1.3 5.3 -0.2 17.5 8.7
EL 11.6 12.5 5.1 1.3 1.5 2.1 3.8 0.1 21.9 16.0
ES 8.9 6.2 5.6 1.6 0.7 0.7 4.8 -0.2 20.0 8.3
FR 13.5 0.6 8.2 1.1 1.5 0.7 5.8 -0.2 29.0 2.2
IT 14.0 -0.4 5.9 1.0 1.7 1.2 4.3 -0.2 26.0 1.6
CY 6.9 10.8 2.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 5.8 -0.6 15.5 10.7
LV 5.1 0.0 3.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 3.3 0.3 12.3 1.3
LT 6.5 4.9 4.6 1.0 0.5 0.6 3.5 -0.4 15.1 6.0
LU 8.6 15.3 5.9 1.1 1.4 2.0 4.0 -0.3 19.9 18.2
HU 11.3 2.6 5.8 1.3 0.3 0.4 4.5 -0.3 21.8 4.0
MT 8.3 5.1 4.9 3.1 1.0 1.6 5.0 -0.7 19.2 9.2
NL 6.5 4.0 4.9 0.9 3.5 4.6 5.6 -0.2 20.5 9.4
AT 12.7 1.0 6.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 5.2 -0.2 25.7 3.3
PL 10.8 -2.1 4.1 0.8 0.4 0.7 3.8 -0.6 19.1 -1.1
PT 11.9 1.5 7.3 1.8 0.1 0.1 5.6 -0.4 24.9 2.9
RO 8.4 7.4 3.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 -0.2 14.7 8.5
SI 10.1 8.5 6.8 1.7 1.2 1.7 5.1 0.7 23.1 12.7
SK 6.6 3.6 5.2 2.1 0.2 0.4 2.9 -0.6 14.9 5.5
FI 10.7 2.6 5.6 0.8 1.9 2.5 6.4 0.0 24.7 5.9
SE 9.6 -0.2 7.3 0.7 3.5 2.2 6.6 0.0 27.1 2.7
UK 6.7 2.5 7.6 1.8 0.8 0.5 4.0 0.0 19.2 4.8
EU-27 10.2 2.3 6.8 1.4 1.3 1.1 4.9 -0.2 23.2 4.6
EA 11.2 2.7 6.8 1.3 1.4 1.3 5.0 -0.2 24.5 5.1
TotalPension spending Healthcare Long-term care Unemployment benefitsand education
Source:  Commission services, EPC.
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Sustainability Report, in part due to the 
extension of the projection horizon from 2050 
to 2060. 
At Member State level, large downward 
revisions in the budgetary impact of ageing 
have occurred since the 2006 Sustainability 
Report in Portugal, Hungary, Denmark and the 
Czech Republic (reflecting the impact of 
pension reforms).  
By contrast, large upward revisions are 
reported in Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Estonia, Austria, Poland and Lithuania 
(reflecting primarily revised projected changes 
in pension expenditure stemming from reform 
reversals and improved modelling 
techniques) (13). 
(13) In the case of Greece, the large upward revisions are due to 
the data not being available in time for the previous report. 
Note also that the cases of Bulgaria and Romania were not 
considered in the 2006 report. 
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This chapter presents the baseline results of the 
sustainability analysis. The S2 indicator shows a 
sustainability gap of 6.5% of GDP for the 
European Union overall, while the S1 shows a gap 
of 5.8%. However there is considerable variation 
between Member States. While nearly all EU 
countries display sustainability gaps on both 
indicators, Denmark and Hungary display no 
sustainability gaps, and Bulgaria only displays a 
sustainability gap on the S2, but not on the S1 
measure. 
According to the S2 indicator, of the 25 Member 
States that display a gap, around a fifth require an 
adjustment of below 4% of GDP, a further half 
below 8% and a third between this and 15% of 
GDP. 
Most countries have sustainability gaps as a result 
of both an unfavourable starting position for the 
public finances and due to the projected increase in 
the cost of ageing. However, a fifth of countries 
have an underlying fiscal position which would be 
sustainable over the long term, were it not for the 
projected increase in age-related expenditure. On 
average, ½ of the gap is due to the initial fiscal 
position and another ½ due to the projected 
increase in age-related expenditure.  
The sustainability gap indicators show the size of 
the permanent adjustment that is required to keep 
the public finances sustainable. Not making this 
adjustment would have the short to medium-term 
effect of increasing debt, before serious 
sustainability concerns start affecting countries' 
abilities to raise debt as the perceived long-term 
risks increase.  
In the absence of an adjustment, by 2060 the EU 
government debt-to-GDP ratio could be more than 
seven times larger than it is now. 
In 2006 the first Commission’s Sustainability 
Report was published. The S2 sustainability gap 
was 3.4% of GDP for the 25 Member States 
considered in that report, some 3.1 points lower 
than in the current report. Aside from some 
methodological changes, and fresher long-term 
projections, the recent deterioration in the 
government deficits and debt levels explains most 
of the worsened sustainability gaps. 
It is clear that Member States will need to address 
the challenges posed by the sustainability gaps. 
Depending on the size and the cause of their gaps, 
Member States will need to find some combination 
of structural reforms of their social protection 
system that result in a reduction in the cost of 
ageing, an increase in tax or a reduction in 
spending. Aside from choosing the optimal way of 
addressing the anticipated hole in their public 
finances, the timing of policy action is also 
important, all the more as fiscal policy is playing 
an important role in pulling the economy out of the 
crisis. On average, delaying the response by 5 
years increases the gap by 0.5 points of GDP, but 
this cost of delay is much more severe for a 
number of Member States. This represents 
additional measures that must be introduced and 
permanently maintained.  
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This Section presents the results of the 
sustainability analysis in terms of the S1 and S2 
indicators and their respective components, as 
described in Chapter I.  
1.1. THE QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS 
Table III.1.1 shows estimates of the sustainability 
gap indicators S1 and S2 and decomposes them 
into their constituent parts. These are: (i) the 
required adjustment given the initial budgetary 
position (IBP), which gives the gap between the 
structural primary balance in 2009 and the long-
term debt-stabilising budget balance; (ii) the 
required adjustment given the long-term change in 
the budgetary position due to the costs of ageing 
(LTC), and (iii), the adjustment necessary to reach 
the debt target of 60% of GDP in 2060. The 
overall change to the share of GDP to be spent on 
age-related expenditure in 2060 relative to 2010 is 
also shown, as is the structural primary balance for 
2008 and 2009. 
The S2 indicator shows a sustainability gap of 
6.5% of GDP for EU-27 and of 5.8% of GDP for 
the Euro Area. This is the permanent adjustment in 
the primary balance necessary to meet the 
intertemporal budget constraint over an infinite 
horizon. The S1 indicator shows a sustainability 
gap for the EU-27 countries and for the Euro Area, 
of 5.4% and 4.8% of GDP respectively.  
The decomposition results show that for the EU-27 
countries, the IBP is responsible for 3.3 percentage 
points (p.p.) of the S2 gap and 3.1 p.p. for the S1 
gap. This means that even without taking into 
account the cost of ageing – that is, assuming that 
age-related expenditure in government accounts 
remained constant as a share of GDP – European 
countries would have to tighten their fiscal stances, 
in terms of the structural primary balance, by an 
average of 3.3% of GDP for their public finances 
to return to a sustainable path. 
LTC contributes 3.2 p.p. to the S2 gap and 2.0 p.p. 
to the S1 gap, with the figures being 3.5 p.p. and 
2.4 p.p. respectively for the Euro Area. This shows 
that the projected increase in ageing-related costs 
has a significant impact on the sustainability 
position of each. 
For the S1 gap, the DR adds a required adjustment 
of 0.2 p.p. for the EU-27 and 0.3 p.p. for the Euro 
Area.  
The table also shows the absolute increase in age-
related expenditure until 2060. Overall, for the 
EU-27, age related expenditure is expected to be 
4.4 percentage points of GDP higher in 2060 
relative to 2010 and 4.8 percentage points higher 
for the Euro Area. This is higher than the impact of 
the LTC due to the discounting of future flows and 
time-profile of the age-related expenditure, in 
particular the fact that moderate increases in 
expenditure are expected in the early years of the 
projection. The difference between the projected 
increase in age-related expenditure and the LTC 
component of the sustainability gaps is also related 
to the relationship between the long-term real 
growth rates and the assumption on real interest 
rates.  
Within the aggregates there are significant 
differences across Member States both in terms of 
the indicators and their constituent components. 
While nearly all EU countries display 
sustainability gaps on both indicators, Denmark 
and Hungary display no sustainability gaps, and 
Bulgaria only displays a sustainability gap on the 
S2, but not the S1 measure. In Bulgaria's case this 
is because its low debt allows some leeway in 
dealing with the costs of ageing through an 
increase in this debt and because the cost of ageing 
is higher in the more distant future, thus having a 
larger impact on S2 than on S1. 
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According to the S2 indicator, of the 25 Member 
States that display a sustainability gap, around a 
fifth require an adjustment of below 4% of GDP, a
further half below 8% and a third between this and
15% of GDP. In terms of the S1 indicator, of the 
24 Member States with a sustainability gap, around 
a quarter require an adjustment of  below 3½% of
GDP, a further half between 3½ and 6½% and a
quarter between this and 12½% of GDP. Broadly, 
the countries displaying significant sustainability 
gaps on one measure, also display it on the other
and, in all cases except Italy, (14) the sustainability
gap is greater according to the S2 than the S1 
indicator. 
(14) Due to a series of reforms since 1992 to its pension system,
Italy is facing a relatively low increase in the cost of ageing 
with little difference between the LTC contribution to S1 
and S2, but faces a high S1 due to its high debt ratio. The 
long-term projections for Italy assume, however, that all 
legislated changes in the pension system will be duly
implemented as planned.
1.2. A GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE 
SUSTAINABILITY GAP (S2) 
Table III.1.1 shows the decomposition of the S1
and S2 indicators into their constituent components 
(IBP, DR and LTC). Using the data for the S2
indicator, Graph III.1.1 depicts the contribution of
the IBP and the LTC components. 
The further along the horizontal axis countries are,
the larger the required adjustment to stabilise the 
debt ratios given the initial budgetary position
(IBP), before considering the long-term costs of
ageing. The higher up the vertical axis, the greater 
the required adjustment due to the long-term 
change in age-related costs (LTC). The
sustainability gap (S2) is the sum of the vertical
and horizontal distances from each dot to the solid 
diagonal line. Countries that are northeast of the 
solid diagonal line have a sustainability gap; the 
further away from that line, the greater their gap. 
Countries that lie southwest of the solid line (in the 
chart Denmark and Hungary only) have
sustainable public finances, the ageing population 
notwithstanding. The dotted diagonals are ‘isogap’
lines: two countries located on the same line have
the same sustainability gap (S2) over an infinite
Table III.1.1: Results of the sustainability gap calculations in the baseline scenario (% of  GDP) 
Structural Structural Change
primary balance primary balance in age-related 
2008 2009 expenditure Total IBP* DR* LTC* Total IBP* LTC*
BE 1.5 0.7 5.9 4.5 0.5 0.6 3.5 5.3 0.6 4.8
BG 1.0 1.1 3.2 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 0.6 0.9 -0.6 1.5
CZ -2.3 -2.9 6.3 5.3 3.6 -0.3 1.9 7.4 3.7 3.7
DK 5.6 2.8 1.0 -0.6 -1.9 -0.5 1.8 -0.2 -1.6 1.4
DE 1.6 0.6 5.1 3.1 0.8 0.2 2.1 4.2 0.9 3.3
EE -3.9 -0.6 -0.1 0.3 1.0 -0.6 -0.2 1.0 1.1 -0.1
IE -6.4 -7.6 8.7 12.1 8.2 0.2 3.7 15.0 8.3 6.7
EL -2.1 -0.9 16.0 10.8 2.4 0.7 7.7 14.1 2.6 11.5
ES -2.4 -5.2 8.0 9.5 5.9 -0.1 3.6 11.8 6.1 5.7
FR -1.5 -2.7 2.1 5.5 3.8 0.4 1.4 5.6 3.8 1.8
IT 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.9 -0.2 0.7 1.4 1.4 -0.1 1.5
CY 2.9 0.2 10.7 4.6 0.2 -0.3 4.7 8.8 0.5 8.3
LV -4.9 -8.1 1.3 9.4 8.8 -0.2 0.9 9.9 8.9 1.0
LT -4.5 -3.1 6.0 5.4 3.7 -0.3 2.0 7.1 3.9 3.2
LU 2.3 1.2 16.2 6.2 -0.6 -0.8 7.5 12.5 -0.4 12.9
HU -0.3 3.1 3.3 -1.1 -1.9 0.4 0.4 -0.1 -1.6 1.5
MT -1.6 -0.2 9.2 4.7 1.1 0.2 3.4 7.0 1.4 5.7
NL 1.7 0.0 6.7 5.2 1.6 0.0 3.7 6.9 1.9 5.0
AT 0.8 -0.2 4.0 3.8 1.5 0.2 2.2 4.7 1.6 3.1
PL -3.1 -3.1 -1.2 2.9 4.2 0.0 -1.2 3.2 4.4 -1.2
PT -0.9 -2.4 2.8 4.7 3.4 0.3 1.0 5.5 3.7 1.9
RO -7.2 -3.7 8.5 6.9 4.1 -0.4 3.2 9.1 4.3 4.9
SI -1.3 -3.3 12.5 9.2 3.8 -0.3 5.7 12.2 3.9 8.3
SK -3.5 -3.7 5.5 5.7 4.3 -0.3 1.6 7.4 4.5 2.9
FI 4.3 2.1 5.4 2.6 -0.8 -0.3 3.7 4.0 -0.5 4.5
SE 3.4 0.9 2.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 0.8 1.8 0.2 1.6
UK -3.3 -7.8 4.8 10.8 8.6 0.2 2.0 12.4 8.8 3.6
EU27 -0.4 -2.0 4.4 5.4 3.1 0.2 2.0 6.5 3.3 3.2
EA 0.2 -0.9 4.8 4.8 2.1 0.3 2.4 5.8 2.3 3.5
S1 S2
* IBP = required adjustment given the  initial budgetary position, DR =  adjustment to reach the debt requirement (60% of GDP) in 2060, LTC = 
required adjustment given the long-term change in the primary balance due demographic ageing.
Source: Commission services 
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horizon, though they may have different initial
budgetary positions and different ageing-related 
costs. 
Most Member States are in the top right quadrant, 
showing that their sustainability gap is due to the 
compounding effects of an unfavourable initial
fiscal position and an increase in the budgetary 
cost of ageing. Countries in the top left quadrant 
have a favourable initial budgetary position in 
2009 thanks to the consolidation efforts of
previous years. However for most of them this
initial position is not enough given the expected 
long-term increase in expenditure. 
Only Denmark and Hungary have an initial fiscal 
position that is favourable enough to absorb the
expected increase in costs related to ageing. 
However, the recent consolidation efforts in 
Hungary must be pursued in coming years in order
to reduce its government debt ratio. Finally, 
Estonia and Poland are in the bottom right 
quadrant; that means that they have a sustainability 
gap which is caused by an unfavourable initial
fiscal position, but which is reduced by a projected
decrease in age-related spending. 
1.3. THE LONG TERM BUDGETARY COST OF 
AGEING 
The LTC component shows significant differences
between Member States in terms of the budgetary 
impact of ageing until 2060 and indefinitely. As 
worked out for the infinite horizon, its impact
ranges from a margin of 1.2% of GDP in Poland 
because of the long-term reduction in expenditure,
to a required adjustment of 12.9% in Luxembourg
because of the increase in ageing-related spending.  
Overall, the LTC components of the sustainability 
gap lies under 2% of GDP for ten Member States 
(Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Italy, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Sweden, France and Portugal). Nine 
Member States face a budgetary impact of between 
2% and 5% of GDP (Slovakia, Austria, Lithuania,
Germany, the United Kingdom, the Czech
Republic, Finland, Belgium and Romania). The
remaining eight countries (the Netherlands Malta, 
Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, Slovenia, Greece and 
Luxembourg) have a LTC of 5% of GDP or above, 
with the costs incumbent on Greece and 
Luxembourg representing 11.5 and 12.9% of GDP,
respectively.  
Chapter II decomposed the contribution of pension 
spending, healthcare, long-term care, education 
Graph III.1.1: Decomposition of the S2 indicator 
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and unemployment benefits on the projected 
increase in spending. Overall, however, the 
Member States facing high expected costs do so 
primarily on the basis of the high costs of their 
pension systems – with the exception of the 
Netherlands, where the projected change in 
pension spending contribute 4 p.p. points of GDP 
to the increase in spending, while long term care is 
expected to increase by 5.8 p.p. of GDP. The 
countries with the largest projected increases in 
pension-related expenditure are those have so far 
introduced at best modest reforms to their pension 
systems.  
In all Member States (except Denmark), the LTC 
has a larger impact on the S2 than the S1 indicator. 
As this is due to the time profile of the costs of 
ageing, it indicates that the budgetary impact of 
ageing is back loaded and may likely continue 
increasing for some time after 2060. In Denmark's 
case, the time profile leads to age-related 
government expenditure reaching its maximum in 
2025 and starting to decline after 2045. For other 
countries, the structure of ageing and the social 
protection arrangements in Member States drive 
the higher contribution to S2 than S1 of the LTC 
component. Other things being equal, countries 
that are due to undergo most of their ageing in the 
near future do not show as large a disparity 
between the contribution of ageing on the two 
indicators. Equally, the institutional setup in place 
plays a crucial role as to how the ageing translates 
into costs, with a flatter profile for countries whose 
pension arrangements limit costs to the 
government sector. 
1.4. THE INITIAL BUDGETARY POSITION 
Aside from the long-term costs of ageing (LTC) 
the current budgetary and debt position also 
contribute to the sustainability gap for a majority 
of countries. According to the initial budgetary 
position (IBP) component of both S2 and S1 
indicators and the debt requirement (DR) (15) for 
S1, only one fifth of Member States have an initial 
fiscal position which would be sustainable if long-
(15) The initial level of debt enters the IBP term, as it 
determines the required primary surplus to service it. 
However, it also directly enters the S1 indicators through 
the additional effort required to bring debt to 60% of GDP 
by 2060. 
term costs were left aside. Another third require an 
adjustment of up to around 3% of GDP to the 
structural public balance to place their public 
finances on a sustainable path, even before 
considering the long-term budgetary impact of an 
ageing population. The remaining Member States 
have an initial fiscal position that would require an 
even greater adjustment. 
According to the IBP component of S2 indicator, 
for the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia Slovakia and Romania, the 
required correction is in the region of 3 to 5% of 
GDP. For Spain it is slightly above 6% of GDP, 
while Latvia, UK and Ireland – given their very 
large structural imbalances in 2009 – require 
adjustments of over 8% of GDP.  
The IBPs are calculated using the budgetary 
position of 2009 – drawn from the European 
Commission spring forecasts (16) from May 2009. 
– as starting point. As discussed in Chapter I, the 
structural primary balance is used in the 
calculation of the sustainability gap indicators. 
This removes the estimated effect of the economic 
cycle from the primary balance and also removes 
the effect of one-off measures. Some of the 
automatic effect of the economic crisis on budgets 
is therefore stripped out of from the data. 
However, structural adjustment can only be 
undertaken imperfectly and this is particularly the 
case in the middle of such unprecedented 
economic times. In so far as the crisis leads to a 
durable reduction in economic activity and growth, 
the structural deficit and sustainability gaps could 
be underestimated. However, on the other hand, 
some of temporary stimulus measures adopted by 
government may have not been properly filtered 
out when estimating the structural deficits and may 
currently appears as deteriorating the structural 
deficits.  
(16) European Economy, 3 (4 May 2009). 
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While the long-term consequences of the crisis on
the economies and public finances of the EU
Member States are still unclear, the debt and 
deficit figures that contribute to deriving the IBP 
and DR indicators, as well as the growth and other
assumptions going forward are therefore liable to 
change. Alternative scenarios for the
macroeconomic environment and its consequences
are presented in Chapter IV. 
In order to look at the role of the initial structural 
balance in more detail, Table III.1.2 shows how
this has changed in recent years. The first column
shows the average for the 2004-09 period, the 
second the absolute difference and finally the 2008 
outturn, and forecasts for 2009 and 2010. Overall 
just under one quarter of Member States have
improved their structural balance, and on average 
the structural balance for the EU-27 and for the
Euro Area countries deteriorated by 1.5 and 0.9 
percentage points of GDP respectively between
2004 and 2008. 
Amongst Member States with a deterioration in the 
structural balance, Bulgaria, Denmark, Portugal
and Sweden have had a loosening of under 1 p.p.
of GDP between 2004 and 2008; Belgium, France, 
Lithuania, Netherlands and Finland between 1 and
2 p.p. of GDP; the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Austria, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia 2 and 5
p.p. and Ireland, Spain, Latvia and UK over 5 p.p. 
of GDP. According to the IBP component, most of 
these countries have large sustainability gaps, 
indicating that this loosening has been an
important contributor to the fiscal adjustment that 
needs to occur for sustainability to be ensured in
the future. This can also be seen by observing the 
size of the structural balance in Table III.1.2 as the
link between the initial structural primary balance 
and the sustainability indicators is direct – a 
change in the structural balance feeds into an
equivalent increase or decrease into the
sustainability gap indicator. Conversely, a number 
of countries, and in particular Hungary and
Cyprus, have strengthened their structural balances
significantly. 
Table III.1.2: Government structural balances (% of GDP) 
2004-2009 average
Difference between 
2009 and 2004 2008 out-turn 2009 forecast 2010 forecast
BE -1.8 -1.9 -2.2 -3.2 -4.0
BG 1.0 -0.4 0.2 0.3 1.6
CZ -3.1 -2.2 -3.4 -4.0 -3.7
DK 3.1 -0.9 4.2 1.2 -0.4
DE -2.2 1.1 -1.2 -2.4 -3.9
EE -0.8 -3.0 -4.1 -1.0 -1.9
IE -2.6 -10.2 -7.5 -9.8 -12.2
EL -5.8 2.8 -6.5 -5.7 -4.7
ES -0.9 -7.5 -3.9 -6.8 -8.2
FR -4.2 -1.4 -4.3 -5.5 -5.5
IT -3.8 2.4 -3.4 -2.6 -2.8
CY -1.5 2.9 0.1 -2.1 -2.1
LV -4.4 -8.1 -5.8 -9.5 -11.5
LT -3.1 -1.8 -5.2 -4.3 -5.5
LU 0.3 1.4 2.0 0.6 0.1
HU -6.4 5.4 -4.5 -1.7 -2.0
MT -4.1 2.2 -4.9 -3.6 -2.8
NL -0.8 -1.5 -0.5 -2.6 -4.3
AT -1.8 -2.8 -1.8 -3.2 -3.8
PL -4.9 0.0 -5.3 -6.0 -5.6
PT -4.5 -0.5 -3.8 -5.5 -5.1
RO -4.1 -3.3 -7.9 -5.2 -4.7
SI -2.3 -3.2 -2.5 -4.9 -5.2
SK -3.5 -3.1 -4.7 -5.0 -4.7
FI 2.5 -1.8 2.8 0.8 -0.7
SE 0.8 -0.3 1.7 -0.5 -1.9
UK -5.1 -6.1 -5.6 -10.0 -12.2
EA-16 -2.7 -0.9 -2.8 -3.9 -4.7
EU-27 -3.0 -1.5 -3.1 -4.6 -5.5
Structural balance
Source: Commission services 
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It is now evident that the fiscal deficits are 
deteriorating substantially in 2009 relative to 2008
and a further weakening of the public balance
beyond the effects of the business cycle is
projected for 2010. The expected deterioration in
the structural balances can be seen in Table III.1.2.
While the average structural balance for 2008
stood at –3.1% for EU-27, in 2009 it is expected to
be –4.6% before falling further to –5.5% in 2010. 
Thus, if 2010 was used as the base year for the
analysis in this report, the results would indicate 
greater sustainability gaps caused by the weaker 
starting balances. 
1.5. REQUIRED PRIMARY BALANCE 
It is informative to see the size of the primary 
balance required to close the sustainability gaps;
that is, to account for the costs of ageing and the
interest on current stock of debt.  In other words, to
see what a sustainable budgetary position looks
like. 
This is given by the required primary balance 
(RPB). The RPB represents the structural primary 
balance that would be necessary at the beginning
of the long-term projections to ensure long-term 
sustainability in the light of these liabilities, once 
all other spending has been covered. The RPB is 
usually calculated as an average over five years: 
the RPB for the years 2011-2015 is shown in Table 
III.1.2, along with the structural primary balance 
and the increase in age-related expenditure 
between 2010 and 2060. 
Table III.1.3: Required primary balance (% GDP) 
Structural primary
balance
Required primary
balance
Increase in age-related 
expenditure
2009 average 2011-2015 between 2010 and 2060
BE 0.7 5.9 5.9
BG 1.1 2.3 3.2
CZ -2.9 4.6 6.3
DK 2.8 1.9 1.0
DE 0.6 5.0 5.1
EE -0.6 0.3 -0.1
IE -7.6 7.2 8.7
EL -0.9 12.7 16.0
ES -5.2 6.4 8.0
FR -2.7 2.8 2.1
IT 2.0 3.4 1.6
CY 0.2 8.9 10.7
LV -8.1 2.2 1.3
LT -3.1 4.2 6.0
LU 1.2 13.6 16.2
HU 3.1 3.5 3.3
MT -0.2 6.3 9.2
NL 0.0 6.5 6.7
AT -0.2 4.5 4.0
PL -3.1 1.1 -1.2
PT -2.4 3.0 2.8
RO -3.7 5.4 8.5
SI -3.3 8.4 12.5
SK -3.7 4.0 5.5
FI 2.1 5.5 5.4
SE 0.9 3.1 2.4
UK -7.8 4.5 4.8
EU27 -2.0 4.5 4.4
EA -0.9 4.9 4.8
Source: Commissions services 
The table shows that there is significant variation 
in terms of the RPB across Member States. While 
for EU-27 it will represent an average of 4.5% of 
GDP, and 4.9% for the Euro Area, the figures
range from under 2% of GDP for Estonia,
Denmark and Poland, to over 10% of GDP for
Greece and Luxembourg. Twelve Member States
will require a primary balance of 5% of GDP or 
over. 
For several countries, the RBP is so large that it is
socially and politically unrealistic to reach and 
sustain; they are well above the largest primary
surpluses ever recorded in any EU Member State.
For these countries, an effort of consolidation in 
the medium-term, even if very ambitious would
not suffice to put the public finances on a
sustainable path without profound reforms of their
social protection systems. 
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As already mentioned elsewhere in the report, 
these long-term debt projections have been
prepared under a no-policy-change assumption and 
in partial equilibrium. Given that assumption, these 
projections are not robust forecasts and are not 
meant to be realistic scenarios of what may happen
in the future. In practice, it is extremely unlikely 
that financial markets would keep financing
government debt which amounted to several times 
the annual GDP of a country, or that government
would not change their policies in the presence of
ever increasing debts. The aim of the debt 
projections is to illustrate the long-term trends and 
the size of the required remedial action to avoid 
government debts to enter into an exponentially
increasing spiral. 
1.6. GOVERNMENT DEBT PROJECTIONS 
The analysis of sustainability presented so far 
looks at the adjustment of the structural primary 
balance required to ensure sustainability in terms
of the S2, S1 or RPB indicators. An alternative 
way of looking at sustainability is to consider the
trajectory of debt, if such an adjustment were not 
undertaken. The results of this exercise are
presented in Graph III.1.2 and, in more detail, in
Table III.1.4. The table shows the government
gross debt ratio in 2008 and 2009, and the 
projections for 2010, 2030 and 2060, once the 
costs of servicing debt and paying for age-related 
expenditure are taken into account. In a sense, it 
represents the stock measure of the flow indicators
S2 and S1. 
Table III.1.4: Projected debt developments 
2008 2009 2010 2030 2060
BE 89,6 94,9 98,6 137,8 372,4
BG 14,1 16,0 18,6 -9,9 9,8
CZ 29,8 33,0 37,0 114,9 486,7
DK 33,3 29,8 26,4 11,3 18,3
DE 65,9 72,4 75,1 102,5 318,9
EE 4,8 10,1 13,9 28,5 81,4
IE 43,2 60,0 75,8 260,8 848,5
EL 97,6 104,6 111,6 205,9 884,0
ES 39,5 48,1 55,6 188,2 766,6
FR 68,0 78,5 83,8 177,4 431,3
IT 105,8 113,3 116,7 112,2 205,9
CY 49,1 44,8 42,4 67,8 335,5
LV 19,5 30,9 42,4 230,6 898,1
LT 15,6 24,0 34,1 113,9 545,9
LU 14,7 14,9 13,7 35,6 437,5
HU 73,0 84,1 89,0 21,8 -26,3
MT 64,1 68,4 72,6 114,0 432,5
NL 58,2 55,3 58,0 121,0 450,3
AT 62,5 69,3 72,7 116,7 337,8
PL 47,2 53,9 60,4 108,9 318,4
PT 66,4 73,8 78,9 156,1 389,9
RO 13,6 21,8 30,4 125,1 633,8
SI 22,8 27,2 30,7 158,8 831,6
SK 27,6 32,0 36,3 115,5 561,2
FI 33,4 37,5 40,0 61,3 248,7
SE 38,0 41,6 40,8 32,2 93,1
UK 52,0 64,0 71,2 271,3 759,2
EU27 63,0 70,6 75,2 155,9 477,3
EA 68,6 75,8 80,0 140,2 422,3
Gross debt
The government debt ratio is usually compiled in gross terms, without 
netting out assets from government liabilities. Gross debt can therefore 
never be negative. Moreover, the projections is this table assumes that 
the accumulation of financial assets is nil for countries with debt. In this 
table, the negative values should be interpreted as net accumulation of
assets for the countries that would fully reimburse their debts. Although
the assumption of no accumulation of assets until the full repayment of 
debt is not plausible, it has no implications on the sustainability
assessment provided the interest rate paid on government debt and the 
rate of return on government assets are similar.
Source: Commission services 
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In 2008, the government gross debt-to-GDP ratio
stood above 60% mark for the Euro Area on 
average and for eight of the 27 EU Member States. 
These countries are Belgium, Greece, France, 
Italy, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Portugal.
However, Ireland, Spain, Poland and UK are also
forecast to reach or exceed this debt ratio by the
end of 2010. 
On unchanged policy relative to 2009, by 2060 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Italy and Sweden 
would have reduced their debt ratios. Conversely,
the spectacularly high debt projections for the 
majority of other countries indicate unsustainable
policies and illustrate the magnitude of the issue. 
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The results in this report differ significantly from 
those presented three years ago in the 2006 
Sustainability Report. While the EU-25 (17) 
average sustainability gap was estimated 3.4% of 
GDP on S2, the current estimates are for 6.5% of 
GDP. 
Graph III.2.1 compares the S2 indicator calculated 
in this report with the one of 2006. The difference 
between S2 in the 2006 and 2009 reports is split in 
three components: (i) the difference that is due to 
changes in the initial budgetary position, (ii) the 
difference that owes to the revision in the long-
term projection of age-related expenditure because 
of new demographic projections and a number of 
improvements in the projection methods, and 
(iii) the fact that the long-term projections have 
been extended from 2050 to 2060. 
On average, the sustainability gap has increased by 
3.1 percentage points (p.p.) of GDP for the 25 
countries that were members of the EU in 2006. 
While 4 Member States (Hungary, Portugal, Italy 
and Germany) show a lower sustainability gap 
than in the 2006 exercise, the remaining 21 
Member States show a deterioration. Of these, in 
all cases expect Luxembourg, Greece and Malta, 
the deterioration is essentially due to a weakening 
of the initial budgetary position rather than to an 
increase in the age-related costs and the delay in 
the required adjustment that leads to a higher LTC. 
For Ireland, Spain, Latvia and UK the weakened 
initial budgetary position is responsible for an 
increase of the estimated sustainability gap of over 
5 points.  
Overall, for the EU-25 countries, the deterioration 
in S2 is due to the worsening in the starting 
budgetary position. The required adjustment given 
the starting position has increase by 3.2 p.p. of 
GDP between the 2006 and 2009 reports, as the 
base year for the analysis changed from 2005 to 
2009. The fiscal impact of the economic and 
financial crisis is therefore included in the 2009 
estimates and explains the worse initial budgetary 
position.  
(17) The comparison in sustainability indicators estimated in 
2006 and 2009 concerns 25 countries, since Bulgaria and 
Romania joined the EU in 2007 after the publication of the 
2006 sustainability report. 
Conversely, there has been a slight improvement 
by 0.1 p.p. of GDP in the LTC component of S2. 
Almost half of Member States show an 
improvement on this component. Notable outliers 
are Luxembourg, Malta and Greece where changes 
in the estimate of the LTC are equal to 3.6, 4.6 and 
9.9 points, respectively. In Greece's case, this is 
largely explained by the fact that the 2006 
estimates did not include pension expenditure as 
projections were not available at that time. For 
Luxembourg, the required adjustment given the 
long-term costs (LTC) now takes into account the 
pension expenditure that should be paid out to non-
residents, while in 2006 this was omitted.  
Table III.2.1 shows the LTC component of the S2 
indicator calculated until 2050 and 2060, as well as 
the difference between the two and the S2 
sustainability gap. It aims to complement the 
analysis presented in Graph III.2.1 by showing the 
evolution of the LTC due to the increase in 
expenditure in the years after 2050. The figures 
show that on average there is little difference 
between the LTC until 2050 and until 2060. For 
EU-27 the difference equals 0.3 points on average, 
while for the Euro Area, the difference is 0.1 p.p. 
of GDP. Little of the difference between the results 
presented in this report and those presented in the 
2006 Sustainability Report can therefore be 
attributed to the additional costs of ageing beyond 
2050. However, it suggests that, on the basis of 
current projections, the ratio-to-GDP of age-related 
expenditure will keep increasing beyond 2060 for 
most. However, it should be noted that the 
relationship between the cost of ageing and the 
LTC depends on the discount rates and the time 
profile of the spending increases. For individual 
Member States, however, there is more variation 
with some such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta 
having a significant increase in their sustainability 
gap due to the effect of the additional costs of 
ageing beyond 2050. 
European Commission 
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Graph III.2.1: S2 indicator in the baseline scenario compared to the results of the 2006 Sustainability Report 
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Table III.2.1: LTC component of the S2 indicator until 2050 and 
2060
S2 
until 2050 until 2060 until 2060
BE 4.6 4.8 0.1 5.3
BG 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.9
CZ 2.9 3.7 0.8 7.4
DK 1.8 1.4 -0.4 -0.2
DE 3.0 3.3 0.3 4.2
EE -0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.0
IE 5.3 6.7 1.4 15.0
EL 10.8 11.5 0.7 14.1
ES 5.4 5.7 0.4 11.8
FR 1.9 1.8 -0.1 5.6
IT 1.9 1.5 -0.5 1.4
CY 6.6 8.3 1.6 8.8
LV 1.0 1.0 0.0 9.9
LT 2.6 3.2 0.6 7.1
LU 11.9 12.9 1.0 12.5
HU 1.0 1.5 0.5 -0.1
MT 4.5 5.7 1.2 7.0
NL 5.0 5.0 0.0 6.9
AT 3.1 3.1 0.0 4.7
PL -1.3 -1.2 0.0 3.2
PT 1.6 1.9 0.3 5.5
RO 4.4 4.9 0.5 9.1
SI 7.7 8.3 0.7 12.2
SK 2.3 2.9 0.6 7.4
FI 4.3 4.5 0.2 4.0
SE 1.2 1.6 0.4 1.8
UK 2.6 3.6 0.9 12.4
EU27 2.9 3.2 0.3 6.5
EA 3.4 3.5 0.1 5.8
LTC Difference in LTC 
2050 - 2060
Source: Commission services 
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The results of the sustainability gap exercise 
present a policy challenge for the nearly all the
Member States. On average, policies are required 
that will close a sustainability gap equal to 6.5% of 
GDP, with a half of this effect being due to the 
long-term costs of ageing. This can be achieved 
through some combination of a reduction in the
additional costs of ageing, an increase in tax, a 
reduction in non-age related spending or structural
reforms that slows down age-related expenditure. 
The sustainability gap indicators show the 
correction that is required for the years covered by
the analysis. Implicitly, the gap given by the 
indicators is the size of the correction that must
occur now and be maintained for the years until 
2060 and beyond.  
If the correction were to be undertaken later, then 
countries with a sustainability gap would need to 
make a greater adjustment. Table III.3.1 presents
this additional cost of delay – that is the increase in 
the S1 and the S2 indicators. It shows how much 
greater the adjustment would have to be, if it were 
undertaken in 5 years’ time rather than now. For 
ease of comparison it also shows the S2 gap 
presented in Table III.1.1 and the size this would 
be with a 5-years delay. For the EU on average, a 5 
year delay would result in an additional required 
adjustment of 0.5 percentage points of GDP being
necessary to ensure sustainability according to the
S2 indicator. 
For twelve Member States, the additional cost of 
delayed response is greater than 0.5 p.p. of GDP.
These countries are the Czech Republic, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and the 
UK. For Greece and Slovenia, the cost of delay 
exceeds 1 percentage point of GDP, thus
significantly increasing an already sizeable 
sustainability gap.
The absolute additional costs in terms of required 
adjustment of the delay is related to the size of the 
sustainability gap and the government gross debt 
but its relative size also depends on the projected
economic growth in the future. 
Table III.3.1: Cost of delaying the response by 5 years
S1 S2 original S2 S2 delayed
BE 0.7 0.3 5.3 5.7
BG -0.1 0.1 0.9 1.0
CZ 0.8 0.6 7.4 8.1
DK -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
DE 0.5 0.4 4.2 4.6
EE 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.0
IE 1.5 0.7 15.0 15.7
EL 1.6 1.1 14.1 15.1
ES 1.3 0.8 11.8 12.6
FR 0.8 0.3 5.6 5.9
IT 0.3 0.1 1.4 1.5
CY 0.5 0.4 8.8 9.2
LV 1.4 0.9 9.9 10.8
LT 0.8 0.7 7.1 7.8
LU 0.8 0.5 12.5 13.1
HU -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
MT 0.7 0.6 7.0 7.6
NL 0.8 0.6 6.9 7.5
AT 0.6 0.3 4.7 5.1
PL 0.4 0.3 3.2 3.5
PT 0.7 0.4 5.5 5.9
RO 0.9 0.8 9.1 9.9
SI 1.4 1.1 12.2 13.3
SK 0.8 0.7 7.4 8.1
FI 0.4 0.3 4.0 4.3
SE 0.1 0.1 1.8 1.9
UK 1.5 0.7 12.4 13.1
EU27 0.8 0.5 6.5 6.9
EA 0.7 0.4 5.8 6.2
Cost of delay ( % of GDP) Sustainability gap
Source: Commission services 
The results presented in Table III.3.1 make it clear 
that inaction carries a cost. Moreover, there is a 
question of intergenerational fairness to be
considered. The additional costs of ageing will fall
at least in part on future taxpayers for countries 
with a sustainability gap. By closing the gap later, 
more of the burden is incumbent on future 
taxpayers rather than current ones and the burden
is greater in absolute terms too.
The cost of delay indicates show the increase in 
the sustainability gap if no remedial action is 
taken. In so far as the crisis and the fiscal support
that is necessary in support of the recovery do not
allow an ambitious fiscal consolidation effort in
the short- to medium term, the relentless increase
in the sustainability gaps suggests the urgency in
considering in earnest profound reforms in social
protection system, even if the impact of those
reforms may take time to appear in government
accounts. 
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The baseline analysis in this report uses 
projections for potential growth that do not take 
into account any durable effect of the ongoing 
financial and economic crisis. Instead, the pre-
crisis potential growth estimate is forecast forward 
taking changing demographics into account. This 
chapter presents three alternative growth scenarios 
for the medium and long terms in the light of the 
economic crisis and then shows the corresponding 
estimates of the sustainability gaps. 
The financial and economic crisis has already led 
to significantly worse than expected macro-
economic and fiscal developments in 2008 and 
2009. While the prospects for 2010 appear 
disappointing, there is also marked uncertainty 
regarding economic growth in the medium and 
long-term perspective. The unusually sharp and 
rapid deterioration in economic activity has 
transformed into a world recession. This poses the 
question of the extent to which the worsened short-
term outlook would have implications for the 
growth potential of the EU economies also over 
the medium- and longer-term. 
Of the three alternative scenarios presented, the 
first one assumes that it will take a decade for 
potential output to reach its pre-crisis growth rate 
leading to a ‘lost decade’ of growth. If this 
situation were to materialise, the sustainability gap 
would be some 1.2 percentage points (p.p.) of 
GDP higher on average, purely due to the effect 
that lower GDP growth over ten years and a lower 
level of GDP thereafter has. While lower growth 
means that employees will accrue lower pension 
entitlements, the effect on pensions will be more 
modest than on overall output, leading to higher 
pension spending as a share of GDP.  
Of course the ‘lost decade’ scenario may prove to 
be too pessimistic. However, as long as the crisis 
has a long-term impact on the level of output of the 
economy, the baseline sustainability indicators will 
prove to have been underestimates of the true gaps. 
The economic crisis means that any measures to 
address the long-term sustainability difficulties 
will need to be carefully thought through to ensure 
that they do not lead to short-term choking of the 
recovery. If action had been taken in previous 
years, and Member States had attained the 
medium-term objectives (MTOs) that were in 
place for the previous cycle of stability and 
convergence programmes, then, most sustainability 
gaps would have been closed. 
This chapter also presents the results of a 
sensitivity analysis, which considers the effect on 
the estimates of the sustainability gaps of 
alternative scenarios for demographics and for the 
costs of providing health and long-term care for 
the elderly. By looking at different scenarios for 
longevity, health status and health costs, 
productivity, labour market scenarios, interest 
rates, long-term care needs and costs, it provides a 
sense of how the assumptions made in the baseline 
affect the final outcome and the robustness of the 
estimates.  
1. THE EFFECT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
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The assessment of the sustainability conditions in 
each of the EU member states requires very long-
term projections for demographic developments, 
interest rates and labour market, macroeconomic 
and fiscal situation. Given the relatively large 
margins of error surrounding each of those 
projections, this chapter considers a series of 
sensitivity analyses. It starts by presenting 
alternative growth scenarios for the post-crisis 
years and then discusses the uncertainty linked to 
them. It then turns to other issues like the 
demographic projections, productivity growth, 
unemployment and interest rates. This allows an 
assessment of the robustness of the sustainability 
indicators and a better understanding of the long-
term sustainability risks in each country. 
1.1. THE PERSPECTIVES FOR ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
The baseline GDP growth forecasts used in the 
main analysis do not take account any durable 
implications of the economic and financial crisis 
on economic activity. This section presents the 
alternative economic assumptions in the light of 
the crisis that will be used to look at the impact it 
might have on the long-term sustainability of the 
Member States of the European Union. 
The financial and economic crisis has already led 
to significantly worse than expected macro-
economic and fiscal developments in 2008 and 
2009. While a number of forecasters are now 
starting to revise upwards growth forecasts for 
2010, economic growth for the EU as a whole and 
for each Member States will remain quite low or 
even negative. Moreover, there is also marked 
uncertainty regarding economic growth in the 
medium and long-term perspective. The unusually 
sharp and rapid deterioration in economic activity 
has transformed into a world recession. This poses 
the question of the extent to which the worsened 
short-term outlook would have implications for the 
growth potential of the EU economies also over 
the medium- and longer-term.  (18) 
(18) It should be borne in mind that estimating potential output 
growth is subject to uncertainty and that different methods 
for doing so exists. While in principle only structural 
factors matter for the estimation of the growth potential, it 
Under a conventional business cycle interpretation, 
a period of low growth would be followed by a 
period of above trend growth. Given the severity 
and scope of the current crisis, however, there is 
however the serious risk of a structural break in 
growth conditions and that the recovery will be 
characterised by a protracted period of slow 
growth, and reduction in potential GDP growth. 
This might be due to a number of factors, 
including: 
Increases in the cost of capital due to the real 
economy effects of balance-sheet adjustments in 
the financial sector, even in the presence of large 
recapitalisation packages; 
Wide-spread credit constraints and higher 
borrowing costs in the non-financial sector in the 
light of the restructuring of banks. (19) Moreover, 
there may be a possible shift in attitude to risk 
leading to a structurally and permanently higher 
cost of capital; 
Slower growth in total factor productivity due to a 
reduction in investment, which can have a lasting 
effect; 
A permanent loss of human capital due to long 
term unemployment in the event of a protracted 
slow-down (the hysteresis effect). This may be 
more likely in the relatively inflexible EU labour 
markets; 
A collapse in world trade and higher protectionism 
could have a particularly adverse effect on EU 
growth (and especially export-oriented countries); 
A wide-ranging lack of confidence leading to the 
postponement of household consumption and 
investment by firms; 
A lasting increase in the weight of government in 
the economies, with a heavier tax burden that is 
is very difficult to distinguish cyclical and structural factors 
in real time. This is all the more the case in times of rapid 
changes in economic activity or structural breaks, like for 
instance at the current juncture. For this reason, real-time 
estimates of potential growth, and of output gaps, need to 
be interpreted with caution.  
(19) Although EU consumers have lower deleveraging needs 
than US consumers, firms are more heavily indebted. 
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necessary to finance the increase in government 
expenditure and debt. 
1.2. THREE MEDIUM-TERM POST-CRISIS 
SCENARIOS 
In order to look at the possible effects of the
economic crisis, three scenarios for medium and 
long terms economic growth have been modelled
in addition to the baseline scenario. These are
presented in Graph IV.1.1 for EU 27. It should be
noted, that the trajectory of growth differs between 
Member States and that the EU27 average may 
hide substantially different developments and
prospects among member states. (20)  
The baseline scenario shows a gradual reduction in 
potential growth due to population ageing, as 
explained in previous chapters. This scenario
assumes that the loss in output in 2008–10 is of a 
cyclical nature without a durable impact on current
and projected potential. This scenario is basically 
the same that one could have prior to the 
emergence of the crisis. Though it is labelled 
(20) The calculations for the alternative scenarios are based on 
the Commission's spring 2009 forecasts of May 2009 and 
therefore an update on those presented in the 2009 Ageing 
Report, which were based on the January 2009 forecast. 
‘baseline’ and most indicators in this report are 
based on that scenario, it appears at this stage an 
overoptimistic scenario. 
The first alternative scenario, ‘the rebound,’ is also
of an optimistic nature. Though it acknowledges a 
loss in potential growth as measured by the usual 
techniques, during the crisis years, it assumes a
rebound in potential growth the years until 2020 or 
so, with the longer-term outcomes being
unchanged. 
The ‘lost decade’ scenario shows potential growth
taking ten years to return to its pre-crisis level; 
both labour productivity and labour input are
assumed to reach the baseline growth rate in 2020. 
Thereafter it follows the same path as in the 
absence of the crisis, but the output lost during the 
crisis years is definitely lost. 
The most pessimistic scenario is the ‘permanent 
shock’ scenario, where not only is there no
rebound, but there is a permanent hit to potential 
growth going forward. In this case, labour
productivity growth and labour input are assumed
to be permanently lower due to the crisis. This 
appears to be an over pessimistic scenario. 
Graph IV.1.1: Potential GDP growth compared: different crisis scenarios (annual % change) 
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The effects on the level of real GDP per capita of 
the three scenarios, relative to the baseline are 
shown in Table IV.1.1. As over the first few years, 
trend growth follows the 2009 spring forecasts in 
all cases, the initial loss in GDP by 2010 equals 
2% in all cases. Thereafter, in the rebound 
scenario, GDP per capita continues to fall but has 
caught up by 2020 when the recover is complete. 
This is not the case in the either scenarios where 
annual GDP growth over 2007-2020 is on average
0.8-0.9% lower than in the baseline. In the lost
decade scenario, despite potential growth having 
reached its pre-crisis level by 2020, the years of 
the crisis leave a level effect equal to 11% of the 
Table IV.1.1: The effects on the level of real GDP per capita of the three post-crisis scenarios 
2010 2015 2020 2040 2060
Rebound -2 -6 0 0 0
Lost decade -2 -9 -11 -11 -11
Permanent shock -2 -9 -12 -16 -20
EU27 Level of GDP per capita, difference from baseline in %
Source:  Commission services 
Box IV.1.1: Estimating the impact on pension spending of changes in macroeconomic 
variables.
For the analysis in this report, the potential budgetary impact of varying the underlying
assumptions (productivity, employment) on pension spending, is estimated by the Commission
using the sensitivity scenarios on the labour productivity growth rate and the structural
unemployment rate, rather than by the Member States using the national pension models.  
The elasticity of public pension expenditure with respect to changes in GDP is calculated as
follows:  
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⎛
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−
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.
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.ε (1) 
where:  P: pension expenditure (level)
GDP: GDP (level) 
alt.scenario: the higher labour productivity scenario and the higher employment
rate scenario, respectively
This elasticity is time-varying so as to capture potential changes over time that pension reforms
might have induced in the relationship between GDP growth and pension expenditure. 
Using the estimated elasticity, the alternative 'crisis' scenario is imposed as the 'alt.scenario', and
the change in pension expenditure vis-à-vis the baseline is solved for. The alternative scenarios for
pension expenditure carried out in the projection exercise relate to specific shocks (the 0.25 p.p
higher labour productivity growth rate and 1 p.p. lower structural unemployment rate). For shocks
of a different size, the calculated elasticity above can be used as a proxy for the effect of such a
shock on pension expenditure. However, it should be noted that the elasticity with respect to a
shock of a different size might be different. This would occur if there are non-linearities in the
relationship. This simple model does not reflect such cases. 
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baseline GDP per capita. This will never be caught
up. The permanent effect on growth in the 
permanent shock scenario is more dramatic
however; in this case the lower rate of growth
leads to an ever increase difference in level in
GDP per capita going forward. While in 2020
GDP per capita is 12% lower than in the baseline, 
but 2060 it is 20% lower.
1.3. THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE POST-
CRISIS SCENARIOS 
The budgetary impact of the shocks on age-related 
expenditure is modelled according to the three 
scenarios and compared with the baseline.  
For public pension expenditure, the sensitivity
tests of the projections to a change in the structural 
unemployment rate and to the productivity growth
rate is used to calculate an elasticity of public 
pension with respect to changes in output.(21) 
Details are provided in box IV.1.1. For the other
age-related government expenditure items, the 
projections were obtained re-running the different
models (health care, long-term care, education and 
unemployment benefits) with the respective 
alternative macro-economic scenarios.  
The magnitude of the budgetary impact is
determined by the nature of the shock. As the lost
decade and permanent shock scenarios are
negative – in the sense of implying a lower GDP 
level – they lead to higher age-related expenditure 
as a share of GDP, while the rebound scenario is
neutral. Graphs IV.1.2 and IV.1.3 show the effect
of the three potential growth scenarios on public 
pension expenditure and the overall age related 
expenditure, cumulatively over the 2007–60
period. They show, that relative to the baseline, the 
permanent shock has a bigger impact than the lost 
decade scenario, while the rebound scenario is 
neutral overall, both for pension spending and the
overall age related expenditure. 
(21) The sensitivity tests carried out in the 2009 Ageing Report 
were used to calculate the elasticities.
Graph IV.1.2: Potential impact of the budgetary crisis on pensions
EU 27 pension expenditure, change in % of GDP between 2007-2060
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Graph IV.1.3: The potential budgetary impact of the crisis on total 
age-related expenditure 
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In the case of the rebound scenario, the additional
costs in the years when GDP growth in at below 
the baseline rate are offset by lower costs when
GDP growth is at above trend growth. In the lost
decade scenario, pension expenditure is 0.9% of 
GDP higher in 2060 relative to the baseline, while 
the age related expenditure is 1.4% of GDP higher, 
with the increases occurring between 2007 and
2020, before gradually falling. In the permanent
shock scenario, however, the increase in both 
pension expenditure and the overall age related 
expenditure are not only higher (at 1.4% and 2.0%
of GDP respectively), but also continue increasing 
beyond 2020 into the future. 
1.3.1. The dynamics of the impact of the crisis 
on public pension expenditure 
The economic crisis leads to lower nominal GDP 
in the short term and, in the case of the lost decade
and permanent shock scenarios lower potential 
GDP levels relative to the baseline scenario going
forward. In parallel, public pension expenditure
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will be lower than in the baseline scenario. Due to
the design of contribution and entitlement systems
and as pensions tend not to be indexed with wages, 
the short-term elasticity of pension expenditure to
GDP is less than 1. Pension expenditure will
therefore fall less than GDP, leading to an increase 
in pension spending as a share of GDP. Over the
medium to long term, the estimated elasticity rises 
reflecting the fact that lower contributions due to
the effects of the crisis eventually lead to lower 
entitlements. The difference in pension
expenditure in the crisis scenarios vis-à-vis the 
baseline starts therefore to fall over the longer-
term. 
Graph IV.1.4 shows the dynamics of public
pension expenditure as a share of GDP for the 
baseline and lost decade scenarios. It shows that, 
while overall pension spending as a share of GDP
is higher in the lost decade scenario than in the
baseline scenario by 0.9 p.p. of GDP, most of the
increase happens in the early years. Indeed, for the
years 2020–60 the lost decade scenario has a 
marginally lower increase in public pension
spending relative to GDP – by 0.1 p.p. – as lower
entitlements start to have an effect. 
Overall, the no-policy change assumption involves 
the (partial) indexation of pensions alongside
earnings-related entitlements. These features lead
to the crisis scenarios resulting in rising and then 
falling level of pension spending as a share of
GDP.  
1.4. IMPLICATIONS ON SUSTAINABILITY 
INDICATORS OF THE ALTERNATIVE POST-
CRISIS CENARIOS 
Table IV.1.2 shows the sustainability gap, as 
measured by S2 indicator, estimated for the three 
alternative scenarios. The results show the effect of 
the different outcomes for GDP growth on
sustainability, but do not account for the additional
costs associated with the fiscal cost of the recovery 
measures which will add to the stock of debt and 
increase the primary surplus required to service the 
debt. If these additional costs were added on, an 
increase in the gap through the IBP component of
the order of magnitude presented in the last
column of the table would emerge. While this is
not insignificant, it is not as large as the overall 
effect of ageing and is also highly uncertain as the 
final fiscal cost of the crisis will depend on the 
ability of governments to recoup some or all of the 
funds they used for the recapitalisation of banks
and on which share of contingent liabilities borne 
by the government in the context of the crisis (for 
example State guarantees to deposits and to 
liabilities issued by the banks) will materialise. 
Graph IV.1.4: The dynamics of public pension expenditure (baseline versus lost decade scenario, % of GDP) 
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Table IV.1.2: Sustainability calculations under alternative crisis scenarios 
S2 IBP LTC S2 IBP LTC S2 IBP LTC S2 IBP LTC
BE 5.3 0.6 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.1 1.6 2.8 0.3 2.5
BG 0.9 -0.6 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 0.0 -0.6
CZ 7.4 3.7 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1
DK -0.2 -1.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
DE 4.2 0.9 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.1 1.5 1.6 0.2 1.3
EE 1.0 1.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.3
IE 15.0 8.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.2 5.4 5.4 0.4 5.0
EL 14.1 2.6 11.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3
ES 11.8 6.1 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.1 2.9 3.7 0.2 3.6
FR 5.6 3.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.9 2.0 0.3 1.7
IT 1.4 -0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.4 1.3 0.4 0.9
CY 8.8 0.5 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
LV 9.9 8.9 1.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.2 0.7
LT 7.1 3.9 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.3
LU 12.5 -0.4 12.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1
HU -0.1 -1.6 1.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.7 1.3 0.4 0.9
MT 7.0 1.4 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.1 4.0 4.5 0.2 4.3
NL 6.9 1.9 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.7
AT 4.7 1.6 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 2.5 0.2 2.3
PL 3.2 4.4 -1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
PT 5.5 3.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.1 1.2 2.1 0.3 1.8
RO 9.1 4.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.5
SI 12.2 3.9 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.8 2.3 0.1 2.2
SK 7.4 4.5 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1
FI 4.0 -0.5 4.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.8
SE 1.8 0.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 1.7 0.1 1.7
UK 12.4 8.8 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.6
EU-27 6.5 3.3 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.5 0.2 1.3
EA 5.8 2.3 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.1 1.2 1.8 0.2 1.6
Permanent shock
Difference from baseline
Lost decade
Difference from baseline
Baseline
Difference from baseline
Rebound
Level
Source: Commission services 
This is primarily due to higher long term costs of
ageing, but the initial budgetary position also 
contributes more to the gap due to the lower GDP 
growth. Although the analysis undertaken in this 
report is primarily a partial equilibrium exercise, in
the case of the permanent shock scenario, a 
departure from the permanent real interest rate of
3% has been made. Instead, it is assumed that the 
interest rate and GDP growth rate differential
remains constant, so that interest rates in this case 
are lower than in the baseline. This is because with 
a permanent change in the trend rate of output it 
would be expected that there is additionally an
effect on the return to capital and therefore the
interest rate.  
For the rebound scenario, the differences with the 
baseline are all in the short-term, and cancel each 
other out over the long-term. Conversely, for both
the other scenarios, the lasting impact of the
economic crisis puts more pressure on the
sustainability of the public finances. While the lost 
decade scenario assumes a return to previously 
expected trend growth, the lower productivity 
growth for ten years and the lower output that
results is forecast to increase the sustainability gap 
as measured by the S2 indicator   of 1.1% of GDP 
to 6.0% of GDP for EU 27. This increase is 
essentially driven by an increase in the long-term
cost of ageing, as an unchanged assumption about
inflation and therefore the up-rating of pensions 
leads to higher spending as a share of the (lower)
GDP.  For a few countries, the crisis scenarios lead to a 
decrease in the sustainability gaps. This somehow
counterintuitive result is due to eligibility and up
rating rules for pensions, where the lower accrual
of pension rights dominates the lower GDP effects
during the years covered by the analysis. 
In the case of the permanent shock the effect of the
crisis on long-term sustainability is more marked, 
as both the productivity and GDP growth are
assumed to be on a lower trajectory going forward.
This leads to an ever growing difference in output 
levels and an increase in the sustainability gap of
1.5% of GDP.
2. THE EFFECT OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION: AN MTO 
SCENARIO
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The impact of the ageing population on the 
sustainability of the public finances requires that 
the sustainability gaps be closed, where they exist. 
In the light of the current financial and economic 
crisis, the short-term priority for fiscal policy is to 
find a balance between supporting the recovery of
the economies of the Member States and without 
imposing too heavy a burden on the public
finances over the long-term. For this reason, it is 
not the time to recommend immediate action to 
address long-term sustainability issues related to 
ageing populations without an in-depth 
understanding of the situations in the various
countries. 
Table IV.2.1: Effect of the MTO balance on the S2 indicator and 
required primary balance (RPB) 
Baseline Baseline MTO
S2 S2 IBP LTC RPB RPB
BE 5.3 1.0 -3.7 4.7 5.9 5.5
BG 0.9 -6.9 -9.1 2.2 2.3 2.6
CZ 7.4 2.0 -2.2 4.2 4.6 4.9
DK -0.2 -3.0 -3.4 0.4 2.0 1.1
DE 4.2 0.0 -3.7 3.8 5.1 5.1
EE 1.0 -5.0 -5.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
IE 15.0 2.0 -4.5 6.5 7.2 7.0
EL 14.1 8.1 -3.4 11.5 12.7 12.4
ES 11.8 2.8 -2.9 5.7 6.5 6.6
FR 5.6 -1.4 -3.2 1.8 2.9 2.7
IT 1.4 -1.7 -3.2 1.6 3.4 3.2
CY 8.8 4.3 -4.0 8.3 8.9 8.4
LV 9.9 0.3 -1.3 1.6 2.3 2.5
LT 7.1 -0.3 -4.2 3.9 4.1 4.6
LU 12.5 12.0 -1.3 13.4 13.6 13.4
HU -0.1 -2.4 -4.7 2.4 3.4 3.7
MT 7.0 0.8 -4.4 5.2 6.2 6.0
NL 6.9 3.4 -1.3 4.7 6.6 6.2
AT 4.7 0.1 -3.0 3.1 4.5 4.3
PL 3.2 -3.1 -3.2 0.2 1.1 1.4
PT 5.5 -1.3 -3.2 1.9 3.1 3.0
RO 9.1 -0.6 -5.8 5.2 5.3 5.6
SI 12.2 4.4 -3.7 8.1 8.4 8.4
SK 7.4 1.1 -2.5 3.6 4.0 4.4
FI 4.0 -0.7 -4.4 3.7 5.6 4.5
SE 1.8 -2.3 -4.6 2.2 3.2 3.2
UK 12.4 1.1 -2.5 3.6 4.6 4.6
EU-27 6.5 0.2 -3.2 3.4 4.5 4.5
EA 5.8 0.6 -3.1 3.7 4.9 4.8
MTO scenario
Source: Commission services 
Nevertheless, over the medium term a correction
of the budgetary positions or reforms to reduce the
cost of ageing will be necessary. 
Table IV.2.1 presents the effect of the
sustainability calculations in terms of S2, assuming
that the medium-term objectives (MTO) that were
in place at the time of the 2008/09 round of 
stability and convergence programmes of Member 
States were met, through a gradual improvement in 
the underlying fiscal position between 2010 and
2015. The MTOs used for the exercise are shown
in the final column of the table. Where the actual 
MTOs are given as a range, the MTO used and 
presented in the table is from within this range. 
For Member States with an MTO of a balanced 
budget (such as Ireland) and MTO of 0 is chosen. 
For the United Kingdom, which has not submitted
a formal MTO in its convergence programme, an 
MTO of –1% of GDP is used. 
The results show, that overall, if fiscal policy
followed this path, the improvement in the 
underlying position would be nearly sufficient to
offset the increase in the long term cost of ageing, 
with an S2 gap of 0.2 % of GDP for EU 27, though
large gaps would still exist for a number of
Member States. 
This scenario shows that reaching the MTOs 
would give a first and decisive step towards
sustainable public finances. However, it also 
suggests that the MTOs of some countries may 
need to be updated. Moreover, it confirms the 
evidence presented elsewhere in the report that for 
the many countries, in particular those with the 
largest sustainability imbalances, fiscal
consolidation efforts – if not accompanied by
structural reforms – will not suffice to close the 
sustainability gaps.  
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Box IV.2.1: Medium-term debt projections under alternative consolidation scenarios
Rising government deficits and low growth, as well as financial support to the banking sector are leaving a 
legacy of fast growing government debt ratios in the EU. Reflecting concerns arising from durably high
deficits, this box projects the gross debt-to-GDP ratio of the EU Member States up to next 20 years or so,
under three stylised scenarios.
These projections are based on the Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast till 2010, which are then
extended into the future taking into account the ‘lost decade’ macroeconomic scenario (see Chapter IV,
section 1.1). Beyond 2020, the scenarios discussed in the box assume a return of growth to the long-term 
trend.
These additional assumptions are also considered:
• The increase in age-related expenditure is consistent with the macroeconomic scenario. Age-related
expenditure in the EU increases, on average, by 0.4 p.p. of GDP in the EU as a whole up to 2020 (0.6 p. 
p. in the euro area) and by 1.9 p.p. (2.2 in the euro area) up to 2030;  
• The tax-to-GDP ratios are projected to converge to their pre-2007 level for countries with 2010 tax
burdens below their 2007 level. For countries with 2010 tax-to-GDP ratio above the pre-crisis level, it is
assumed that the tax ratio remains constant;
• The implicit interest rate on government debt converges to 3% in real terms (the value assumed for the 
purposes of the long-term sustainability of public finance assessment) in 2020 and remains constant
thereafter, for all countries;
• Specific stimulus measures projected for 2010 are withdrawn in 2011; 
• Zero stock-flow adjustment; this means no further purchases of financial assets or recapitalisations of
financial institutions, nor disposal of such assets.  
Graph 1 depicts the projected evolution for the government gross debt ratio, for the EU as a whole. The solid
thick line shows the outcome for this stylised scenario under the assumption of no fiscal consolidation
measures (Scenario 1). The gross debt-to-GDP ratio would rise steadily over the projection period. By 2015,
the average debt ratio would be at around 100% of GDP, both in the EU and the euro area. It will continue 
increasing to around 120% of GDP in 2020, though with large differences across countries. 
The highest increases in the debt ratio would take place in Ireland and Latvia. A particularly fast rise in the
debt ratio would also occur under this simplified scenario for the United Kingdom. Bulgaria, Denmark,
Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden would be the only Member States with debt ratios below 
60% of GDP in 2020. 
The graph also shows the results of two further scenarios. In Scenario 2, from 2011 on, all Member States
would implement fiscal consolidation efforts (measured in terms of structural primary balance) of 0.5% of
GDP per year until they reach their medium-term objectives (MTOs). (1) The graph clearly illustrates that
this consolidation rhythm – which is the benchmark consolidation effort in the SGP – would not be enough
to stabilise, let alone reduce, the debt ratio by 2030. 
(1) The MTOs of Member States are shown in Table IV.2.1, taking into account information contained in the latest round
of stability and convergence programmes.
(Continued on the next page)
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Box (continued) 
A consolidation effort of 1% of GDP per year (Scenario 3) until the MTOs of each Member State are
reached would stabilise the government debt ratio in the EU in 2016. Note, however, that by 2030, the debt
ratio would still be substantially larger than in the pre-crisis years, and 5 points above the Maastricht
reference value.  
Though these scenarios are based on a number of simplifying assumptions, they show that a fast debt 
reduction requires serious consolidation efforts, sales of assets and may also, in some countries require the
update on their MTOs to more ambitious levels. Structural measures that contribute to avoid a ‘lost decade’
of slow GDP growth would also decisively contribute to an early stabilisation, and then fast reduction, of the 
government debt ratio.  
Graph 1: Medium-term debt projections under alternative assumptions (% of GDP)
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The analysis presented in this report is based on 
the projections set out in the 2009 Ageing Report. 
This section presents the changes in the S2 
indicator under alternative assumptions for life 
expectancy, labour productivity, participation in 
the labour market, including for older workers, 
total employment, migration and the interest rate. 
For all these elements there is considerable 
uncertainty when predicting into the future, so 
considering the response of sustainability results to 
the underlying assumptions is important. The 
results are presented in Table IV.3.1. It should be 
noted that the scenarios considered in this analysis 
are not necessarily the most realistic ones, but 
serve to indicate how the results vary with the 
changes in the underlying assumptions. (22)  
As the analysis in this report is a partial 
equilibrium analysis, some of the mechanisms for 
change are not fully taken into account. Thus, the 
sensitivity results may be either under or 
overestimated in case of some scenarios. The 
results presented should therefore be viewed 
within the context of the caveats presented below. 
3.1. LIFE EXPECTANCY 
The baseline projections of this report are based on 
the EUROPOP 2008 population projection 
published in April 2008 by Eurostat. The 
projections are based on assumptions about 
fertility and mortality rates and the level of net 
migration in each Member State. Life expectancy 
at birth in 2008 averaged 76.1 years for men and 
82.1 for women (23). Eurostat demographers 
forecast to increase to 84.6 and 89.1 years 
respectively, by 2060, with a narrowing in the 
range seen between countries. 
(22) It may be just as plausible that the actual outcome is in the 
opposite direction to the example in the table; for example, 
while the analysis considers the effect of higher life 
expectancy, it could be that life expectancy is shorter rather 
than longer. While the results are not necessarily 
symmetric, they can serve as an informal ‘ready reckoner’ 
for alternative outcomes. 
(23) The range of forecasts is from 65.9 in Lithuania to 79.0 in 
Sweden for men and 76.6 in Romania and 84.3 in France 
for women. 
The higher life expectancy scenario assumes an 
increase in life expectancy of 1 year by 2060 on 
top of the Eurostat projections. Within this 
scenario, mortality falls for all age groups, which 
translates into a slightly larger labour force and 
slightly higher GDP levels. Public expenditure 
increases as life expectancy improves over time, 
thus usually implying longer periods in 
retirement (24) and higher healthcare expenditure. 
Since the impact of higher life expectancy on 
public expenditure exceeds the positive impact on 
GDP, total age-related expenditure to GDP tends 
to increase. The S2 indicator therefore increases 
with rising life expectancy. Table IV.3.1 shows the 
effect on S2. 
It shows that a 1 year increase in life expectancy 
would result in a widening of the S2 sustainability 
gap by 0.5% of GDP across EU-27 and 0.4% in the 
euro area. This is driven by a required increase in 
health-care and pension expenditure that an even 
older population would require.  
The degree to which an increased life expectancy 
will lead to increased costs depends on the pension 
schemes and the range of coverage of health and 
long-term care. Member States where the pension 
annuity explicitly depends on life expectancy at 
retirement age (such as Italy, Poland, Finland or 
Sweden) or where there system is set-up to take 
account of fiscal imbalances (such as through the 
sustainability factor in Germany) show a smaller 
increase in the gap due to a higher life expectancy. 
Conversely, Member States with high levels of 
pension expenditure with no such adjustment 
factors, such as Belgium, are expected to face a 
higher increase in costs.  
Increases in life-expectancy also affect healthcare 
expenditure. The extent to which healthcare 
expenditure will change depends in part on the 
particular healthcare system of the different 
Member States and on whether the additional 
year(s) of life are spent in good health. (25) 
Increases in life expectancy due to improved 
(24) Note, however, that the pension systems of some Member 
States include clauses which automatically adjust 
retirement ages to changes in longevity. 
(25) The assumption is that half of the extra year of life will be 
healthy. 
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health are likely to be less costly to the healthcare 
budget than increases primarily due to advances in
medical technology. 
3.2. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
A difference in labour productivity to that set out 
in the baseline scenario leads to a different
trajectory for GDP growth. Age-related
expenditures are also affected, although the
indexation rules in place will determine the size of 
the effect. In particular, if pension, health care and 
long-term care expenditure are closely related to 
productivity growth, for example by being indexed
to wages, the time patterns of GDP and age-related
expenditure are similar. On the contrary, if the 
indexation rules do not reflect the developments in
productivity the two variables diverge. 
In the baseline scenario, labour productivity is
assumed to increase at an average annual rate of 
1.8%, with higher rates in the earlier period for the 
new Member States, given their relative stages of 
development. In the alternative scenario 
considered in this section, the labour productivity
growth rate is 0.25 percentage points higher than
in the baseline. The increase in labour productivity
is assumed to occur linearly between 2010 and 
2020 and to remain at the higher level thereafter. 
The results in Table IV.3.1 show the effect of the
higher labour productivity scenario on the S2
indicator. As age-related expenditure in percent of
GDP falls with growing labour productivity in
most of the EU Member States, the overall impact 
on S2 indicator is positive, i.e. S2 falls. The results 
indicate that such an increase in productivity 
would reduce the sustainability gap by 0.3% of
GDP on average for EU-27, and by 0.4% in the
Euro area.  
When considering this scenario, the partial
equilibrium approach used should be borne in 
mind. In line with this approach, the analysis does 
not capture any increase in the government 
revenue-to-GDP ratio. In other words, the no-
policy assumption is implemented in such a 
manner that the faster GDP growth does not imply 
fiscal drag.. 
3.3. EMPLOYMENT RATE 
The baseline scenario assumes that the 
employment rate of the working age population
overall, and of older workers in particular,
increases over the medium term from 70.4% of 
individuals aged 15-64 in 2007 to around 74% for 
EU-27 in 2060. Most of this increase is assumed to 
come from older workers; those aged 55-64 are
Table IV.3.1: Sensitivity scenarios, difference in S2 indicator compared to the baseline scenario 
Baseline
S2 Total Pension Healthcare
Long term
care Total IBP LTC
BE 5.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 2.9 0.2 0.9 -0.7
BG 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.5
CZ 7.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.5 0.5 1.1 -0.6 0.3 -0.9
DK -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
DE 4.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 1.9 0.1 0.7 -0.6
EE 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0
IE 15.0 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 1.8 -0.7 0.6 -1.4
EL 14.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 -1.3 -0.4 0.1 2.2 : : :
ES 11.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 2.6 -0.7 0.4 -1.1
FR 5.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 1.4 : : :
IT 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 3.4 : : :
CY 8.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.6 4.7 : : :
LV 9.9 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 : : :
LT 7.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.2 -0.7
LU 12.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 6.8 -2.4 0.0 -2.5
HU -0.1 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 1.4 0.2 0.7 -0.5
MT 7.0 0.5 0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.5 1.8 -0.5 0.6 -1.1
NL 6.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 1.1 -0.3 0.4 -0.7
AT 4.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 4.4 : : :
PL 3.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.0
PT 5.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 3.0 0.3 0.7 -0.4
RO 9.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.5 0.3 -0.7 0.2 -0.9
SI 12.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 1.0 : : :
SK 7.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.4 0.2 -0.6
FI 4.0 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 0.9 -0.2 0.2 -0.4
SE 1.8 0.3 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 1.5 -0.1 0.3 -0.4
UK 12.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 3.1 -0.1 0.6 -0.7
EU27 6.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 2.2 : : :
EA 5.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 2.3 : : :
Zero
migration 
Total
Interest rateHigher life expectancy Labour
productivity
Total
Older
workers 
Total
Total
Employment
Total
Source: Commission services 
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assumed to see a rise in participation from 47.5% 
to around 62½% between 2007 and 2060. 
The higher total employment scenario is based on 
the assumption of a further increase in the 
employment rate of 1 percentage point, relative to 
the baseline projection. It assumes that this 
increase occurs linearly between 2010 and 2020 
and that employment remains higher from there 
on. The increase in employment is assumed to 
occur through a lowering of the NAIRU.  
The other employment scenario assumes an 
increase in the employment rate of older workers, 
equal to 5 percentage points relative to the baseline 
scenario, though the retirement age remains 
unchanged as compared to the baseline. Again, the 
increase is assumed to occur linearly between 2010 
and 2020 and remain higher thereafter. The 
increase occurs through a reduction in the inactive 
population.  
In the first instance, higher labour force increases 
GDP growth compared to the baseline However, 
an increase in the employment of older workers 
also has an impact on pension expenditure. Insofar 
as individuals postpone their exit from the labour 
market, pension expenditure decreases, due to 
individuals working rather than claiming pension 
benefits. However, as individuals work longer they 
accumulate more rights and subsequently receive 
higher pensions once they retire. Thus, the effect 
of higher employment changes over time and is 
spread over a long horizon. Indeed, the exact effect 
will depend on the pension system (including 
penalties or encouragement for earlier retirement) 
the coverage and the ageing structure of each 
Member State. 
In general, a further increase in participation rates, 
either overall or specifically for older workers 
would reduce the sustainability gap in many of the 
Member States. Table IV.3.1 sets out the effect on 
the S2 sustainability gap. An increase in the 
employment rate of older workers will reduce the 
EU 27 sustainability gap by 0.2% of GDP, while 
an increase in total employment by 0.3%. In some 
Member States, though, the effect of higher 
pension entitlements which are accrued during the 
extra years of work overrides the GDP effect of 
more workers and is therefore costly to the public 
finances.   
As in the case of the increase in labour 
productivity scenario, any increase in government 
revenues as a share of GDP, due to higher 
employment, faster growth and fiscal drag is not 
captured.  
3.4. MIGRATION 
The baseline scenario assumes that the average net 
annual migration rate falls from 0.3% of the 
population in 2008 and 0.2% in 2060 for EU 27. 
Overall, an additional 59 million migrants are 
projected to join the Union between 2007 and 
2060, with most joining the euro area. Countries 
that have recently experiences net outflows of 
migration (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Romania) are assumed to see a 
tapering off or reversal of the situation. 
Migration is of course very difficult to predict as it 
depends on socioeconomic and political, legal and 
social developments in both the EU and the rest of 
the world, in particular in the neighbouring 
countries. 
Migrants are an important addition to the work 
force as they tend to be of working age. Moreover, 
there is a longer-term effect on population since 
immigrant populations usually have higher fertility 
rate. Therefore, in the short and medium-run, an 
inflow of migrants leads to increase in GDP of 
receiving country. However, as working migrants 
accumulate pension rights, over the long-term they 
too receive pensions and other social benefits paid 
the host country. 
Table IV.3.1 presents the effects that zero 
migration between each EU Member State and the 
rest of the world would have on the sustainability 
gap. This scenario should not be taken as a realistic 
prediction of possible outcomes for the future. It is 
included to provide a bound for the effect of 
reduced migration by showing the overall 
contribution that migrants are assumed to make to 
the growth rates of the EU economies and fiscal 
sustainability. Overall, assuming zero migration in 
the EU as a whole and in each Member States from 
now until 2060 would increase the sustainability 
gap by 2.2% of GDP in EU 27, with considerable 
variation between countries. 
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Box IV.3.1: Scenario on postponing retirement
This box presents a scenario where effective retirement ages of all Member States are increased in a uniform 
manner. The aim is to illustrate the impact of reforms aimed at increasing the retirement age on
sustainability of public finances.
Labour market exit ages vary however significantly between countries, which are thus in differing positions
to address their sustainability challenges through reforms that would defer retirement. The effective exit
ages in 2008 are reported in Graph 1: Luxembourg and Slovenia have the lowest exist ages, while the
highest exist ages are in Sweden and Ireland.
Graph 1: Effective exit ages in 2008
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In the absence of policy measures aimed at postponing retirement ages – like a change in the statutory 
retirement ages or other encouragements for older workers to remain in the labour market – there will be a
very slow increase in the exit ages (see Graph 2, baseline). This increase is related to the fact that different
age cohorts have different participation rates. The average exit age for the EU-27 aggregate would increase
from slightly below 62 in 2008 to just above 63 years in 2060. It should be noted that, according to the 
demographic projections, the remaining life expectancy at 62 is expected to increase from 20.2 years in 2008
to 26.2 in 2060.
The scenario is based on the assumption that exit ages for each Member State increase by two years – on top
of the baseline – from 2010 to 2020 in a linear fashion. After 2020, the exit ages keep rising by two-thirds of
the increase in remaining life expectancy. Graph 2 shows the trajectories of average exit ages in the baseline
scenario and the postponed retirement scenario for the EU as a whole. The projected evolution in the 
remaining life expectancy at 62 is also shown.
The scenario is purely illustrative; it is not realistic to assume that the retirement ages will increase the same
in all countries. One may expect the retirement ages to converge, that is, one may expect retirement ages to
(Continued on the next page)
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Box (continued) 
increase more in the countries that currently have the lows retirement ages, and by relatively less in the 
countries with the relatively high exit ages.
Graph 2: Exit ages (EU27, baseline and postponed retirement scenario) 
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Source: Commission services.
These additional assumptions are also considered n this scenario: 
• The extension of working lives increases total labour supply in a proportional manner. Labour
productivity for those older workers who continue to stay in the labour force due the deferral of 
the exit age is assumed to be 90 percent of the productivity of an average worker; 
• Total pension expenditure is reduced in proportion to the decrease of average years in retirement,
which is proxied by the remaining life expectancy at the average exit age. Compared with the 
baseline, the average pension increases in line with GDP;
• The ratio-to-GDP of other age-related expenditure (health care, long-term care, education and
unemployment benefits) evolves according to the baseline scenario.
The main implications of the increase in exit ages are related to increase in labour supply and the cut in
overall pension expenditure as compared with the baseline. Given the increase in labour supply, GDP
growth rises on average 0.14 percent per year: by 2060 the GDP level is around 7½ percent larger than in the
baseline. The ratio to GDP of pension expenditure in the EU as a whole falls by 1.8 percentage points of
GDP; the average pension increases in line with GDP, but the number of pensions paid is lower than in the 
baseline.
The postponed retirement scenario yields a sustainability gap (S2) for EU-27 of 4.8 percent of GDP, which
is 1.7 points lower than in the baseline scenario. Therefore, a substantial gap would remain. 
The intuition behind these results is as follows: postponing exit ages, as described, practically eliminates the
increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP, though there is an increase in the average pension.  Note,
(Continued on the next page)
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Aside from the plausibility of the scenario, the 
results for certain Member States need to be 
considered within the context of their economies.
For Luxembourg and Cyprus, the baseline scenario
is for net migration between 2008 and 2060 to
contribute to an increase of around 40 and 50% of
their 2007 populations.  Both these countries' 
economies are heavily reliant of migrant workers 
at the moment, and despite the strong increase in
population in the baseline assumptions, it still
corresponds to a marked decrease in the rate of net 
migration. When interpreting the results of the
sensitivity analysis, however, it should be borne in
mind that the zero migration scenario is a large
departure from the baseline for these (and a 
number of other) countries, so the magnitude of
these results should be interpreted carefully.  
3.5. INTEREST RATE 
The alternative scenario considered in Table 
IV.3.1. assumes a real interest rate of 4%, rather
than the 3% assumed in the baseline.  
The effect of this change in the interest rate 
assumption is to reduce the LTC component but 
increase the IBP component. A higher interest rate 
reduces the amount that a country has to save to
pay for an ageing population in the future, but
increases the amount required to service existing
debt. (26)  
For Member States with ageing profiles where the 
costs are set to increase further rather than earlier 
in the future, a higher interest rate allows them to
finance these costs through smaller increases now 
compared with the baseline. Countries such as 
Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg and Malta, with a 
(26) It can be seen that the effect of changing the interest rate
assumption has a larger effect on countries with higher 
starting levels of debt, such as Greece and Italy. 
large increase in public expenditure over the 
medium term, therefore benefit from a higher real
interest rate.  
In interpreting all these results, it should be borne
in mind that the effect of a higher interest rate on
the growth rate of the economy has not been
modelled. The implicit assumption is that a higher 
interest rate is consistent with unchanged GDP 
growth rates. 
3.6. ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE SCENARIOS 
Table IV.3.2 shows the impact on the
sustainability gap of a faster increase in healthcare 
and long-term care spending, irrespective of 
demographic and macroeconomic assumptions.
The data shows that several variables drive the 
evolution in healthcare expenditure. 
Healthcare spending tends to increase with GDP 
growth and is an important component of 
government spending. Moreover, its response to
increased longevity is more difficult to predict that
pension spending because it crucially depends on
both on the health status of the population and, in
many Member States, on demand factors. It is also 
difficult to predict the effect that technology will
have on the demand for government spending in
this area. 
The baseline scenario assumes that half the 
additional years of life from the increase in life 
expectancy are healthy, whereas half entail 
additional costs associated with age and morbidity.  
The ‘pure ageing’ scenario assumes that the age-
related morbidity rates do not improve and all 
gains in life expectancy are assumed to be spent in
bad health. This attempts to isolate the pure effect
of an ageing population on health-care spending, 
but in doing so ignores the fact that people might, 
Box (continued) 
however, that the projected increase in pension expenditure in the baseline scenario is only half of the 
overall long-term increase in age-related expenditure (healthcare spending and long-term care remain
unchanged). Moreover, for EU-27, LTC (the required adjustment given the long-term change in
expenditure) is around half of S2 in the baseline scenario. Therefore, the reduction in the sustainability
imbalance is around one-fourth of S2 in the baseline scenario.
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in part, be living longer because they are healthier.
Such a scenario would increase the EU 27
sustainability gap by 0.1% of GDP. 
Conversely, the ‘constant health’ scenario assumes
that the number of years spent in bad health are
constant with all gains longevity from now on
being healthy ageing. Such a scenario would 
reduce the sustainability gap by 0.6% of GDP in 
the EU-27 countries. This is a much bigger 
absolute effect than in the opposite case (the pure
demographic scenario) because health-care costs 
increase disproportionately with age and this 
scenario looks at changing the assumptions made
about the oldest old.
Spending on healthcare is concentrated on 
individuals' final years. The ‘death-related costs’
scenario projects healthcare spending by linking
health-care spending to the remaining years of life. 
This scenario has been constructed by looking at 
the different costs for descendents and survivors 
provided by Member States and applies them to
the EUROPOP2008 demographic projections. It
shows a small fall in the sustainability gap overall, 
but some variation across countries. 
The ‘income elasticity’ scenario departs from the
baseline assumption of a constant income elasticity
of demand for healthcare of 1. Instead, it assumes 
an elasticity of 1.1 which converges to 1 by 2060, 
reflecting a higher demand for healthcare as
society becomes wealthier. It shows an increase of 
the sustainability gap of 0.4% of GDP for the EU 
27 countries.  
So far, all the scenarios presented approach the 
costs of healthcare as being demand rather than
supply driven. The final two scenarios do the
opposite. The ‘EU12 cost convergence’ scenario
Table IV.3.2: Sensitivity scenarios, difference in S2 indicator compared to the baseline scenario 
Pure Ageing Constant HealthStatus
Death-related 
Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost
Convergence Labour Intensity
BE 0.2 -0.7 0.1 0.4 : 0.7
BG 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 1.9 0.6
CZ 0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.4 0.4 1.1
DK 0.2 -0.5 0.1 0.4 : 0.6
DE 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 : 0.6
EE 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.3 1.3 0.8
IE 0.2 -0.6 0.0 0.4 : 0.8
EL 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 : 0.7
ES 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.3 : 0.6
FR 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.4 : 0.7
IT 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.3 : 0.5
CY 0.2 -0.4 0.1 0.3 3.1 0.5
LV 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.2 2.5 0.7
LT 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.3 1.6 0.7
LU 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.4 : 0.1
HU 0.3 -0.7 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.9
MT 0.3 -0.7 -0.4 0.6 1.3 0.9
NL 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.3 : 0.7
AT 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.4 : 0.8
PL 0.2 -0.9 0.2 0.5 2.1 0.9
PT 0.2 -0.7 0.0 0.5 : 0.8
RO 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 2.1 0.7
SI 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
SK 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.4 1.0 0.6
FI 0.3 -0.5 0.2 0.5 : 0.8
SE 0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.3 : 0.7
UK 0.2 -0.7 -0.4 0.5 : 0.6
EU27 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 : 0.7
EA 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.4 : 0.6
Source: Commission services 
63 
European Commission 
Sustainability Report - 2009 
assumes that the costs of delivering healthcare in 
the most recently acceded Member States (EU12) 
increase to the average observed in the EU15 
countries by 2060, thus increasing significantly the 
cost of ageing in the new Member States. As 
healthcare spending in EU is significantly below 
spending in the rest of the EU, if this scenario 
materialised, the sustainability gap in those 
countries would widen quite substantially. 
Finally, the ‘labour intensity’ scenario assumes 
that healthcare costs are driven by productivity 
increases, as healthcare is a relatively labour 
intensive sector. This scenario serves to provide 
and insight into the effects of unit costs on 
healthcare expenditure. It assumes that costs 
increase with GDP per worker rather than per 
capita and shows an overall increase in the 
sustainability gap of 0.7% of GDP for EU 27. 
3.7. CHANGES IN THE LONG-TERM CARE 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The final section of this chapter considers the 
effect on the sustainability gap of changing the 
underlying assumptions on the costs associated 
with long-term care. The results are shown in table 
IV.3.3. 
The first two columns show the effect on S2 of a 
pure demographic change, where, just as in the 
healthcare scenario, it is assumed that there is not 
improvement in the rate of disability and ability of 
individuals to care for themselves as life 
expectancy increases. This would increase the 
sustainability gap by an average of 0.1 percentage 
points (p.p.) of GDP. The overall effect on the gap 
though would the sum of this and the effect on 
healthcare presented in the previous section. 
Conversely, the constant disability scenario 
assumes that trends in age-specific disability rates 
decline in the future – it is therefore analogous to 
the constant health states assumption in the 
healthcare scenarios. It assumes that the level of 
disability in the Member States stays constant 
despite the increase in older people. This would 
lead to a decrease in the contribution of long term 
care to the S2 indicator by an average 0.1 % of 
GDP. The next two scenarios show the impact on 
S2 of a change in care arrangements. The baseline 
scenario assumes no policy change, meaning that 
Member States which currently offer little long 
term care assistance will continue to do so in the 
future. In the light of an ageing population this 
may not be realistic and, moreover, may have other 
adverse consequences on the relatives of the old.  
The first scenario looks at the increase in S2 from 
a shift away from informal care to home-based 
care. It models the impact of a yearly shift of 1% 
of the disabled elderly who receive only informal 
care receiving formal care at home, over the first 
10 years of the forecasting period. Such a shift 
would increase the gap by an average of 0.2 % of 
GDP. A shift to institutional care, however, would 
be more expensive with a corresponding increase 
in S2 of 0.5% of GDP. 
Finally, the last two scenarios look at the supply 
side and present the results for different 
assumptions about the growth in the costs of 
providing care. The fast/slow unit growth 
scenarios show the effect of increasing or reducing 
the assumed rate of growth of unit costs which are 
supposed to evolve in line with GDP per worker in 
the baseline scenario. The effect is to increase the 
sustainability gap by an average of 0.3% of GDP 
for the fast growth or reduce it by 0.8% in the slow 
growth scenario.  
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Table IV.3.3: Sensitivity scenarios, difference in S2 indicator compared to the baseline scenario 
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability At home
In an 
institution
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in
unit costs
BE 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3 -1.0
BG 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1
CZ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.3
DK 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 -1.2
DE 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.9
EE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1
IE 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 -1.0
EL 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 -1.4
ES 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.1 -0.5
FR 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.6
IT 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.8 0.3 -0.8
CY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LV 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 -0.3
LT 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.3
LU 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 -1.6
HU 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.2
MT 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 -1.0
NL 0.3 -0.3 0.5 1.1 0.9 -3.3
AT 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.8
PL 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.4
PT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1
RO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SI 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 -1.1
SK 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2
FI 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 -1.9
SE 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.8 0.6 -1.7
UK 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4
EU27 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 -0.8
EA 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 -0.9
Shift to formal care
Source: Commission services 
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Chapter III of this report presented the 
sustainability indicators and chapter IV discussed 
and quantified some of the uncertainty surrounding 
them. This chapter expands on the discussion of 
the uncertainty by looking at aspects that cannot be 
quantified as readily, but are nonetheless important 
in assessing the overall sustainability of a country's 
public finances.  
The level of debt of an economy enters the 
sustainability indicators directly and affects 
sustainability through the need to service the debt. 
However, beyond this direct effect, the level of 
debt can have further consequences on both the 
real and political side of the economy. A high level 
of debt can reduce a country's ability to deal with 
even a temporary shock to its interest rate or 
growth rate. With the costs of servicing the debt 
being more significant the higher the level of debt, 
a shock to the cost of servicing has the potential to 
be markedly more significant than for countries 
with a lower stock of debt to re-finance. Moreover, 
a high level of debt can also affect the interest rate 
paid on it with threshold effects being a possibility. 
These occur when debt reaches a certain level 
beyond which interest rates are pushed up. The 
levels of debt in the EU Member States are 
therefore considered as an additional risk factor 
over and above their contribution to the 
sustainability gaps.  
The chapter also considers the possibility that the 
assumptions about pension expenditure underlying 
the Member States' pension expenditure 
projections may be difficult to implement socially 
and politically. While pension reform is important 
for many countries, it is also important that the 
expected levels of average pension are realistic. 
Countries forecasting a strong fall in the relative 
generosity of their pensions may find that they are 
unable to deliver this for political, electoral and 
social reasons.  
For this reason, such countries may face a higher 
sustainability challenge than is apparent by looking 
just at the indicators, although the extent to which 
this occurs will depend on private pension 
provision and whether individuals anticipate the 
decline in the state pension and make alternative 
arrangements for the retirement. 
Moreover, private pensions themselves are not 
without risk. Insofar as they depend on the 
vagaries of financial markets a shortfall in their 
performance can result in pressure on the 
government to address shortfalls. Indeed, there is a 
wide range of expenditure that governments may 
be faced with that is not included in the 
projections. Contingent liabilities are those which 
the government only needs to assume if particular 
situations arise. These may be implicit – such as 
dealing with natural disasters – or explicit, such as 
loan guarantees. In the light of the economic and 
financial crisis, many Member States have taken 
on explicit contingent liabilities to aid the 
functioning of the financial sector and other 
industries. Depending on whether or not these are 
called in, the public finances of the Member States 
may find themselves with additional spending that 
is currently not being budgeted for. 
A final factor that is considered is the apparent 
scope which Member States' governments have to 
address the sustainability problems illustrated in 
this report. In theory, a sustainability gap can be 
filled by increasing tax revenues or reducing 
spending, while in the short-term an increase in 
debt is a possibility for countries with low levels of 
debt and a back loaded ageing profile. Reducing 
spending means either reducing spending on non-
age-related expenditure or reforming the social 
security system so that the costs of ageing can be 
contained. For countries with current very high 
levels of tax or low levels of spending the options 
may be more limited as it may be difficult and 
economically costly for them to increase tax 
further. 
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Chapter III of this report presented the estimates of 
the sustainability indicators and chapter IV 
discussed and quantified some of the uncertainty 
surrounding them. This chapter expands on the 
discussion of the uncertainty by looking at aspects 
that cannot be integrated in the sustainability 
indicators, or quantified, as readily, but are 
nonetheless important in assessing the overall 
sustainability of a country's public finances. The 
issues discussed in this chapter will be taken into 
account in the overall assessments presented in 
chapter VI and, on a country by country basis, 
chapter VII. 
1.1. THE LEVEL AND EVOLUTION OF GROSS 
DEBT 
The current level of government debt directly 
affects sustainability through the need to service 
the interest payments on the debt. It enters S1 and 
S2 through the term that relates to the initial 
budgetary position (IBP) (27). It also enters S1 in 
the debt requirement (DR) term which measures 
additional effort to the debt stabilisation for 
Member States with debt initially above 60% of 
GDP to reach that level in 2060.   
Beyond this direct effect, the level of debt can 
have further consequences on the economy and on 
policy making. A high level of debt can reduce a 
country's ability to deal with shocks to interest 
rates or growth rates, even if those are temporary. 
With the costs of servicing the debt being more 
significant the higher the level of debt, a shock to 
(27) The definition of debt used in this report is the one relevant 
for the EU budgetary surveillance procedures. It has been 
established by the Treaty Protocol on the excessive deficit 
procedure and specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 
479/2009 (which has recently codified Regulation (EC) No 
3605/93 and a number of amending acts) through cross 
references to the European System of Accounts (ESA95). It 
is gross debt for all government, consolidated at face value. 
It includes loans, deposits and bonds, in national and 
foreign currencies. The debts of public enterprises, which 
are classified by statisticians in the corporate sector, are not 
included, even if some governments take over public 
enterprises’ debts from time to time. Spending in arrears is 
not included either. Contingent liabilities (which are 
discussed later in this chapter) and the debts of special 
purpose vehicles active in the management of the current 
crisis are not included. It also does not include the net 
present value of the accrued-to-date pensions to be paid to 
civil servants or beneficiaries of social security. 
the cost of servicing has the potential to be 
markedly more significant than for countries with 
a lower stock of debt to re-finance. For example, in 
countries where government debt exceeds annual 
GDP, a relatively small rise of 10 basis points in 
financing costs increase government outlays by 
more than 0.1% of GDP per year. 
A high level of debt is likely to lead to threshold 
effects, whereby once debt reaches a certain level, 
further increases to debt will push interest rates 
higher.  This increase occurs in order to continue 
to attract buyers of government debt, and may 
have the effect of crowding out private investment. 
The level of debt at which it happens will vary by 
country and depend on characteristics such as size, 
economic development, the structure of financial 
market, debt maturity, external imbalances and the 
monetary regime. 
The effect of increasing debt servicing costs and a 
consequent increase in interest rates faced by 
governments issuing (and/or re-financing) debt, 
can also play a disciplinary role. In particular, once 
the financial markets signal a decreased 
willingness to take on a government’s debt by 
requiring higher interest rates in return, this can 
exert pressure on governments to contain their 
fiscal deficits. By setting out credible plans to stop 
and reverse the increase in their debt levels, 
governments can try to reduce the perceived 
sovereign risk. Once debt reaches a certain high 
level, such actions may become necessary to 
contain the snowball effect of government debt 
and ensure the continued sustainability of a 
country's economy.  
Table V.1.1 shows the government debt-to-GDP 
ratios for the EU Member States for 2000, 2005 to 
2008, as well as forecasts for 2009 and 2010 on the 
Commission 2009 Spring forecasts. The forecast 
change in ratio between 2009 and 2010 is also 
shown. The figures show a marked increase in debt 
between 2009 and 2010 – primarily as result of the 
ongoing economic and financial crisis. At the end 
of 2008 Italy had a government gross debt that 
exceeded 100% of annual GDP, while Greece's 
debt was close to that threshold and Belgium's 
stood at nearly 90% of GDP. By 2010, the 
forecasts show both Greece and Belgium returning 
to above the 100% threshold. 
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1.2. PRIMARY BALANCE 
The primary balance is a crucial determinant of the 
change in the debt ratio. Table V.1.1 shows the 
structural primary balance for the years 2005-
2010, with the values given for 2009 and 2010
being the Commission 2009 Spring forecasts. It
shows that overall, for the years 2005 to 2007, EU
27 countries had a structural primary surplus, 
while for 2008, 2009 and 2010 a growing 
structural primary deficit is forecast. For countries 
which already have a significant level of debt, a
weak structural primary balance is a risk that must 
be taken into consideration. 
The level of debt also affects the political climate
within which economic policy is determined. Even 
in the absence of adverse shocks, a high level of
debt involves a higher level of interest payments 
and therefore requires a consistently positive 
primary surplus purely to service the debt, and 
higher surpluses to reduce its level. This can be 
politically and socially difficult to sustain and
when compounded with the need for additional
surpluses to address the needs of an ageing 
population, can make the required adjustments 
even more difficult. How significant a factor this is 
will depend on the institutions and the political
debate within a country; experience shows that 
while some countries are able to find the political 
consensus and will to reduce high levels of debt, 
others have proven less able or willing to do this.  
Whether or not the ability to take measures to 
contain the cost of ageing will be correlated with
past experience in reducing debt remains to be
seen. However, insofar as countries with large 
sustainability gaps also have persistently high 
levels of debt, the ability to run required surpluses 
must be judged as an additional risk point, over 
and above the risk attributable to the high levels of
debt. 
Table V.1.1: General government gross debt ratio 
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008
2009 
(forecast)
2010 
(forecast)
Change in debt 
ratio in 2009 and 
2010
BE 107.8 92.2 87.9 84.0 89.6 95.7 100.9 11.4
BG 74.3 29.2 22.7 18.2 14.1 16.0 17.3 3.2
CZ 18.5 29.8 29.6 28.9 29.8 33.7 37.9 8.1
DK 51.7 37.1 31.3 26.8 33.3 32.5 33.7 0.3
DE 59.7 67.8 67.6 65.1 65.9 73.4 78.7 12.8
EE 5.2 4.5 4.3 3.5 4.8 6.8 7.8 3.0
IE 37.7 27.5 24.9 25.0 43.2 61.2 79.7 36.4
EL 101.8 98.8 95.9 94.8 97.6 103.4 108.0 10.4
ES 59.2 43.0 39.6 36.2 39.5 50.8 62.3 22.8
FR 57.3 66.4 63.7 63.8 68.0 79.7 86.0 18.0
IT 109.2 105.8 106.5 103.5 105.8 113.0 116.1 10.3
CY 58.8 69.1 64.6 59.4 49.1 47.5 47.9 -1.3
LV 12.3 12.4 10.7 9.0 19.5 34.1 50.1 30.7
LT 23.7 18.4 18.0 17.0 15.6 22.6 31.9 16.3
LU 6.4 6.1 6.7 6.9 14.7 16.0 16.4 1.7
HU 54.2 61.7 65.6 65.8 73.0 80.8 82.3 9.3
MT 55.9 69.8 63.7 62.1 64.1 67.0 68.9 4.8
NL 53.8 51.8 47.4 45.6 58.2 57.0 63.1 4.8
AT 66.4 63.7 62.0 59.4 62.5 70.4 75.2 12.7
PL 36.8 47.1 47.7 44.9 47.1 53.6 59.7 12.7
PT 50.4 63.6 64.7 63.5 66.4 75.4 81.5 15.1
RO 24.6 15.8 12.4 12.7 13.6 18.2 22.7 9.1
SI 26.8 27.0 26.7 23.4 22.8 29.3 34.9 12.1
SK 50.3 34.2 30.4 29.4 27.6 32.2 36.3 8.7
FI 43.8 41.4 39.2 35.1 33.4 39.7 45.7 12.3
SE 53.6 51.0 45.9 40.5 38.0 44.0 47.2 9.2
UK 41.0 42.3 43.4 44.2 52.0 68.4 81.7 29.7
EA-16 69.2 70.0 68.3 66.0 69.3 77.7 83.8 14.5
EU-27 61.8 62.7 61.3 58.7 61.5 72.6 79.4 17.8
Debt as a % of GDP, outturn and forecast
Source:  Commission services, Eurostat. 
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Table V.1.2: General government financial assets as a share of 
GDP 
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007
BE 20.8 16.2 13.9 14.3 14.6
BG .. 78.9 39.3 35.2 30.7
CZ .. .. 45.5 44.6 ..
DK 43.3 31.4 33.7 36.6 35.7
DE 25.4 26.0 21.2 21.3 21.0
EE 52.6 40.2 41.1 40.1 38.4
IE .. 23.5 26.2 27.6 28.5
EL 20.2 26.1 28.6 29.6 33.9
ES 17.7 22.3 20.5 22.4 23.5
FR 24.6 30.0 32.2 33.5 35.0
IT 23.6 26.1 26.3 26.5 25.4
CY .. 25.1 28.8 26.8 27.1
LV .. 31.2 19.7 19.3 17.9
LT 65.3 54.3 35.5 35.2 31.6
LU 47.2 59.9 56.3 .. ..
HU 64.1 28.2 22.5 20.2 19.3
MT .. .. 32.8 25.6 25.5
NL 35.5 28.9 26.1 23.4 24.1
AT 30.9 36.2 32.7 32.7 31.2
PL 66.6 29.9 34.6 35.5 ..
PT 43.8 33.7 29.1 29.0 26.9
RO .. 74.8 36.6 30.2 31.2
SI .. .. 41.7 42.9 46.5
SK 68.9 45.1 33.5 27.4 33.0
FI 69.4 83.5 106.3 112.9 112.6
SE 55.5 59.2 64.3 69.1 68.2
UK .. .. .. .. ..
Source: Commission services.
1.3. GOVERNMENT ASSETS 
The debt figures used in this report are defined in
gross and consolidated terms; this means that 
financial and non-financial assets controlled by
government are not netted out, unless they are 
liabilities issues by other government units. 
Governments may, however, have significant other
financial assets in their possession as shown in
Table V.1.2. 
Assets should be taken into account when 
assessing the sustainability position of countries, 
as their disposal may contribute to reimburse debt
and because they generate property income. Assets
have particularly an impact on sustainability in
cases where the real value and the book value of
assets differ or the returns on assets are different
from the interest rate on debt. 
Table V.1.3: Structural primary balances as a share of GDP
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BE 3.2 2.5 2.3 1.5 0.7 0.0
BG 2.7 3.3 3.1 1.0 1.1 2.4
CZ -1.6 -2.8 -1.4 -2.3 -2.9 -2.5
DK 6.5 5.2 4.5 5.6 2.9 1.2
DE -0.2 0.7 1.6 1.6 0.6 -0.9
EE 0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -3.9 -0.6 -1.4
IE 2.3 2.8 -0.9 -6.4 -7.6 -9.0
EL -1.3 0.0 -0.4 -2.1 -1.0 0.1
ES 2.9 3.4 3.2 -2.4 -5.2 -6.3
FR -1.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.5 -2.7 -2.5
IT -0.6 0.7 2.1 1.8 2.0 2.0
CY 0.4 1.9 5.8 2.9 0.2 0.1
LV -1.1 -2.8 -4.1 -4.9 -8.1 -9.2
LT -1.0 -1.4 -2.1 -4.5 -3.1 -3.9
LU -0.2 -0.4 1.1 2.3 1.2 0.7
HU -4.8 -6.6 -1.5 -0.2 3.1 2.9
MT -0.2 0.4 0.0 -1.6 -0.2 0.7
NL 2.6 2.4 1.2 1.7 0.0 -1.6
AT 1.5 0.6 1.0 0.8 -0.1 -0.6
PL -1.6 -1.9 -0.9 -3.1 -3.1 -2.7
PT -2.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.9 -2.5 -1.8
RO -0.7 -2.3 -3.7 -7.2 -3.7 -3.1
SI 0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -1.3 -3.3 -3.4
SK -0.1 -2.3 -2.4 -3.5 -3.7 -3.3
FI 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.2 2.1 0.7
SE 2.9 2.3 3.7 3.4 0.9 -0.5
UK -1.9 -1.2 -1.5 -3.3 -7.8 -9.2
EA-16 0.2 0.9 1.1 0.2 -0.9 -1.5
EU-27 0.0 0.5 0.7 -0.4 -1.8 -2.5
Structural primary balance as a % of GDP, outturn and forecast
Source: Commission services.
At the end of 2008, six countries (Germany,
France, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Portugal) had
a debt ratio between 60% and 80% of GDP. By 
2010, it is forecast that four countries (France, 
Hungary, Portugal and the United Kingdom) will
have debts between 80% and 100% of GDP, while
six (Germany, Ireland, Spain, Malta, the 
Netherlands and Austria) will stand at between 
60% and 80%. 
All countries except Cyprus are expected to see an 
increase in their debt ratios between 2009 and
2010 and for some of these the increase is
substantial. While on average the EU  27 debt ratio 
is set to increase by 14.5 percentage points, for 
Ireland, Latvia and the United Kingdom the
increase is forecast to be around or above 30 
percentage point of GDP. Nine countries, however, 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and
Slovakia) are still expected to have debt at below 
40% of GDP at the end of 2010. 
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2.1. PENSION EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 
AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RISKS. 
The relationship between having an ageing
population and the increase in the long-term 
expenditure on pensions is not linear. Countries 
with less generous schemes or with planned
reductions to their generosity face less pressure on 
their public finances for same ageing profile than
countries which provide more generous benefits 
for the aged.
Public pension expenditure can be decomposed
into four main parts. These are (i) the change in the
dependency ratio which is a function of the
demographic profile, (ii) the change in the
coverage ratio which considers the number of
individuals eligible for public pensions relative to 
population aged over 65, (iii) the change in the 
employment rate amongst those of working age 
and (iv) the benefit ratio which measures the 
generosity of public pensions in relation to the 
average wage (28). 
Overall, the expected change in the benefit ratio
will contribute to lessening the impact of an ageing
population on the public finances as the generosity
of public pensions is expected to fall. This is 
shown in Table V.2.1, along with the effect that 
any change in the benefit ratio will have on public 
pension expenditure as a share of GDP. Only in 
Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and the United 
Kingdom are changes in the benefit ratio expected 
to contribute to the increase in the long-term
change in expenditure – in all other countries a 
reduction in the relative value of age related social
security benefits compared with the gross average 
wage is envisaged. Greece not only has an 
increasing benefit ratio, but starts from the highest
benefit ratio of all EU Member States. 
At the other end of the scale, reductions in the 
benefit ratio in Poland, Italy, Austria, Portugal, 
(28) To wit: 
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Sweden, France, Latvia and Estonia are expected 
to lead to a decline in the ratio of the public 
pension expenditure relative to GDP of over 3% of
GDP. For all these countries, the ratio between the 
average pensions and the economy-wide average
wage is set to fall by between 25% (France) and 
54% (Poland). The effect that this will have on the 
standard living of pensioners will depend on the 
extent that it is anticipated and on the other 
provision that pensioners have made (whether
through mandatory or voluntary private funded
pension provision or their own personal savings). 
For example, in Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Poland 
and Slovakia, reductions in the public pension
benefit ratio are not so stark once the 
accompanying increase in funded private pension 
is taken into account. Alternatively, individuals
may change their behaviour in the light of reduced
public pensions and choose to work longer, thus
accumulating pension entitlements and relieving 
pressure on the pension system and providing them
with a higher standard of living when they do
retire. 
Countries whose current policy will lead to strong 
declines in their benefit ratios may come under 
significant political pressure to introduce ad hoc
increases to pension levels or to change their social
security systems to increase the standard living of
pensioners. As Chapter 2 showed, the ratio of 
people aged 65 or above relative to the working 
age population is projected to more than double 
from 25% in 2007 to 2060 to 54% making them a
significant constituent of electorates. 
Aside from the countries that are forecast to have
significant falls in their benefit ratios, there are 
countries that are expected to have low levels of
pension provision, even if the decrease in the ratio 
is not as significant. By 2060, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK 
are predicted to have benefit ratios of below 40%, 
although once private pensions are taken into
account only the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Poland, 
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Portugal and the UK remain below this 
threshold (29).
The countries forecasting low benefit ratios are 
also liable to pressure to increase spending. This
may be particularly in the case of the newer
Member States, which have lower benefit ratios on
average. However, it is difficult to assess the
possible magnitude of these pressures, as even in
the absence of private pensions individuals may 
have other forms of support such as drawing down
of accumulated assets or savings and it is likely to 
be the overall standard of living of pensioners that
is important. Individuals might also change their
behaviour by choosing to retire later or provide for 
their retirement. On the other hand, the provision
of support from a private scheme also entails
(29) For some countries, data on the expected benefit ratios 
from funded private pensions are not available, which may
have implication on data comparability.
substantial of uncertainty in so far as the level of 
the pensions received depends on the performance 
of asset markets or other factors of the economy,
depending on the way the private pension schemes 
are organised, how they invest their assets and the 
kind of guarantees or other support the government
provides to those schemes.  
The final column in table V.2.1 shows the average 
real increase in pensions implied by the benefit
ratios for the public pensions. On average, 
pensions are set to increase by 1.4% per annum in
real terms for the EU as a whole. Within that total,
all countries, even those with marked falls in their 
benefit ratios are forecasting real terms increases. 
In addition, some countries with falls in their 
benefit ratios (such as Latvia) have reasonably
high increases in their real levels, as comparatively 
high growth is forecast. Nevertheless, a real rate of
growth may not be sufficient to ease the political
Table V.2.1: Benefit ratio – 
Change in Average real
GDP ratio due %change in pensions
2007 2060 % change 2007 2060 % change to benefit ratio per year 2010-2060
BE 45 43 -4 -1.0 1.6
BG 44 36 -20 44.4 40.9 -7.8 -1.8 2.4
CZ 45 38 -17 -1.2 1.8
DK 39 38 -4 64.0 74.6 16.6 -0.5 1.6
DE 51 42 -17 51.4 42.5 -17.3 -2.2 1.3
EE 26 16 -40 26.5 21.8 -17.7 -3.1 1.5
IE 27 32 16 0.7 2.0
EL 73 80 10 0.8 2.2
ES 58 52 -10 62.1 56.9 -8.3 -1.7 1.6
FR 63 48 -25 -4.0 1.1
IT 68 47 -31 -5.5 0.8
CY 54 57 5 -0.3 1.9
LV 24 13 -47 24.0 24.8 3.5 -3.9 1.3
LT 33 28 -16 33.1 32.5 -1.9 -1.8 2.2
LU 46 44 -4 45.8 44.0 -3.9 1.2 2.0
HU 39 36 -8 38.9 37.6 -3.2 -1.1 2.1
MT 42 40 -6 -0.5 1.8
NL 44 41 -7 73.8 80.9 9.6 -0.6 1.6
AT 55 39 -30 -5.0 1.0
PL 56 26 -54 56.2 31.2 -44.4 -7.1 0.9
PT 46 33 -29 47.3 32.6 -31.2 -4.5 1.2
RO 29 37 26 29.4 41.4 41.0 1.7 3.4
SI 41 39 -6 40.9 40.2 -1.7 -0.7 2.1
SK 45 33 -27 45.2 40.2 -10.9 -2.4 1.9
FI 49 47 -5 -0.9 1.7
SE 49 30 -39 63.9 46.4 -27.5 -4.3 0.8
UK 35 37 7 0.5 1.9
EA-16 1.4
EU-27 1.3
benefit ratio %
public pensions public and private pensions
Note: The 'Benefit ratio' is the average benefit of public pension and public and private pensions, respectively, as a share of the economy-wide average
wage (gross wages and salaries in relation to employees), as calculated by the Commission. The 'Gross Average Replacement Rate' is calculated as the 
average first pension as a share of the economy-wide average wage, as reported by the Member States in the pension questionnaire. Public pensions 
used to calculate the Benefit Ratio includes old-age and early pensions and other pensions, while public pensions used to calculate the Gross Average
Replacement Rate only includes old-age and early pensions. In general, the old-age and early pensions are the major part of pension expenditure, so
this difference is unlikely to affect the results substantially. The benefit ratio and the gross average replacement rate convey different information. In 
particular, due to differences in wage concepts used when calculating the benefit ratio and the replacement rate, the two indicators (and in specially
their level) are not strictly comparable and should be interpreted with caution.
Source: Commission services 
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pressure of pensions falling relative to wages in a 
number of Member States.  
The projections of pension expenditure depend 
significantly on the statutory rules (and 
assumptions) on indexation. In a large number of 
countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Sweden, the UK) (30) the projection for minimum 
pensions/old age allowances assumes indexation in 
part to wages, and in some of them (Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Finland, Sweden, Lithuania), the pension 
projection for minimum pensions/old age 
allowances assumes a higher indexation than 
foreseen in the legislation (e.g. to wages despite 
the fact that the legislated indexation postulates 
indexation to prices). Under the assumption that 
the minimum pension/old age allowances are set at 
a level considered to ensure a minimum income for 
subsistence (a basic social safety net), this 
modelling choice may be considered as fairly 
neutral.  
For the countries that assume price indexation, the 
projections, may underestimate the future actual 
spending on minimum pensions due to the political 
need to ensure adequate pension income for older 
people – particularly those at the bottom of the 
income distribution. Still, since in almost all 
Member States the proportion of public minimum 
pensions in relation to total public pension 
expenditure is small, the size of this possible 
underestimation may not be of a very significant 
magnitude. 
2.2. PRIVATE FUNDED PENSION SCHEMES AND 
FINANCIAL RISKS  
Alongside public pensions, private funded pension 
schemes, both mandatory and voluntary, are 
increasingly becoming an important part of 
retirement income, and are likely to be even more 
so in the future. This development is supported by 
policies in a number of Member States; reforms 
that enhance the sustainability of public pension 
(30) It should be noted that for some countries, projection for 
minimum pensions or social allowances are not available. 
This missing data may underestimate pension expenditure. 
systems reduce their generosity, and incentives for 
private pillars are being initiated to fill the gap in 
pension provision.  
Graph V.2.1 shows the private pension projections 
by pillar for the Member States for which data are 
available. The graph is not comprehensive; for 
some countries' private pensions schemes it was 
not possible to provide data or projections. This is 
in part because the expenditure of non-public 
pension schemes will depend on the assets held in 
them and this can be difficult to quantify. Indeed,  
for occupational pension expenditure, only 
six  Member States (Denmark, Ireland, Spain,  
 Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) 
provided  projections, while only  eleven Member 
States   (Denmark, Greece, the Czech Republic,  
 Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta,  
 Poland, Slovakia and Romania) have   indicated 
that non-public occupational pension   schemes do 
not exist. For the remaining nine countries the data 
are missing. For private  mandatory pension 
schemes, eight Member States   (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,  Poland, Slovakia and 
Sweden) have provided   projections while nine 
Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, 
Spain, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Czech 
Republic and Malta) report that such pension do 
not exist. For private non-mandatory pension 
expenditure, only three   Member States (Spain, 
Slovenia and Sweden) have provided projections 
and five (Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Malta and 
Poland) report that they do not exist. 
A number of countries have implemented systemic 
pension reforms, shifting part of the previously 
public pillar to a mandatory funded private pillar 
(Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden). For the 
Member States for which data on these schemes 
are available, graph V.3.1 shows that while these 
private pillars are making very small 
disbursements for the time being, their importance 
will increase in the future reaching around 1.5 to 
2.5% of GDP in Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, 
Romania, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia and 
Sweden and nearly 5% of GDP in Latvia. As these 
funds have not started to pay out pensions, only 
Hungary and Sweden provided a level of pension 
expenditures by mandatory private funds for 2007, 
although in comparison to GDP the value is close 
to zero. In addition, significant pension income is 
already received in Sweden, Denmark and the 
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Netherlands from occupational pension schemes 
and this is set to increase considerably by 2060. By 
then it is forecast to reach over 3% of GDP in
Sweden, around 9% in Denmark and over 12% in
the Netherlands. It should be pointed out that these 
schemes have been in place for a long time and so
are already providing top-ups to public schemes. 
Pension income from these pension funds is
affected not only by the contributions made, but
also by developments in the financial markets. The
volatility of pension income, at least in the short 
term, with respect to financial markets will depend
on the design of the pension scheme, which can
influence the final effect of shocks on the value of 
the fund's assets. A first distinction is that between
defined benefit and defined contribution schemes. 
In a defined benefit scheme, a contributor to the 
scheme received an pension scheme that is fixed in 
advance – this is the case, for example, in final
salary schemes where the level of pension income 
is set as a percentage of final (or average) salary. 
Conversely, purely individual schemes where 
individuals contribute over the working lives into a
personal fund which is invested and which is then 
used to purchase an annuity are defined 
contribution schemes, where the value of the
pension is a function of the total size of the assets 
of accumulated. Defined contribution schemes are 
typically more affected by the performance of 
financial markets in the short term, although the 
extent to which they are will depend on the 
investment strategy followed. An important
characteristic of such schemes though is that all the
risk associated with the level of pension income is
transferred to the individuals while in defined 
benefit schemes the organisation running the 
scheme absorbs some or all of the risk. 
However, over the longer terms economic shocks
or lower returns to capital will also affect defined 
benefit schemes, albeit while spreading the risk 
between more individuals and over the longer
period.  Over the longer term, however, all private 
pension schemes will need to break even and the 
returns to individuals investing in the schemes will 
need to adjust to reflect the overall returns to 
capital. Nevertheless, for a given individual just
before retirement, there is usually more risk in a 
defined contribution scheme. 
In recent years, many defined benefit occupational 
pension schemes have switched towards defined 
contribution schemes. Most private pension funds
were constructed as defined contribution schemes 
from the beginning. An increasing role of defined 
contribution schemes has and will have important
implications for the pensioners' asset value
Graph V.2.1: Expenditure of non-public occupational, private mandatory and non-mandatory pension (% of GDP) 
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depending on the rate of return and the volatility of 
asset markets. While they provide an addition to 
the pension income provided by the state, they also 
present an element of risk in the event of the 
performance of the funds not matching 
expectations.  
3. CONTINGENT LIABILITIES 
78 
Government debt includes the explicit liabilities 
that governments have incurred through borrowing 
– short and long-term loans and bonds –and that 
they need to service. However, there are a number 
of other government commitments that are 
typically not included in debt. These consist of 
implicit and contingent liabilities. Implicit 
liabilities are not backed up by law, but involve 
spending for which there is an expectation that it 
will continue or materialise. Contingent liabilities 
are those which the government will only need to 
assume if certain situations occur.  
Implicit and contingent liabilities are not mutually 
exclusive categories but different dimensions of 
categorisation. Spending commitments can be 
either implicit or explicit depending on their legal 
backing and contingent or non-contingent 
depending on whether their status depends on the 
realisation of an uncertain event outside the 
government's full control. 
The scale of contingent commitments of the public 
sector can only be assessed by setting out explicit 
parameters that determine what will and what will 
not be considered. This is because aside from the 
explicit contingent liabilities that are backed up by 
legal provision – such as guarantees to borrowing 
of public and private enterprises –, there are also 
implicit contingent liabilities whose scope is open. 
Moreover, even once the scope of liabilities to be 
considered has been decided, the data may not be 
available. Increased interest in contingent 
liabilities due to government support measures in 
the crisis should lead to improved statistical 
understanding and measures of these liabilities in 
due course. An assessment of the value of those 
liabilities and commitments would require an 
understanding of the probability of situations that 
give rise to liabilities occurring, and the size of 
these liabilities under the various outcomes. This is 
an exercise beyond the scope of this report and 
which can only ever be undertaken incompletely.  
In the light of the economic and financial crisis, 
many Member States have taken on explicit 
contingent liabilities to aid the functioning of the 
financial sector. These are presented in the first six 
data columns of table V.3.1, and how they affect 
the public sector risk differs depending on their 
nature. Columns three and four show the approved 
and effective guarantees provides to financial 
institutions. These are explicit contingent liabilities 
as they represent the magnitude of government 
underwriting that will not appear on the 
government's balance sheet unless the guarantees 
are called in. For some Member States these are 
particularly significant. 
In addition to these, the government have aided 
their financial sectors through capital injections, 
the relief of impaired assets, and underwriting 
liquidity and bank support schemes. The capital 
injections appear on the public sector's balance 
sheet and so provide the governments with assets 
which they sell in the future, but whose value is 
nevertheless subject to uncertainty. The asset relief 
and liquidity and bank support schemes, are a 
mixed set of interventions, some of which transfer 
risk to the public sector without an outlay that 
appears in debt, thereby also increasing the explicit 
contingent liabilities of the government (31). 
However, aside from these schemes which have 
been quantified, governments also provide 
guarantees to depositors, which will only impose a 
cost to the government if they are called in. The 
final column of table V.3.1 shows the value of 
limit of the deposits that Member States guarantee. 
While different governments have different 
explicit limits, implicitly it might well be the case 
that Member States with lower limits find 
themselves under political pressure to reimburse 
the full amount of deposits in the event of a bank 
run or collapse. 
(31) For an explanation on the recording in national accounts of 
these measures, see ‘Public Finances in EMU-2009,’ 
section II.1, European Economy,5/2009. 
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Table V.3.1: Public interventions in the banking sector as a share of GDP
Total
approved 
measures
Effective 
capital
injections
Total
approved 
measures
Guarantees
granted
Total
approved 
measures
Effective 
interventions
BE 5.3 6.1 70.8 16.3 8.1 8.1 100 000
BG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
CZ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
DK 6.1 2.4 253.0 2.5 0.3 0.3 100%
DE 4.4 2.0 18.6 7.2 1.4 1.4 100%
EE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
IE 6.6 6.5 164.7 164.7 0.0 0.0 100 000
EL 2.0 1.5 6.1 1.2 3.3 1.8 100 000
ES 0.0 0.0 18.6 2.1 2.8 1.8 100 000
FR 1.2 1.2 16.6 5.5 0.2 0.2 70 000
IT 1.3 0.1 NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 circa 103 000
CY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 000
LV 1.4 0.9 25.7 2.8 10.9 4.7 50 000
LT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 000
LU 6.9 7.9 12.4 NR 0.9 0.9 10000.0
HU 1.1 0.1 5.9 0.0 0.0 2.6 100%
MT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 000
NL 6.4 6.8 34.3 7.7 11.4 5.5 100 000
AT 5.5 1.7 25.7 6.8 7.1 2.0 100%
PL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
PT 2.4 0.0 10.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 100 000
RO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
SI 0.0 0.4 32.8 6.3 0.0 0.0 100%
SK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100%
FI 0.0 0.0 27.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 000
SE 1.6 0.2 48.5 11.0 12.6 0.0 50 000
UK 3.5 2.6 21.7 11.3 16.4 14.7 50 000
EA-16 2.7 1.7 24.6 7.8 4.1 3.0
EU-27 2.7 1.7 20.5 7.8 2.1 1.4
Public interventions in the banking sector (% GDP)
Capital injections Guarantees on bank liabilities
Relief of impaired asset 
and liquidity and bank
support
Guarantees 
on deposits 
(€ or % of 
deposits)
Source: Commission services 
4. TAX RATIO 
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The sustainability gap analysis shows the 
additional resources that must be channelled into 
making the public finances sustainable. A first
option would be to reduce the costs imposed by
ageing population through reform of support for
pensioners or through changes to the labour
market. Previous chapters presented an overview 
of the expected trajectory of the level of pensions
and discussed potential risks around their level.  
Graph V.4.1: Receipts and spending as a share of GDP 
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In the absence of reforms to the costs of ageing, or
cuts in other expenditure categories, the 
sustainability gap  will have to be closed by
adjusting tax revenues. How feasible or easy that is
will depend, in part, on the pre-existing situation in 
the different Member States. Member States with 
high levels of tax revenues, might find it hard to
increase taxation further.  
This is both because it might be politically difficult 
to persuade voting taxpayers to increase taxes and
because economically there might be concern 
about the deadweight cost of high taxes on the 
economy, as higher taxes will usually constitute a 
disincentive to work and reduce competitiveness.
Conversely, amongst some countries with
traditionally high levels of tax, there might be
other factors that would ease the pressure against 
tax raising measures. For example, Member States 
with relatively efficient tax and expenditure 
systems, or which place more weight on
distributional than efficiency arguments, might be 
more willing have larger government sectors. 
Graph V.4.1 shows general government total tax 
receipts (including social security contributions) as 
a share of GDP for the 2000–07 period on average, 
and for 2008, as well as spending over the 2000-07 
year on average. It shows that there is considerable 
variation between Member States' tax receipts, 
with Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia receiving
under 30% of GDP on average between 2000 and
2007 and France, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark
over 45% (32).
None of the countries in the top third of tax 
burdens are amongst the highest in terms of their 
sustainability gap. Instead, countries with 
significant sustainability gaps tend to have low to 
medium tax burdens. It is the countries in the
middle of table with very large sustainability gaps
(Luxembourg, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and
Spain) that will turn into relatively high tax/large 
government economies if they close their 
sustainability gaps mainly through additional
taxation.. 
(32) In addition to tax, countries receive income from property
and own production which is not represented in the graph.
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SUMMARY 
It provides a clear distinction of the degree of risk 
countries might face with regard to long-term 
public finance sustainability and at the same time 
recognises that ageing population represents a 
budgetary challenge over the long-term for all 
countries, albeit to varying degrees. In particular, 
low long-term risk countries also face a risk and 
may need to implement reforms. However, an 
assessment of low long-term risk implies that the 
need for adjustments of the country is less severe 
or less urgent than for countries assessed to be at 
medium and high long-term risk.  
On the basis of the quantitative sustainability 
indicators (Chapter III), the sensitivity analysis 
(Chapter IV) and additional  factors (Chapter V), 
an overall assessment of the long-term risks to 
public finance sustainability the different Member 
States might face is reached, i.e. how important the 
long-term risks to public finance sustainability are 
and where they mainly stem from. This chapter 
sums up the results of the analysis carried out in 
the previous chapters and explains how the 
different factors are taken into account so as to 
reach an overall assessment of the long-term 
sustainability of public finances.   
While this categorisation gives a clear indication 
of the relative degree of long-term risk different 
countries are facing, the overall assessment also 
provides an indication of where the long-term risks 
mainly stem from. In particular, the extent to 
which the long-term risks are mainly related to 
medium-term or to long-term budgetary 
developments is addressed.  
In order to indicate the relative importance of the 
risks, a three level categorisation is used in this 
report: low / medium / high long-term risk, similar 
to the one used in the 2006 Sustainability Report 
and by the Commission and the Council in the 
assessments for the previous rounds of the stability 
and convergence programmes.  
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1.1. THE SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS  
The sustainability indicators provide a firm and 
objective basis to classify the long-term public 
finances sustainability risks in the EU Member 
States, though the margins of error surrounding the 
projections are large, and there are even some 
projection inconsistencies given the partial 
equilibrium approach. 
This report has put emphasis on the more stringent 
S2 indicator. The starting point for the long-term 
projections was the budgetary projection for 2009 
of the Commission’s spring 2009 forecasts. The S2 
indicator is consistent with the concept of 
sustainability of public finances over an infinite 
horizon and is based on regarding budgetary 
developments and on the most recent comparable 
information regarding the long-term impact of 
ageing populations on public expenditure.  
Alongside the S2 indicator, the relative value of 
the S1 indicator is considered as it gives an 
indication of the urgency of any necessary reforms. 
Where the S1 indicator is markedly lower than the 
S2, the satiability constraints will materialise 
further in the future and therefore allows the 
Member State a bit more time to implement the 
necessary reforms without risking as large an 
impact on their government gross debt. 
1.2. ADDITIONAL FACTORS 
To make an overall assessment on the 
sustainability of public finances, other additional 
relevant factors are taken into account in order to 
better qualify the assessment with regard to where 
the main risks are likely to stem from and to 
consider the impact of relevant factors not (or not 
sufficiently) reflected in the sustainability 
indicators. Taking into account these other relevant 
factors may lead to a somehow different overall 
assessment than the one that would result from 
evaluating the sustainability indicators only.  
1.2.1. Additional factors concerning the 
current and medium-term budgetary 
position  
The level of the outstanding government debt is 
arguably the most important additional factor (see 
Chapter V). Indeed, while the sustainability 
indicators already include information on the 
current level of debt, they do not incorporate all 
the specific risks faced by countries with a large 
initial level of debt. First, high-debt countries are 
more sensitive to short/medium term shocks to 
economic growth and to interest rates changes. 
Second, a high level of debt may lead to higher 
interest rate than assumed in the projections and 
increase further the risks to public finance 
sustainability. Third, when calculating the 
sustainability indicators, it is assumed that all 
countries are able keep their primary balance as a 
share of GDP at its current level in the future. 
High-debt countries need to maintain large primary 
surpluses for a prolonged period of time in order to 
reduce their debt ratio. This may prove difficult in 
view of other competing budgetary pressures. This 
factor is used symmetrically as a risk-increasing 
factor for very high debt countries (notably 
Belgium, Greece, Italy and Hungary) and a risk-
decreasing factor for very low debt countries 
(notably Bulgaria, Estonia, Luxembourg and 
Romania). A note of caution is added to 
assessments of France, Portugal and United 
Kingdom, where the difficulties of the economic 
and financial crisis seem likely to add to their 
sustainability risk through high resulting levels of 
debt.  
A country's primary balance is also informative 
with regards to changes to its debt level. A 
negative primary balance is associated with a 
rising debt burden while a positive one with falling 
debt as a share of GDP. The Commission 2009 
spring forecasts are used to look at the structural 
primary balance evolution over the years 2008 to 
2010.  The forecast deterioration of the structural 
primary balance, is seen as risk increasing factor 
for eleven Member States (Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom), 
of which three (Denmark, Latvia and UK) have a 
particularly marked deterioration which should be 
flagged as a strong risk-increasing factor. In the 
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case of Denmark, however, the deterioration 
comes from a very healthy starting position. 
The analysis of contingent liabilities (see Chapter 
V, Section 4) is an increasingly important part of 
the budgetary surveillance process regarding the 
medium-term budgetary developments, as their 
stock is non-negligible and may entail significant 
fiscal risks. However, as data are scarce and only 
available on explicit contingent liabilities and as 
the distinction between explicit and implicit 
liabilities is not so clear-cut economically a level 
of caution must be exercised when determining the 
relative risks of different countries.  
1.2.2. Additional factors concerning the long-
term budgetary developments 
The evolution of the benefit ratio is strongly 
driven by the pension system features and 
therefore by any reforms that have been enacted 
(see Chapter V). A decrease in the public benefit 
ratio usually leads to a reduction (or slowdown) in 
government expenditure in pensions. However, it 
can also lead to other risks to public finances, if: 
(i) it leads to a substantial increase in the poverty 
rate of older people, which may require 
government assistance; (ii) moreover, the projected 
fall in the benefit ratio may be associated to a large 
increase in the relative share of social 
contributions that are diverted from social security 
or other public pension schemes to private 
schemes, which may affect public revenue. The 
sustainability indicators in Poland are clearly 
dependent on such a marked decrease in the 
benefit ratio that there is significant upward risk to 
the sustainability gap from political pressure. For 
Austria, Portugal and Sweden the decrease is also 
an additional risk. Conversely, the high and 
increasing benefit ratio for Greece must be seen an 
indication of the types of reforms that are 
necessary in the country to address its very large 
sustainability gap. 
The assessment is made fundamentally on the 
basis of a central demographic and macroeconomic 
scenario, which is further discussed in the Ageing 
report. However, sensitivity tests provide 
information on the robustness of the results with 
respect to changes in some key parameters. Also, 
different assumptions concerning the main drivers 
of expenditure can have a large impact on the size 
of the increase in age-related expenditures, for 
example concerning the income elasticity for 
health-care. There is therefore some uncertainty 
regarding the size of the sustainability challenge 
that EU countries are facing. Sensitivity tests 
illustrate the possible impact of different 
uncertainties materialising. 
A high current tax ratio leaves limited room of 
manoeuvre for using tax increases to finance 
additional public expenditure as compared to a 
lower tax ratio (see Chapter IV.5). This is the case 
for Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Sweden, with 
Belgium combining a high tax ratio with a need to 
reduce its very high debt.  By contrast, low tax 
ratios are not considered to be a risk-reducing 
factor, since a possible decision regarding an 
increase of the tax ratio would not only take into 
account the financing needs resulting from ageing 
but would depend on the size of public 
procurement of good and services, the 
effectiveness of tax systems, the structure of the 
tax system and its impact on growth.  
1.3. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Table V.1.1 presents an assessment of the long-
term risks associated with the S2 indicator and lists 
the main additional factors that are taken into 
account when reaching an overall assessment for 
the 27 Member States. As noted in this section, 
information on certain factors is incomplete, which 
prevents a fully consistent analysis and use of all 
factors at this stage, e.g. concerning contingent 
liabilities, and the evolution of the benefit ratio.  
The relationship between the overall classification 
and the S2 indicator is shown in Graph V.1.1 
which indicates that in general, the synthetic S2 
indicator summarises the overall degree of long-
term risks well. Specifically, the overall 
assessment is different from an assessment that 
would be based solely on the value of the S2 
indicator in the main scenario in a few cases, 
namely: Both Italy and Hungary are deemed to be 
at medium long-term risk despite a low S2 
indicator due mainly to their very high debt and in 
the case of Italy also to its high tax ratio. Despite a 
very large sustainability gap, Luxembourg is 
assessed as being at medium long-term risk due to 
its low level of debt, the large level of assets and 
the significantly lower S1 indicator which allows it 
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some more time to correct its gap than would be 
the case with a higher S1. 
Finland is assessed to be low long-term risk, 
though the projected increase on age-related 
expenditure is substantial and the fiscal cost of the 
crisis has been large. However, the large stock of
financial assets in the government’s portfolio 
(above 100 percent of GDP) provides a cushion to
absorb the crisis-related deterioration in
government accounts. 
It should be noted that countries with different
characteristics can overall face a similar degree of
risks to fiscal sustainability. For example, the 
projected cost of ageing in BE is high while the 
budgetary position is relatively sound, with a small
structural primary deficit and a very high level of
government debt. By contrast, PL, which is in the
same medium long-term risk category, has a 
projected cost of ageing which marginally
improves its long-term sustainability while its
sustainability difficulties arise from its weak
budgetary position. Despite having the same
classification and S2 gaps within 2 percentage
points of GDP of each other, the priorities are 
different; PL needs to consolidate its public 
finances once the upswing is underway and the
time is right, while BE might consider appropriate 
introducing measures to curb the projected high
increase in age-related expenditure.  
An overall assessment of risks to the long-term
sustainability of public finances is given in the
following section for the 27 Member States. 
Moreover, a more detailed assessment per Member 
State is given in Chapter VI. As noted in this 
section, information on certain factors is 
incomplete, which prevents a consistent analysis
and use of all factors at this stage, e.g. concerning
contingent liabilities. 
Table VI.1.1: Main factors considered in reaching an overall assessment of the public finance sustainability risks 
S2 indicator Level of debt
Change in the structural 
primary balance tax ratio
Difference 
between the S1 
and S2
indicators
Benefit
ratio
Overall
assessment
Baseline 2009 2008 - 2010 %change
BE medium very high – medium
BG low very low low
CZ high low high
DK low low – – – low
DE medium high – medium
EE low very low low
IE high high – high
EL high very high high
ES high medium – high
FR medium high medium
IT low very high – medium
CY high medium – + high
LV high low – – high
LT high low high
LU high very low + medium
HU low very high medium
MT high high high
NL high medium – high
AT medium high – medium
PL medium medium – medium
PT medium high – medium
RO high very low high
SI high low – high
SK high low high
FI medium low – low
SE low medium – – – low
UK high high – – high
Note: '-' factor tends to increase the risk to long-term sustainability, '+' factor tends to decrease the risk to long-term sustainability 
Source: Commission services 
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Graph VI.1.1: Overall risk classification and the sustainability gaps (S2 and S1 in the baseline scenario) 
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The budgetary impact of ageing populations is a 
concern for the sustainability of public finances in 
all EU Member States. There is however a large 
variation in the degree of risks that they are facing 
and where they mainly come from. This section 
summarises the different risks that the EU Member 
States are facing with regard to the long-term 
sustainability of the public finances. Overall, 
thirteen countries are assessed to be at high risk, 
nine at medium risk and five at low risk. 
Compared with the results of the 2006 
Sustainability Report, ten Member States are in a 
higher risk category, while two are in lower risk 
group.  
2.1. LOW LONG-TERM RISK COUNTRIES 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Sweden have 
in general come furthest in coping with ageing, 
which implies a strong budgetary position (running 
large surpluses prior to the crisis, reducing debt 
and/or accumulating assets) and/or comprehensive 
pension reforms, sometimes including a shift 
towards private funded pension schemes, and 
present therefore a low long-term risk. 
Of these countries, Finland has an above average 
projected increase in age-related expenditure over 
the long-term. Although, the large stock of public 
financial assets provides a buffer against the 
negative budgetary impacts of the crisis.  
For Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia and Sweden the 
forecast increases in age-related expenditure are 
amongst the lowest in EU and their budgetary 
positions are either in or close to surplus. This does 
not mean that in these countries there are no risks 
regarding the long-term sustainability of public 
finances however, but that their social protection 
systems (pension and healthcare) at present appear 
able to deal with the pressures of an ageing 
population on current estimates. In particular, in 
case of Bulgaria and Estonia, a positive impact of 
low debt level and implemented pension reforms 
should be seen in the context of the ongoing 
convergence to the levels observed in the rest of 
EU. 
2.2. MEDIUM-RISK COUNTRIES 
The intermediate group of countries (Belgium, 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Austria, Poland and Portugal) consists of Member 
States with very different characteristics but three 
distinct categories can be distinguished: 
Belgium, Germany, Austria are countries with a 
significant cost of ageing and where measures 
might be needed to curb these costs, but which 
currently have relatively strong budgetary 
positions. For these countries, reforms to address 
the rising cost of ageing are a priority and these 
can be undertaken without waiting for the end of 
the financial crisis, insofar as the reforms do not 
adversely affect the recovery. This is also the case 
for Luxembourg which faces the highest increase 
in age-related expenditure of all EU countries, but 
which is included in the medium long-term risk 
category due to its low level of debt, high stock of 
assets and lower ageing costs at the beginning of 
the period as shown by its lower S1 indicator. For 
Belgium, the strong budgetary position in recent 
years is counterweighted by very high levels of 
debt ratio-to-GDP which is forecast to reach 100% 
by 2010. Nevertheless, Belgium is assessed to 
present medium long-term risk because of its track 
record of running consistently high primary 
surpluses over time and reduce its debt when the 
economy is not in crisis.  
France, Poland, and Portugal are countries that 
need to consolidate, though to different degrees, 
their public finances over the medium-term but for 
which the costs of ageing are relatively less of a 
concern, usually as a result of reforms made to 
their pension systems. It may be that the 
government accounts improve when the recovery 
comes, but where this is not the case budgetary 
consolidation will be necessary and should be 
undertaken as soon as the time is right in order to 
reduce risks to public finance sustainability. In 
Poland’s and Portugal’s cases, there is an added 
risk in relation to the sharp reduction in the benefit 
ratio. 
For Italy and Hungary neither the budgetary 
position nor the long term cost of ageing are 
particularly high. However the initial levels of debt 
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give cause for concern. In both Italy and Hungary, 
rapid budgetary consolidation is required to ensure 
a steady reduction of the currently very high level 
of debt, although it will need to be undertaken at a 
time when it does not adversely affect the recovery 
from the economic and financial crisis.  
2.3. HIGH LONG-TERM RISK COUNTRIES  
This category of countries (Czech Republic, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia 
and United Kingdom) are characterised by a very 
significant rise in age-related expenditure over the 
long-term, underlining that measures aimed at 
curbing them will prove necessary. Of these, 
Latvia is the exception, where age-related 
expenditure is forecast to be just 1.3 percentage 
points (p.p.) of GDP higher in 2060 compared with 
2010. For Greece and Slovenia (as well as 
Luxembourg) the increase in these expenditures is 
over 10 p.p. of GDP.  
Conversely, Romania is characterised by very low 
levels of debt which stand at below 20% of GDP, 
while for Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia and Slovakia debt ratios stand at below 
40%. At the other end of the spectrum, Greece has 
a government dent of nearly 100% of GDP, which 
is combined with one of the highest increases in 
age-related expenditure grouping the whole EU. 
Latvia, while characterised by very low debt 
levels, is forecast to have a very large increase in 
debt by 2010.  
For most of the Member States in this high long-
term risk category it will be necessary to address 
both the long-term costs of ageing through reforms 
to pension systems and the weakness of the 
budgetary positions. For some Member States the 
deficits may return to surplus when the recovery 
comes, but where this is not the case budgetary 
consolidation will be necessary and should be 
undertaken as soon as the time is right in order to 
reduce risks to public finance sustainability. 
Conversely, the reforms to the pension and 
healthcare system which will not adversely affect 
the recovery of the Member States' economies 
should be approached with urgency. This is 
particularly the case for countries where age 
related expenditure is a significant source of 
unsustainability: Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, 
Malta, Netherlands, Romania and Slovenia. As not 
all pension and healthcare reforms are neutral with 
respect to the recovery, care should be taken to 
consider the effect of any changes undertaken. 
Within the high long-term risk countries, the case 
of Cyprus should also be noted. Thanks to 
successful consolidation in the pre-crisis years, 
Cyprus managed to significantly reduce its debt 
ratio. Moreover, although the planned increases in 
age-related expenditure is very large, its 
demographic projections are such that the increase 
in ageing-related expenditure will be relatively 
contained in the first half of the projection horizon. 
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1.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on 
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure Belgium has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 5.3% of GDP, which is below the EU average 
(6.5% of GDP). This means that to put public 
finances on a sustainable path, Belgium should 
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 5.3% of GDP. In principle, this 
adjustment could take place via an increase in 
revenues or cuts in expenditure. Alternatively the 
social protection system (in particular public 
pensions, health and long-term care) would have to 
be reformed to decelerate the planned increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Belgian sustainability gap is to a limited 
extent the result of the initial budgetary position, 
as the required adjustment to stabilise the debt 
ratio is slightly positive (0.6% of GDP) but clearly 
below the EU average (3.3% of GDP).  This 
reflects starting position in terms of the structural 
primary balance, which is relatively sounder than 
in several other Member States. On the other hand, 
the required adjustment given the long-term cost of 
ageing (4.8% of GDP) is significantly above the 
EU average (3.2% of GDP). The long-term cost of 
ageing is mainly driven by an increase in pension 
expenditure (by 4.5 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010), 
while health care and long-term care also 
contribute less but still significantly to the long-
term cost of ageing (increasing by 1.1 p.p. and 1.3 
p.p. respectively). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
1.8% of GDP. The difference between that report 
and the current results (3.5 p.p.) stems from the 
deterioration of the initial budgetary position (4.2 
p.p.), while component of the long-term cost of 
ageing actually has fallen (-0.5 p.p.).  
The extension of the projection period from 2050 
(in the 2006 report) to 2060 had no impact for 
Belgium on these results.  
The Belgian government debt in 2009, the base 
year of the analysis, stood at 95.7% of GDP and is 
forecast to increase to around 100% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to 
decrease from 0.7% in 2009 to 0.0% in 2010. 
Belgian debt is far above both EU average and the 
60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria thus 
poses risks for the medium and long term 
sustainability.  
1.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Belgium appears to be at medium risk with regard 
to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
The long-term budgetary impact of ageing is above 
the EU average, mainly as a result of a relatively 
high increase in pension expenditure as a share of 
GDP over the coming decades. The budgetary 
position has worsened in 2009 and now 
compounds the budgetary impact of population 
ageing on the sustainability gap. Moreover, the 
current level of gross debt, which is far above the 
Treaty reference value, adds to the sustainability 
risk. Also, the further deterioration of the structural 
primary balance may widen the sustainability gap.  
Belgium has little scope to increase its already 
high tax burden thus focus should be put on 
decreasing public spending in order to diminish its 
sustainability gap. Further reforming the Belgian 
social security system would improve the 
sustainability of public finances. Reforms should 
however be pursued in a manner that do not 
amplify the fallouts of the current economic and 
financial crisis. 
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Table VII.1.1: Summary table (Belgium) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.3 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.2 12.3 1.7
Working age population (15-64) % of total 65.9 66.0 65.0 63.8 62.4 60.9 59.2 58.6 57.8 -8.1
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 25.9 26.1 28.2 30.6 33.8 37.6 42.3 43.9 45.8 19.9
Participation rate (15-64) 67.3 68.0 69.5 69.8 69.4 69.4 69.7 69.7 69.7 2.4
 - Older workers (55-64) 36.2 39.3 46.0 48.9 48.9 48.8 49.5 49.4 49.1 13.0
Unemployment rate (15-64) 7.5 10.3 6.8 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -1.3
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 1.9 1.0 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 -0.2
Expenditure projections
Pensions 10.0 10.3 10.9 11.8 13.0 13.9 14.6 14.7 14.7 4.8
Benefit ratio 44.8 46.5 47.5 48.2 48.3 47.9 46.3 44.6 43.2 -1.6
Health care 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.7 8.8 8.8 1.2
Long-term care 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.8 2.9 1.4
Education 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 0.0
Unemployment benefits 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 -0.4
Total age-related expenditure 26.5 26.8 27.3 28.2 29.7 31.1 32.7 33.3 33.4 6.9
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 1.5 0.7 0.0
Public debt 89.6 95.7 100.9 103.1 116.3 137.8 199.0 278.1 372.4
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
eloss age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 5.9 0.7 6.6 4.5 1.1 1.3 -0.3 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 7.7 0.7 8.4 5.7 1.1 1.5 0.1 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 4.5 0.5 0.6 3.5 5.3 0.6 4.8 0.3 5.9
Crisis scenario: lost decade 6.1 0.7 0.6 4.9 7.0 0.7 6.4 0.5 7.0
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero mielation Interest rate
AWG scenarios 5.3 0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 2.9 0.2
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.2 -0.7 0.1 0.4 : 0.7
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast elowth in 
unit costs
Slow elowth in
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3 -1.0
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 46.6 47.0
 (End year 2050) 1.8 5.3 4.2 -0.7
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
Graph VII.1.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Belgium) 
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Note on interpretation: This chart allows to compare countries on the 
basis of the main variables that are taken into account in the overall
assessment of sustainability risk per country: S2, S1, the required
adjustment given the initial budgetary position (IBP), the required
adjustment given the long-term change in age-related expenditure 
(LTC), the government debt ratio in 2009, the debt ratio at the end of the 
projection horizon (2060) under an unchanged policy assumption, and 
the stock of financial assets. The scale for each variable corresponds to
the range of data in the EU. Data are in percent of GDP. Countries with
high sustainability risks have each or most of the variables close to the 
centre of the chart; for countries with low sustainability risks, the area in
the chart is larger.
Source: Commission services.
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2.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis indicates that on the 
basis of the current budgetary position of 2009,
based on the 2009 commissions services' spring
forecast, and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure Bulgaria has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 0.9% of GDP, which is clearly below the EU
average (6.5% of GDP). This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Bulgaria
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 0.9% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via an increase in 
revenues or cuts in expenditure. Alternatively the
social protection system would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the planned increase in age-
related expenditure. 
The Bulgarian sustainability gap is partially offset 
by the initial budgetary position i.e. the required
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is negative (-
0.6% of GDP), clearly below the EU average 
(3.3% of GDP). The required adjustment given the 
long-term cost of ageing (1.5% of GDP) is 
significantly lower than the EU average (3.2% of 
GDP). The long-term cost of ageing is driven by 
an increase in public pension expenditure (by 2.2
p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010) and to a lesser extend
by an increase of healthcare and long-term care
expenditure (by 0.6 p.p. and 0.2 p.p. increasing).  
The Bulgarian government debt in 2009, the base
year for the analysis, stood at 16.0% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 17% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
increase from 1.1% of GDP in 2009 to 2.4% of
GDP in 2010. Bulgaria's debt is among the lowest
among EU Member States and way below the
Maastricht limit. 
2.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Bulgaria appears to be at low risk with regard to 
the long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
budgetary position in 2009, with a large structural 
primary surplus, contributes significantly to debt
reduction before considering the long-term
budgetary impact of ageing. Maintaining high 
primary surpluses over the medium-term and
further reforming the Bulgarian social security 
system would limit risks to the long-term
sustainability of public finances.  
The current context of economic and financial
crisis entails that any change exacerbating its
effects should be ruled out, which means that
Bulgaria should keep a prudent fiscal policy
stance.  
Graph VII.2.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Bulgaria) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.2.1: Summary table (Bulgaria) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.2 7.0 6.8 6.3 5.9 5.5 -2.2
Working age population (15-64) % of total 69.3 69.1 67.0 65.4 64.7 64.2 61.3 56.4 53.8 -15.5
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 24.9 25.3 28.2 31.1 33.7 36.3 43.6 55.4 63.5 38.7
Participation rate (15-64) 66.8 67.8 69.9 70.3 69.6 69.0 68.0 67.9 69.3 2.4
 - Older workers (55-64) 46.6 46.4 47.4 48.2 48.8 49.8 49.0 47.6 50.2 3.6
Unemployment rate (15-64) 6.9 7.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 -2.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 5.9 3.5 3.0 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.4 0.3 0.8 -5.1
Expenditure projections
Pensions 8.3 9.1 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.6 9.5 10.8 11.3 3.0
Benefit ratio 44.4 49.9 47.1 44.3 42.2 40.3 37.3 35.6 35.6 -8.8
Health care 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.4 0.7
Long-term care 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2
Education 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.0 -0.2
Unemployment benefits 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 16.6 17.1 16.5 16.5 16.7 16.9 17.9 19.6 20.2 3.7
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 1.0 1.1 2.4
Public debt 14.1 16.0 17.3 3.4 -3.6 -9.9 -17.2 -11.9 9.8
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
eloss age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 3.2 0.0 3.2 2.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 2.4 0.0 2.4 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.0 -0.3
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 0.6 0.9 -0.6 1.5 0.1 2.3
Crisis scenario: lost decade -1.2 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 0.3 -0.6 0.9 0.0 1.9
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero mielation Interest rate
AWG scenarios 0.9 0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.3
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 1.9 0.6
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast elowth in 
unit costs
Slow elowth in
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 33.9 33.2
 (End year 2050) : 0.6 : :
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source: Commission services.
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3.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure, the Czech Republic has a 
sustainability gap (S2) of 7.4% of GDP, which is 
above the EU average (6.5% of GDP).  This means 
that to put public finances on a sustainable path, 
the Czech Republic should improve its structural 
primary balance in a durable manner by 7.4% of 
GDP. In principle, this adjustment could take place
via both an increase in revenues and cuts in 
expenditure. Alternatively, the social protection
system (in particular public pensions and health
care) would have to be reformed to decelerate the 
projected increase in age-related expenditure. 
The Czech sustainability gap is compounded by 
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(3.7% of GDP), slightly above the EU average
(3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the required 
adjustment given the long-term cost of ageing 
(3.7% of GDP) is somewhat above the EU average 
(3.2% of GDP). The long-term cost of ageing is 
mainly driven by an increase in pension
expenditure (by 4.0 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010),
while health care also contributes to the long-term
cost of ageing (increasing by 2.0 p.p.). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
5.5% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (2.0 p.p.) stems from the 
deterioration of the initial budgetary position (3.2
p.p.), while the component of the long-term cost of 
ageing has actually decreased (-1.9 p.p.) due 
mainly to reforms to the pension and health care 
systems. The extension of the projection period 
from 2050 (in the 2006 report) to 2060 increases
the sustainability gap by 0.7 p.p. 
The Czech government debt in 2009, the base year 
of the analysis, stood at 33.7% of GDP and is 
forecast to increase to around 37.9% of GDP in
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
improve slightly from -2.9% in 2009 to -2.6% in
2010. Czech debt is both below the EU average
and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria, 
however the continuing structural primary deficits
may widen the sustainability gap of its public 
finances. 
3.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The Czech Republic appears to be at high risk with 
regard to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. The long-term budgetary impact of
ageing is above the EU average according to the 
projections made in 2009. The budgetary position 
in 2009 compounds the budgetary impact of
population ageing on the sustainability gap.
Improving the primary balance over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system would contribute to reducing risks to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis 
Graph VII.3.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (The Czech 
Republic) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.3.1: Summary table (The Czech Republic) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.4 10.2 9.9 9.5 -0.8
Working age population (15-64) % of total 71.2 70.5 67.5 65.1 64.5 64.3 61.6 56.5 54.4 -16.9
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 20.2 21.8 26.5 31.1 33.8 35.7 42.7 54.8 61.4 41.2
Participation rate (15-64) 70.0 71.0 73.5 73.9 72.9 72.5 72.3 73.5 73.5 3.6
 - Older workers (55-64) 48.9 53.0 56.8 58.1 58.5 60.8 63.4 66.8 67.5 18.6
Unemployment rate (15-64) 5.3 7.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 -0.8
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 3.9 2.9 3.0 2.5 1.6 1.4 0.9 0.7 1.1 -2.8
Expenditure projections
Pensions 7.8 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.1 8.4 10.2 11.0 3.3
Benefit ratio 45.2 41.6 38.7 36.8 35.7 35.4 36.5 37.6 37.6 -7.5
Health care 6.2 6.4 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.4 7.8 8.1 8.4 2.2
Long-term care 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4
Education 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.2 -0.3
Unemployment benefits 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 17.9 17.0 16.9 17.2 17.7 18.1 19.8 22.0 23.4 5.5
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -2.3 -2.9 -2.6
Public debt 29.8 33.7 37.9 65.9 87.4 114.9 192.4 317.0 486.7
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
eloss age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 6.3 0.0 6.3 4.0 2.0 0.4 0.0 -0.3
Crisis scenario: lost decade 6.3 0.0 6.3 4.0 1.9 0.4 0.0 -0.3
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 5.3 3.6 -0.3 1.9 7.4 3.7 3.7 0.6 4.6
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.3 3.6 -0.3 2.0 7.5 3.8 3.7 0.6 4.6
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero mielation Interest rate
AWG scenarios 7.4 0.5 -0.1 0.5 0.5 1.1 -0.6
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.4 0.4 1.1
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast elowth in 
unit costs
Slow elowth in
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.3
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 36.7 35.9
 (End year 2050) 5.5 6.7 3.2 -1.9
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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4.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure, Denmark has a negative sustainability
gap (S2) of -0.2% of GDP, which is clearly below 
the EU average (6.5% of GDP). 
While the Danish sustainability gap is negative, the 
required adjustment given the long-term cost of 
ageing is positive (1.4% of GDP), which is below 
the EU average (3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the 
initial budgetary position, i.e. the required
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is negative (-
1.6% of GDP) clearly below the EU average (3.2% 
of GDP). The increase in the long-term cost of 
ageing is mainly driven by long-term care and 
health care expenditure (increasing by 1.5 p.p. and 
0.9 p.p. respectively in 2060 relative to 2010),
while the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP
decreases by 0.2 p.p. 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
negative (-2.2% of GDP). The difference between 
that report and the current results (2.0 p.p.) stems
mainly from the deterioration of the initial
budgetary position (4.5 p.p.), while the component
of the long-term cost of ageing has decreased by
2.1 p.p. The extension of the projection period
from 2050 (in the 2006 report) to 2060 decreases 
the sustainability gap by 0.4 p.p. 
The Danish government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 32.5% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 33% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease from 2.8% in 2009 to 1.2% in 2010.
Danish debt is both below the EU average and the
60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria.  
4.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Denmark appears to be at low risk with regard to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of the cost of ageing is 
lower than on average in the EU, notably due to 
the recent pension reform. Moreover, the 
budgetary position with a structural surplus will 
further limit risks to the sustainability of public 
finances. 
High primary surpluses over the medium term
would contribute to reducing risks to the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. Reforms should 
however be pursued in a manner that do not
amplify the fallouts of the current economic and 
financial crisis. 
In addition, Denmark gave guarantees to its
banking sector which if actually granted, could
threaten the sustainability of Danish public 
finances, due to their magnitude.  
Graph VII.4.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Denmark) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.4.1: Summary table (Denmark) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 0.5
Working age population (15-64) % of total 66.1 65.5 64.1 63.1 62.0 60.3 58.2 59.2 58.7 -7.4
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 23.2 25.0 29.1 31.8 34.5 37.8 42.7 41.3 42.7 19.5
Participation rate (15-64) 80.3 79.8 79.8 79.6 79.6 79.6 80.6 81.0 80.8 0.6
 - Older workers (55-64) 61.3 60.3 61.1 62.6 64.4 64.0 66.6 70.3 69.3 8.1
Unemployment rate (15-64) 3.8 6.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 -0.6
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 1.7 0.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.6 -0.1
Expenditure projections
Pensions 9.1 9.4 10.2 10.6 10.5 10.6 10.4 9.6 9.2 0.1
Benefit ratio 39.4 39.4 38.9 38.3 38.0 38.3 37.7 37.5 37.8 -1.6
Health care 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 1.0
Long-term care 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.2 1.5
Education 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.2 0.2
Unemployment benefits 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 -0.2
Total age-related expenditure 24.8 25.2 26.5 27.4 27.5 28.1 28.6 27.9 27.4 2.6
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 5.6 2.8 1.2
Public debt 33.3 32.5 33.7 12.2 10.3 11.3 17.4 21.3 18.3
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 1.0 1.2 2.2 -0.2 0.9 1.5 0.1 -1.1
Crisis scenario: lost decade 0.8 1.2 2.0 -0.3 0.8 1.4 0.0 -1.1
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario -0.6 -1.9 -0.5 1.8 -0.2 -1.6 1.4 0.0 1.9
Crisis scenario: lost decade -0.8 -1.9 -0.5 1.6 -0.4 -1.6 1.2 0.0 1.9
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios -0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 1.2 0.3
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.2 -0.5 0.1 0.4 : 0.6
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 -1.2
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 49.4 50.0
 (End year 2050) -2.2 0.1 4.5 -2.1
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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5.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on 
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure Germany has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 4.2% of GDP, which is significantly below the 
EU average (6.5% of GDP). This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Germany 
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 4.2% of GDP. In principle, this 
adjustment could take place via an increase in 
revenues or cuts in expenditure. The new 
budgetary rule anchored in the German 
Constitution, setting a 0.35% of GDP ceiling for 
the federal budget in structural terms as of 2016 
and prescribing structurally balanced budgets for 
the Länder governments as of 2020, will be a 
cornerstone of future consolidation efforts. In 
parallel, the social protection system would have to 
be reformed further and the achievements of the 
past reforms would have to be preserved. In 
particular, recent deviation from the pension 
adjustment formula resulting in higher outlays for 
pension benefits in 2008 and 2009 would have to 
be reversed as envisaged as of 2010. 
The German sustainability gap is slightly 
compounded by the initial budgetary position, i.e. 
the required adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is 
positive (0.9% of GDP), clearly below the EU 
average (3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the required 
adjustment given the long-term cost of ageing 
(3.3% of GDP) is close to the EU average (3.2% of 
GDP). The long-term cost of ageing is mainly 
driven by an increase in pension expenditure (by 
2.6 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010), while health care 
and long-term care contribute to the long-term cost 
of ageing by a lesser but still significant amount 
(increasing by 1.6 p.p. and 1.4 p.p. of GDP 
respectively). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
4.4% of GDP.  
The difference between that report and the current 
results (-0.2 p.p.) stems from the improvement of 
the initial budgetary position (0.5 p.p.), while the 
component of the long-term cost of ageing has 
increased slightly (0.1 p.p.). The extension of the 
projection period from 2050 (in the 2006 report) 
increases the sustainability gap by 0.2 p.p.  
The German government debt in 2009, the base 
year of the analysis, stood at 73.4% of GDP and is 
forecast to increase to around 78% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is projected 
to decrease from 0.6% in 2009 to -0.9% in 2010. 
German debt is above both the EU average and the 
60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria which 
poses risks for the medium and long term. The 
deterioration of its structural primary balance may 
also pose some risk for the long-term sustainability 
of its public finances. 
5.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Germany appears to be at medium risk with regard 
to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
The long-term budgetary impact of ageing is close 
to the EU average. The budgetary position has 
worsened in 2009 and now compounds the 
budgetary impact of population ageing on the 
sustainability gap. Moreover the current level of 
gross debt is above the Treaty reference value and 
on a rising trend. The decrease of the structural 
primary balance may widen the sustainability gap.  
Improving primary surpluses over the medium 
term, preserving the achievements of past pension 
reforms and further reforms to the social security 
system aimed at curbing the increase in age-related 
expenditures would contribute to reducing risks to 
the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner 
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current 
economic and financial crisis. 
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Table VII.5.1: Summary table (Germany) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 82.3 82.1 81.9 81.5 80.9 80.2 77.8 74.5 70.8 -11.6
Working age population (15-64) % of total 66.3 66.0 65.9 64.6 62.6 59.7 56.7 56.2 55.0 -11.3
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 29.9 31.2 32.2 35.3 39.5 46.2 54.7 56.4 59.1 29.2
Participation rate (15-64) 76.2 77.3 78.7 79.1 78.8 79.3 80.2 79.7 79.8 3.6
 - Older workers (55-64) 57.3 60.3 67.6 69.9 69.6 70.5 74.7 73.9 73.9 16.5
Unemployment rate (15-64) 8.4 10.4 7.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -2.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 0.9 0.8 1.9 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.1
Expenditure projections
Pensions 10.4 10.2 10.1 10.5 11.0 11.5 12.1 12.3 12.8 2.3
Benefit ratio 51.4 50.4 49.7 49.7 47.8 45.9 42.9 42.5 42.5 -8.9
Health care 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.5 9.0 9.2 9.2 1.8
Long-term care 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.4 1.4
Education 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 -0.4
Unemployment benefits 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.3
Total age-related expenditure 23.6 23.3 23.2 23.6 24.5 25.4 26.9 27.8 28.4 4.8
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 1.6 0.6 -0.9
Public debt 65.9 73.4 78.7 77.7 86.8 102.5 152.1 222.1 318.9
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 5.1 0.0 5.1 2.5 1.6 1.4 -0.4 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 6.7 0.0 6.7 3.9 1.5 1.5 -0.3 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 3.1 0.8 0.2 2.1 4.2 0.9 3.3 0.4 5.0
Crisis scenario: lost decade 4.7 1.0 0.2 3.6 5.8 1.0 4.8 0.6 5.7
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 4.2 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 1.9 0.1
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 : 0.6
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.9
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 40.7 41.1
 (End year 2050) 4.4 4.0 -0.5 0.1
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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Source: Commission services.
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6.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary of 2009, position based on 
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Estonia has a sustainability gap (S2)
of 1.0% of GDP, which is clearly below the EU
average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Estonia 
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 1.0% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure.  
The Estonian sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(1.0% of GDP), below the EU average (3.2% of 
GDP). The sustainability gap is mitigated by the 
required adjustment given the long-term cost of 
ageing is negative (-0.1% of GDP) and clearly 
lower than the EU average (3.3% of GDP). The 
long-term cost of ageing are driven by an increase
in health care expenditure (by 1.1 p.p. in 2060 
relative to 2010), while long-term care expenditure 
contribute less to the long-term cost of ageing
(increasing by 0.1 p.p.). At the same time, the GDP 
share of pension expenditure is expected to fall by 
1.6 p.p. 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
-3.4% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (4.4 p.p.) stems mainly from 
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(2.9 p.p.), while the component of the long-term
cost of ageing has increased by 1.5 p.p. The
extension of the projection period from 2050 (in 
the 2006 report) to 2060 had no impact for Estonia
on these results. 
The Estonian government debt in 2009, the base 
year of the analysis, stood at 6.8% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 8% of GDP in 2010. 
The structural primary balance is forecast to
increase from -0.6% in 2009 to -1.4% in 2010. 
Estonian debt is well below the EU average and
the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria. 
Despite the deterioration of its structural primary
balance, Estonia has sustainable public finances.  
6.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Estonia appears to be at low risk with regard to the
long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is among the
lowest in the EU, mainly due to the reforms of the 
pension system, and social protection system at 
present appears able to deal with the pressures of 
an ageing population based on current estimates.
However, the adjustment needed due to the
structural primary deficit in 2009 outweighs the 
budgetary impact of population ageing and 
increases the sustainability gap. This assessment
should be seen in the context of the ongoing cost
convergence, as well as an initially low level of 
total age-related expenditure compared to the EU 
average level. 
Improving the primary balance over the medium
term would contribute to reducing risks to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.6.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Estonia) 
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Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.6.1: Summary table (Estonia) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 -0.2
Working age population (15-64) % of total 68.0 67.9 66.1 64.3 63.5 63.2 62.1 58.1 55.3 -12.7
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 25.1 25.0 26.7 29.2 31.9 34.4 39.0 47.2 55.6 30.5
Participation rate (15-64) 72.9 74.4 75.4 75.4 74.6 74.3 74.1 73.7 74.5 1.6
 - Older workers (55-64) 62.4 63.3 60.6 62.8 63.7 64.6 64.5 61.9 64.1 1.7
Unemployment rate (15-64) 4.7 14.1 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 -1.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 4.8 1.0 3.2 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.0 0.6 1.2 -3.6
Expenditure projections
Pensions 5.6 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.3 4.9 -0.7
Benefit ratio 26.5 33.7 31.8 29.2 26.9 24.8 21.9 18.5 15.8 -10.6
Health care 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.8 6.0 6.1 1.2
Long-term care 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Education 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.5 -0.2
Unemployment benefits 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 14.3 14.8 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.6 14.4 14.7 14.7 0.4
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -3.9 -0.6 -1.4
Public debt 4.8 6.8 7.8 19.2 23.7 28.5 40.1 57.4 81.4
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -1.6 1.1 0.1 0.3 -0.3
Crisis scenario: lost decade -0.5 0.0 -0.5 -2.0 1.0 0.1 0.4 -0.4
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 0.3 1.0 -0.6 -0.2 1.0 1.1 -0.1 0.1 0.3
Crisis scenario: lost decade 0.1 1.1 -0.6 -0.5 0.7 1.2 -0.5 0.1 0.1
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 1.0 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.3 1.3 0.8
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 32.8 31.2
 (End year 2050) -3.4 1.0 2.9 1.5
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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7.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure, Ireland has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 15.0% of GDP, which is clearly above the EU
average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Ireland 
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 15.0% of GDP. In principle, 
this adjustment could take place via both an
increase in revenues and cuts in expenditure.
Additionally, the social protection system (in
particular public pensions and health care) would
have to be reformed to decelerate the projected
increase in age-related expenditure. 
The Irish sustainability gap is compounded by the 
initial budgetary position, i.e. the required
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(8.3% of GDP), clearly above the EU average
(3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the required 
adjustment given the long-term cost of ageing 
(6.7% of GDP) is again clearly above the EU 
average (3.2% of GDP). The long-term cost of
ageing is mainly driven by an increase in pension 
expenditure (by 5.9 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010),
while health care and long-term care also 
contribute less but still significantly to the long-
term cost of ageing (increasing by 1.7 p.p. and 1.3
p.p. of GDP respectively). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
2.9% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (12.1 p.p.) stems from the 
deterioration of the initial budgetary position (11.6 
p.p.), while the component of the long-term cost of 
ageing has decreased by 0.7 p.p. The extension of
the projection period from 2050 (in the 2006 
report) to 2060 increases the sustainability gap by
1.2 p.p. 
The Irish government debt in 2009, the base year
of the analysis, stood at to 61.2% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 80% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
deteriorate from -7.6% % in 2009 to -9.0% in 
2010. Irish debt is still both below the EU average 
but already above the 60% ceiling set by the
Maastricht criteria. The widening of already large 
structural primary deficits will aggravate the stance 
of Irish public finances. 
7.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Ireland appears to be at high risk with regard to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is well 
above the EU average, mainly as a result of a
relatively high projected increase in pension 
expenditure over the coming decades. The
budgetary position in 2009 compounds the 
budgetary impact of population ageing on the 
sustainability gap.
Improving the primary balance over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system would contribute to reducing the high risks
to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
In addition, the extent of guarantees on bank
liabilities granted should be considered a potential 
risk factor. 
Graph VII.7.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Ireland) 
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Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.7.1: Summary table (Ireland) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 4.3 4.6 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.8 2.4
Working age population (15-64) % of total 68.6 68.0 66.6 65.6 65.2 65.1 63.3 58.8 57.8 -10.7
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 16.1 16.7 18.4 20.2 22.3 24.6 30.6 40.4 43.6 27.4
Participation rate (15-64) 72.5 73.9 75.2 75.7 75.7 75.7 76.0 76.3 76.3 3.9
 - Older workers (55-64) 55.1 57.1 62.3 65.6 66.6 68.1 68.6 68.3 69.1 14.0
Unemployment rate (15-64) 4.6 15.7 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 0.5
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 3.7 -1.2 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 1.8 1.6 2.0 -1.7
Expenditure projections
Pensions 5.2 5.5 5.9 6.4 7.0 7.5 8.7 10.5 11.3 6.1
Benefit ratio 27.3 28.5 29.1 29.7 30.0 30.4 31.0 31.5 31.6 4.3
Health care 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.9 7.3 7.6 1.8
Long-term care 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.2 1.3
Education 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.2 -0.3
Unemployment benefits 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.1
Total age-related expenditure 17.2 17.5 18.0 18.7 19.5 20.3 21.9 24.5 26.2 8.9
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -6.4 -7.6 -9.0
Public debt 43.2 61.2 79.7 154.7 203.8 260.8 403.8 606.3 848.5
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 8.7 0.0 8.7 5.9 1.7 1.3 -0.2 -0.1
Crisis scenario: lost decade 14.9 0.0 14.9 10.1 1.5 2.2 1.1 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 12.1 8.2 0.2 3.7 15.0 8.3 6.7 0.7 7.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 16.7 8.6 0.2 7.9 20.6 8.5 12.1 1.1 11.1
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 15.0 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.1 1.8 -0.7
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.2 -0.6 0.0 0.4 : 0.8
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 -1.0
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 30.0 31.7
 (End year 2050) 2.9 13.8 11.6 -0.7
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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8.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Greece has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 14.1% of GDP, which is clearly above the EU
average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Greece
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 14.1% of GDP. In principle, 
this adjustment could take place via both an
increase in revenues and cuts in expenditure.
Additionally, the social protection system (in
particular public pensions) would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Greek sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(2.6% of GDP), below the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (11.5% of GDP) is
clearly above the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The
long-term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an 
increase in pension expenditure (by 12.5 p.p. of
GDP in 2060 relative to 2010). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
3.0% of GDP (33). The difference between that 
report and the current results (11.0 p.p.) stems 
mainly from the increase in the long term cost of 
ageing (9.9 p.p.), while the deterioration of the 
initial budgetary position has a clearly smaller
impact (0.7). The extension of the projection
period from 2050 (in the 2006 report) to 2060
increases the sustainability gap by 0.5 p.p. 
Greek debt is far above both the EU average and
the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria. The 
Greek government debt in 2009, the base year of
the analysis, stood at 103.3% of GDP and is 
(33) In 2006 no pension projections were available for Greece, 
and the rise in age-related expenditure was therefore 
underestimated.
forecast to increase to around 108% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
improve from -0.9% in 2009 to 0.3% in 2010.  
8.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Greece appears to be at high long-term risk with 
regard to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. The long-term budgetary impact of
ageing is well above the EU average, mainly as a
result of a relatively high increase in pension
expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming 
decades. The budgetary position in 2009 
compounds the budgetary impact of population
ageing on the sustainability gap.
Improving primary surpluses over the medium
term and especially a further reform of the pension 
system aimed at curbing the substantial increase in 
age-related expenditures would contribute to
reducing risks to the long-term sustainability of
public finances. Reforms should however be
pursued in a manner that do not amplify the 
fallouts of the current economic and financial
crisis. 
Graph VII.8.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Greece) 
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Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.8.1: Summary table (Greece) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 11.2 11.3 11.5 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.4 11.1 -0.1
Working age population (15-64) % of total 67.1 66.8 65.5 64.5 63.8 62.8 58.9 55.3 55.4 -11.7
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 27.6 28.2 30.6 32.8 35.4 38.5 48.2 57.0 57.1 29.5
Participation rate (15-64) 67.1 68.2 69.3 69.4 68.8 68.3 68.4 69.1 68.8 1.7
 - Older workers (55-64) 44.3 44.8 47.1 48.7 50.4 50.9 51.5 51.3 51.7 7.5
Unemployment rate (15-64) 8.3 9.7 7.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -2.1
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 3.5 2.0 2.7 2.9 1.8 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.4 -2.1
Expenditure projections
Pensions 11.7 11.6 12.2 13.2 14.8 17.1 21.4 24.0 24.1 12.4
Benefit ratio 73.1 72.2 74.7 77.9 81.4 85.6 86.9 83.7 80.5 7.4
Health care 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.4 1.4
Long-term care 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.5 3.1 3.6 2.2
Education 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.7 0.0
Unemployment benefits 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1
Total age-related expenditure 22.1 21.9 22.7 23.9 25.9 28.5 33.6 37.2 37.9 15.9
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -2.1 -0.9 0.3
Public debt 97.6 103.3 107.9 133.7 160.3 205.9 360.5 596.5 884.0
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 16.0 0.0 16.0 12.5 1.3 2.1 0.1 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 15.1 0.0 15.1 3.8 1.3 2.1 7.9 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 10.8 2.4 0.7 7.7 14.1 2.6 11.5 1.1 12.7
Crisis scenario: lost decade 10.1 2.5 0.7 6.9 13.3 2.7 10.6 1.0 12.3
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 14.1 0.3 -1.3 -0.4 0.1 2.2 :
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 : 0.7
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 -1.4
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 33.8 34.6
 (End year 2050) 3.0 13.6 0.7 9.9
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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9.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure, Spain has a sustainability gap (S2) of 
11.8% of GDP, which is clearly above the EU
average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Spain should
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 11.8% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Additionally, the 
social protection system (in particular public
pensions and health care) would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Spanish sustainability gap is compounded by 
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(6.1% of GDP), clearly above the EU average
(3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the required 
adjustment given the long-term cost of ageing 
(5.7% of GDP) is again clearly above the EU 
average (3.3% of GDP). The long-term cost of
ageing is mainly driven by an increase in pension 
expenditure (by 6.2 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010),
while health care and long-term care also 
contribute less but still significantly to the long-
term cost of ageing (increasing by 1.6 p.p. and 0.7
p.p. respectively). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
3.2% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (8.6 p.p.) stems from the 
deterioration of the initial budgetary position (8.9
p.p.), while the component of the long-term cost of 
ageing has decreased by 0.5 p.p. The extension of
the projection period from 2050 (in the 2006 
report) to 2060 increases the sustainability gap by
0.2 p.p. 
The Spanish government debt in 2009, the base 
year of the analysis, stood at to 50.8% of GDP and
is forecast to increase to around 62% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
deteriorate from -5.2% % in 2009 to -6.2% in 
2010. Spanish debt is still both below the EU 
average and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht 
criteria, however the widening of already large
structural primary deficits will bring Spanish 
government debt above the Maastricht limit 
already in 2010 and will aggravate the stance of its 
public finances. 
9.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Spain appears to be at high risk with regard to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is well 
above the EU average, mainly as a result of a
relatively high increase in pension expenditure as a 
share of GDP over the coming decades. The
budgetary position in 2009 compounds the 
budgetary impact of population ageing on the 
sustainability gap.
Improving the primary balance over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system would contribute to reducing the high risks
to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.9.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Spain) 
ES
S2(0...15)
IBP(-2...9)
LTC(-1...13)
Debt 2009(10...113)Debt 2060(-26...898)
Assets 2007(15...113)
S1(-1...12)
Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
Chapter VII
Sustainability assessment per Member State, Spain 
109 
Table VII.9.1: Summary table (Spain) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 44.5 46.7 49.4 51.1 52.1 52.7 53.3 53.2 51.9 7.4
Working age population (15-64) % of total 68.8 68.3 67.0 66.3 65.7 64.5 59.6 54.7 54.7 -14.1
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 24.2 24.4 25.8 27.4 30.2 34.3 46.4 58.7 59.1 34.9
Participation rate (15-64) 71.6 73.3 75.2 75.7 75.8 76.4 77.2 77.6 77.3 5.7
 - Older workers (55-64) 47.5 51.3 58.4 63.5 66.8 70.9 72.7 73.1 74.0 26.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 8.3 20.5 7.5 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -2.1
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 2.9 0.2 3.1 3.4 2.5 1.8 0.9 1.1 1.6 -1.3
Expenditure projections
Pensions 8.4 8.9 9.2 9.5 10.1 10.8 13.2 15.5 15.1 6.7
Benefit ratio 57.8 62.6 65.9 65.2 63.3 61.0 57.2 54.5 52.2 -5.6
Health care 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.8 7.1 7.2 1.6
Long-term care 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 0.9
Education 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.6 0.1
Unemployment benefits 1.3 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 -0.4
Total age-related expenditure 19.3 20.0 20.4 20.7 21.5 22.4 25.3 28.4 28.3 9.0
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -2.4 -5.2 -6.2
Public debt 39.5 50.8 62.3 111.0 144.5 188.2 320.2 528.0 766.6
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 8.0 0.3 8.3 6.2 1.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.3
Crisis scenario: lost decade 11.5 0.3 11.8 8.9 1.5 0.9 0.4 -0.4
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 9.5 5.9 -0.1 3.6 11.8 6.1 5.7 0.8 6.4
Crisis scenario: lost decade 11.9 6.1 -0.1 5.9 14.8 6.2 8.6 1.0 8.5
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 11.8 0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 2.6 -0.7
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.3 : 0.6
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.1 -0.5
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 34.3 36.2
 (End year 2050) 3.2 11.6 8.9 -0.5
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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10.1. OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure France has a sustainability gap (S2) of 
5.6% of GDP, which is below the EU average 
(6.5% of GDP). This means that to put public 
finances on a sustainable path, France should
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 5.6% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via an increase in 
revenues or cuts in expenditure. Alternatively the
social protection system would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the planned increase in age-
related expenditure. 
The French sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(3.8% of GDP), above the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (1.8% of GDP) is
below the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The long-
term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an increase 
in health care expenditure (by 1.1 p.p. in 2060 
relative to 2010), while pensions and long-term 
care contribute to the long-term cost of ageing by a 
lesser amount (increasing by 0.6 p.p. and 0.7 p.p.
respectively). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
4.0% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (1.6 p.p.) stems from the 
deterioration of the initial budgetary position (2.5
p.p.), while the component of the long-term cost of 
ageing has actually decreased (-0.7 p.p.). The 
extension of the projection period from 2050 (in 
the 2006 report) increases the sustainability gap by
1.6 p.p. 
The French government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 79.7% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 86% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
slightly improve from -2.7% in 2009 to -2.5% in
2010. French debt is above both the EU average
and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria
which poses risks for the medium and long term. 
The continuing structural primary deficits may also 
pose some risk for the long-term sustainability of
its public finances. 
10.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
France appears to be at medium risk with regard to 
the long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is lower 
than the EU average, due to reforms to the social 
security system already enacted. The budgetary 
position in 2009 compounds the budgetary impact 
of population ageing on the sustainability gap.
Moreover, the current level of gross debt, which is
above the Treaty reference value, adds to the 
sustainability risk. Also, the forecast structural
primary deficits may widen the sustainability gap.
Given that France has little scope to increase its 
tax burden, already one of the highest in the 
European Union, focus should be put on cuts in
public expenditure. Specifically, further reforms to 
the social security system aimed at curbing the
increase in age-related expenditures would 
contribute to reducing risks to the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. Reforms should 
however be pursued in a manner that do not
amplify the fallouts of the current economic and 
financial crisis. 
Graph VII.10.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (France) 
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Table VII.10.1: Summary table (France) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 61.5 62.6 64.2 65.6 66.8 68.0 69.9 71.0 71.8 10.3
Working age population (15-64) % of total 65.2 64.8 63.1 61.6 60.5 59.4 57.6 57.3 57.4 -7.8
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 25.2 25.8 29.3 32.8 35.8 39.0 44.0 44.7 45.2 20.0
Participation rate (15-64) 70.3 70.0 70.6 70.8 70.7 70.9 71.7 71.5 71.6 1.3
 - Older workers (55-64) 41.0 39.3 42.9 46.1 47.7 48.8 49.4 48.4 49.3 8.3
Unemployment rate (15-64) 8.4 10.7 7.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -2.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 1.6 0.7 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.2
Expenditure projections
Pensions 13.0 13.5 13.5 13.6 13.9 14.2 14.4 14.2 14.0 1.0
Benefit ratio 63.3 63.3 60.6 57.7 55.0 52.9 50.3 48.3 47.5 -15.8
Health care 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.9 9.2 9.3 9.4 1.2
Long-term care 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.2 0.8
Education 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.6 0.0
Unemployment benefits 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 -0.3
Total age-related expenditure 28.4 29.0 29.1 29.4 29.8 30.5 31.3 31.3 31.2 2.7
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -1.5 -2.7 -2.5
Public debt 68.0 79.7 86.0 122.4 147.4 177.4 250.5 336.5 431.3
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 2.1 0.0 2.2 0.6 1.1 0.7 -0.2 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 3.0 0.0 3.0 1.2 1.1 0.8 -0.1 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 5.5 3.8 0.4 1.4 5.6 3.8 1.8 0.3 2.8
Crisis scenario: lost decade 6.6 3.9 0.4 2.3 6.6 3.9 2.7 0.4 3.3
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 5.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 1.4 :
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.4 : 0.7
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.6
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 44.8 45.5
 (End year 2050) 4.0 5.8 2.5 -0.7
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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11.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure, Italy has a sustainability gap (S2) of 
1.4% of GDP, which is significantly below the EU
average (6.5% of GDP). This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Italy should
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 1.4% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via an increase in 
revenues or cuts in expenditure. Alternatively, the 
social protection system would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Italian sustainability gap is mainly due to the 
required adjustment given the long-term cost of 
ageing (1.5% of GDP), which is below the EU 
average (3.3% of GDP). In contrast, the
sustainability gap is mitigated by the initial
budgetary position, i.e. the required adjustment to
stabilise the debt ratio is negative (-0.1% of GDP) 
clearly below the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The 
increase in the long-term cost of ageing is mainly
driven by health-care and long-term care
expenditure (increasing by respectively 1.0 p.p.
and 1.2 p.p.  in 2060 relative to 2010), while the 
ratio of pension expenditure to GDP is expected to
fall by 0.4 p.p.  
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
3.1% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (-1.7 p.p.) stems mainly
from the improvement of the initial budgetary 
position (1.2 p.p.), while the component of the
long-term cost of ageing has increased by 0.2 p.p. 
The extension of the projection period from 2050
(in the 2006 report) to 2060 decreases the 
sustainability gap by 0.6 p.p. 
The Italian government debt in 2009, the base year
of the analysis, stood at 113.0% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 116% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary surplus is forecast to
stay at the level of 2.0% both in 2009 and 2010. 
Italian debt is far above both the EU average and
the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria 
which poses significant risks for the long-term
sustainability of its public finances. 
11.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Italy appears to be at medium risk with regard to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. The
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is lower 
than the EU average. However pension 
expenditure as a share of GDP remains among the
highest in the EU and the projections hinge upon
the assumption that the adopted reforms are fully
implemented. The budgetary position in 2009 
would be sufficient to stabilise the current debt
ratio but would not contribute to offsetting the 
projected long-term budgetary impact of ageing. 
Moreover, the current level of gross debt, which is 
above the Treaty reference value, adds to the 
sustainability risk.
Achieving high primary surpluses would therefore
contribute to limiting the medium risk to the long-
term sustainability of public finances. Reforms
should however be pursued in a manner that do not
amplify the fallouts of the current economic and 
financial crisis. 
Graph VII.11.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Italy)
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Table VII.11.1: Summary table (Italy) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 59.1 60.0 60.9 61.4 61.7 61.9 62.0 61.2 59.4 0.3
Working age population (15-64) % of total 66.0 65.6 64.5 63.9 63.3 61.6 57.0 55.1 55.1 -10.9
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 30.2 31.0 33.6 35.5 38.0 42.4 54.1 59.2 59.3 29.2
Participation rate (15-64) 62.6 63.7 65.7 66.4 66.9 67.4 67.7 67.9 67.7 5.1
 - Older workers (55-64) 34.7 39.2 48.7 54.0 58.8 62.3 61.9 62.8 63.1 28.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 6.1 9.4 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 -0.3
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 0.9 0.5 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.5
Expenditure projections
Pensions 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.1 14.3 14.8 15.6 14.7 13.6 -0.4
Benefit ratio 68.5 71.3 71.9 70.5 67.5 64.1 57.3 51.7 47.3 -21.2
Health care 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.9 7.0 6.9 1.1
Long-term care 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.8 3.0 1.3
Education 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8 -0.3
Unemployment benefits 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.3 26.6 27.3 28.7 28.6 27.6 1.6
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 1.7 2.0 2.0
Public debt 105.8 113.0 116.1 109.9 109.0 112.2 136.6 173.1 205.9
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 1.6 0.0 1.6 -0.4 1.0 1.2 -0.2 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 1.8 0.0 1.7 -0.4 1.0 1.3 -0.1 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 1.9 -0.2 0.7 1.4 1.4 -0.1 1.5 0.1 3.4
Crisis scenario: lost decade 2.7 0.0 0.7 1.9 1.8 0.0 1.8 0.2 3.5
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 1.4 0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 3.4 :
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.3 : 0.5
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.8 0.3 -0.8
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 43.1 41.8
 (End year 2050) 3.1 2.0 -1.2 0.2
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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12.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Cyprus has a sustainability gap (S2)
of 8.8% of GDP, which is significantly above the 
EU average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to
put public finances on a sustainable path, Cyprus
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 8.8% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Additionally, the 
social protection system (in particular public
pensions) would have to be reformed to decelerate 
the projected increase in age-related expenditure. 
(34) 
The Cypriot sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is slightly 
positive (0.5% of GDP), below the EU average 
(3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the required 
adjustment given the long-term cost of ageing 
(8.3% of GDP) is clearly above the EU average
(3.2% of GDP). The long-term cost of ageing is 
mainly driven by an increase in pension
expenditure (by 10.8 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
8.5% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (0.3 p.p.) stems mainly from 
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(0.4 p.p.), while the component of the long-term
cost of ageing has actually decreased (-1.7 p.p.). 
The extension of the projection period from 2050
(in the 2006 report) to 2060 increases the 
sustainability gap by 1.6 p.p. 
The Cypriot government debt in 2009, the base 
year of the analysis, stood at 47.5% of GDP and is
(34) In February 2009 the Cypriot government adopted a 
pension reform which places the burden on contribution 
increases but does not address the large increases in 
pension expenditures. The effects of the reform were not
reflected in the 2009 Ageing report pension projections.
forecast to increase to around 47% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease slightly from 0.2% in 2009 to 0.1% in
2010. Currently, Cypriot debt is both below the EU 
average and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht 
criteria.  
12.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Cyprus appears to be at high risk with regard to the
long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is well 
above the EU average, mainly as a result of a
relatively high increase in pension expenditure as a 
share of GDP over the coming decades. The
budgetary position in 2009 compounds slightly the 
budgetary impact of population ageing on the 
sustainability gap.
Improving primary surpluses over the medium
term and especially a further reform of the pension 
system aimed at curbing the substantial increase in 
age-related expenditures would contribute to
reducing risks to the long-term sustainability of
public finances. Reforms should however be
pursued in a manner that do not amplify the 
fallouts of the current economic and financial
crisis. 
Graph VII.12.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Cyprus) 
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Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.12.1: Summary table (Cyprus) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.5
Working age population (15-64) % of total 69.8 70.3 69.3 67.5 66.1 65.4 64.9 61.7 58.8 -10.9
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 17.6 18.0 19.9 22.3 24.9 27.4 30.8 37.7 44.5 26.8
Participation rate (15-64) 72.9 74.6 76.9 78.5 78.6 78.4 78.0 78.0 78.0 5.1
 - Older workers (55-64) 57.6 58.9 61.1 62.7 63.1 64.6 66.6 65.4 65.1 7.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 4.0 5.9 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 -0.6
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 2.9 2.4 3.8 3.9 3.2 2.9 2.3 1.8 1.8 -1.1
Expenditure projections
Pensions 6.3 6.9 7.8 8.9 9.8 10.8 12.8 15.5 17.7 11.4
Benefit ratio 53.7 57.6 59.1 60.0 58.2 57.4 59.2 58.4 56.5 2.9
Health care 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 0.6
Long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education 6.1 5.6 4.9 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.7 5.0 -1.2
Unemployment benefits 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1
Total age-related expenditure 15.4 15.5 15.8 16.8 17.9 19.1 21.0 23.7 26.2 10.8
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 2.9 0.2 0.1
Public debt 49.1 47.5 47.9 42.6 51.6 67.8 119.2 204.4 335.5
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 10.7 0.0 10.7 10.8 0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.5
Crisis scenario: lost decade 10.6 0.0 10.6 10.4 0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.5
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 4.6 0.2 -0.3 4.7 8.8 0.5 8.3 0.4 8.9
Crisis scenario: lost decade 4.6 0.3 -0.3 4.6 8.7 0.5 8.2 0.4 8.4
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 8.8 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.6 4.7 :
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.2 -0.4 0.1 0.3 3.1 0.5
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 39.4 33.1
 (End year 2050) 8.5 7.2 0.4 -1.7
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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13.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Latvia has a sustainability gap (S2)
of 9.9% of GDP, which is significantly above the 
EU average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to
put public finances on a sustainable path, Latvia
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 9.9% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Alternatively,
the social protection system would have to be
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Latvian sustainability gap is mainly due to the 
initial budgetary position, i.e. the required
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(8.9% of GDP), clearly above the EU average
(3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the required 
adjustment given the long-term cost of ageing 
(1.0% of GDP) is below the EU average (3.2% of
GDP). The limited increase in the long-term cost 
of ageing is mainly driven by long-term care and
health-care expenditure (increasing by 0.5 p.p. and 
0.5 p.p. respectively in 2060 relative to 2010),
while the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP
remains at the current level. 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
0.8% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (9.1 p.p.) stems only from
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(9.5 p.p.), while the component of the long-term
cost of ageing has actually decreased (-0.1 p.p.). 
The extension of the projection period from 2050
(in the 2006 report) to 2060 decreases the 
sustainability gap by -0.2 p.p.
The Latvian government debt in 2009, the base 
year of the analysis, stood at 34.1% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 50% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease slightly from -8.1% in 2009 to -9.2% in
2010. Currently, Latvian debt is both below the EU 
average and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht 
criteria, however the dramatic size of its structural 
primary deficit poses an additional risk to the 
sustainability of public finances. 
13.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Latvia appears to be at high risk with regard to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is lower 
than the EU average, as a result of the pension 
reforms already enacted. However, the
deterioration of the budgetary position
significantly increases the risks to the 
sustainability of public finances. 
Increasing the primary balances over the medium
term would contribute to reducing risks to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.13.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Latvia) 
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Table VII.13.1: Summary table (Latvia) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 -0.6
Working age population (15-64) % of total 68.9 69.0 67.6 66.1 65.0 64.2 62.4 57.8 53.3 -15.6
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 24.8 25.2 26.2 28.1 31.1 34.6 40.7 51.2 64.5 39.7
Participation rate (15-64) 72.9 74.2 76.1 75.3 74.0 73.9 73.7 72.0 74.2 1.3
 - Older workers (55-64) 60.4 59.3 60.0 58.5 56.2 58.6 58.8 54.4 58.1 -2.3
Unemployment rate (15-64) 6.0 16.0 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 -1.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 5.3 -0.2 3.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 0.7 -0.1 1.1 -4.2
Expenditure projections
Pensions 5.4 5.1 4.8 5.2 5.6 5.9 6.1 5.8 5.1 -0.4
Benefit ratio 24.0 25.7 25.3 25.2 24.3 23.4 21.3 16.1 12.6 -11.4
Health care 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 0.6
Long-term care 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.5
Education 3.7 3.1 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.3 -0.3
Unemployment benefits 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 13.2 12.3 11.8 12.4 13.2 13.5 13.8 13.8 13.6 0.4
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -4.9 -8.1 -9.2
Public debt 19.5 34.1 50.1 122.2 173.6 230.6 385.9 619.7 898.1
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.3 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 1.8 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 9.4 8.8 -0.2 0.9 9.9 8.9 1.0 0.9 2.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 10.2 9.0 -0.2 1.4 10.6 9.0 1.6 1.0 2.5
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 9.9 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 :
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.2 2.5 0.7
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 -0.3
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 29.6 29.4
 (End year 2050) 0.8 10.1 9.5 -0.1
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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14.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Lithuania has a sustainability gap 
(S2) of 7.1% of GDP, which is above the EU 
average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Lithuania 
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 7.1% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Alternatively,
the social protection system (in particular public
pensions and health care) would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Lithuanian sustainability gap is compounded
by the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(3.9% of GDP), above the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (3.2% of GDP) is at 
the EU average. The long-term cost of ageing is 
mainly driven by an increase in pension
expenditure (by 4.9 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010),
while health and long-term care expenditure also 
contribute to the long-term cost of ageing by
growing 1.0 p.p. and 0.6 p.p.
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
1.8% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (5.9 p.p.) stems from the 
deterioration of the initial budgetary position (3.4
p.p.), while the component of the long-term cost of 
ageing has increased by 1.3 p.p. The extension of
the projection period from 2050 (in the 2006 
report) to 2060 increases the sustainability gap by
0.5 p.p. 
The Lithuanian government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 22.6% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 32% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
deteriorating from -3.1% in 2009 to -3.9% in 2010. 
Lithuanian debt is both below the EU average and
the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria, 
however the widening of already large structural
primary deficits may aggravate the sustainability
gap of its public finances. 
14.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Lithuania appears to be at medium risk with regard
to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
The long-term budgetary impact of ageing is at the
EU average, the rise is due mainly to pension
expenditure. The budgetary position has worsened 
considerably in 2009 and compounds the 
budgetary impact of population ageing on the 
sustainability gap.
Improving the primary balance over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system would contribute to reducing risks to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.14.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Lithuania) 
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Table VII.14.1: Summary table (Lithuania) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 -0.8
Working age population (15-64) % of total 68.5 69.2 69.1 67.6 65.7 63.8 61.5 58.1 52.9 -15.6
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 22.7 23.2 24.0 26.0 29.7 34.7 42.8 51.1 65.7 42.9
Participation rate (15-64) 68.1 69.0 70.6 71.0 70.1 69.1 68.3 67.6 68.2 0.1
 - Older workers (55-64) 55.5 58.5 59.9 59.4 56.3 56.0 56.9 54.8 54.1 -1.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 4.3 15.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 -0.8
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 6.2 1.4 3.6 2.5 1.8 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.4 -5.7
Expenditure projections
Pensions 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.9 7.6 8.2 9.1 10.4 11.4 4.6
Benefit ratio 33.1 33.5 33.2 32.7 32.2 31.6 30.3 29.0 27.7 -5.4
Health care 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.6 1.1
Long-term care 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.6
Education 4.0 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.1 -0.9
Unemployment benefits 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 15.8 15.1 14.8 15.1 16.0 16.9 18.1 19.6 21.2 5.4
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -4.5 -3.1 -3.9
Public debt 15.6 22.6 31.9 61.8 83.9 113.9 204.3 341.2 545.9
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 6.0 0.0 6.0 4.9 1.0 0.6 -0.4 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 6.9 0.0 6.9 5.5 0.9 0.7 -0.2 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 5.4 3.7 -0.3 2.0 7.1 3.9 3.2 0.7 4.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 6.1 3.9 -0.3 2.5 7.8 4.0 3.8 0.8 4.7
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 7.1 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.4
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.3 1.6 0.7
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.3
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 30.7 29.2
 (End year 2050) 1.8 6.6 3.4 1.3
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
15. LUXEMBOURG 
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15.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Luxembourg has a sustainability gap 
(S2) of 12.5% of GDP, which is clearly above the
EU average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to
put public finances on a sustainable path,
Luxembourg should improve its structural primary 
balance in a durable manner by 12.5% of GDP. In
principle, this adjustment could take place via both 
an increase in revenues and cuts in expenditure. 
Additionally, the social protection system (in
particular public pensions) would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The sustainability gap in Luxembourg is mitigated 
by the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is slightly 
negative (-0.4% of GDP), below the EU average 
(3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the required 
adjustment given the long-term cost of ageing 
(12.9% of GDP) is the highest in the EU. The 
long-term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an 
increase in pension expenditure (by 7.4% p.p. in
2060 relative to 2010). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
9.5% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (3.0 p.p.) stems mainly from 
the increase in the long-term cost of ageing (3.6 
p.p.), while the initial budgetary position has 
actually improved by 0.4 p.p. The extension of the 
projection period from 2050 (in the 2006 report) to
2060 increases the sustainability gap by 1.1 p.p.
The Luxemburgish government debt in 2009, the
base year of the analysis, stood at 16.0% of GDP 
and is forecast to decrease to around 16% of GDP 
in 2010. The structural primary balance is forecast
to decrease from 1.2% in 2009 to 0.7% in 2010. 
The Luxemburgish debt is both below the EU 
average and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht 
criteria.  
15.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Luxembourg appears to be at medium risk with
regard to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. The long-term budgetary impact of
ageing in Luxembourg is among the highest in the
EU, influenced notably by a very considerable
projected increase in pension expenditure. The
budgetary position in 2009, the low debt ratio, the 
significant assets accumulated in social security, 
and a structural primary surplus contribute to 
offsetting the projected long-term budgetary
impact of ageing populations. However, this is not
sufficient to cover the sizeable increase in age-
related expenditure.  
Achieving high primary surpluses over the 
medium term and implementing measures aimed at 
curbing the substantial increase in age-related
expenditures would contribute to reducing the
medium risk to the long-term sustainability of
public finances. Reforms should however be
pursued in a manner that do not amplify the 
fallouts of the current economic and financial
crisis. 
Graph VII.15.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Luxembourg) 
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Table VII.15.1: Summary table (Luxembourg) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3
Working age population (15-64) % of total 67.6 67.8 67.6 66.9 65.4 63.5 61.1 60.8 60.3 -7.4
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 20.7 21.1 22.3 24.2 27.1 30.8 36.3 37.8 39.1 18.3
Participation rate (15-64) 66.4 67.0 67.1 66.9 66.8 66.9 67.3 67.1 66.8 0.4
 - Older workers (55-64) 33.0 36.4 39.0 40.6 40.9 40.4 41.9 42.3 41.3 8.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 4.2 7.0 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 0.4
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 3.5 1.9 4.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.0 -1.5
Expenditure projections
Pensions 8.7 8.6 8.9 9.9 12.1 14.2 18.4 22.1 23.9 15.2
Benefit ratio 45.8 41.4 38.0 37.0 39.1 39.3 41.1 42.9 44.1 -1.7
Health care 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.8 7.0 7.0 1.2
Long-term care 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.4 3.0 3.4 2.0
Education 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 -0.5
Unemployment benefits 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 20.0 19.9 20.0 21.1 23.7 26.1 31.3 35.7 38.0 18.0
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 2.3 1.2 0.7
Public debt 14.7 16.0 16.4 6.3 14.8 35.6 118.2 253.8 437.5
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 16.2 1.9 18.2 15.3 1.1 2.0 -0.3 -0.8
Crisis scenario: lost decade 16.4 1.9 18.3 14.9 1.0 2.4 0.0 -0.8
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 6.2 -0.6 -0.8 7.5 12.5 -0.4 12.9 0.5 13.6
Crisis scenario: lost decade 7.5 -0.6 -0.8 8.9 13.2 -0.4 13.5 0.6 13.4
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 12.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 6.8 -2.4
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.4 : 0.1
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 -1.6
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 38.6 38.8
 (End year 2050) 9.5 11.5 -1.6 3.6
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
16. HUNGARY
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16.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure, Hungary has a negative sustainability
gap (S2) of -0.1% of GDP, which is clearly below 
the EU average (6.5% of GDP).  
While the Hungarian overall sustainability gap is 
negative, the required adjustment given the long-
term cost of ageing is positive (1.5% of GDP), 
which is below the EU average (3.3% of GDP). In 
contrast, the sustainability gap is mitigated by the 
initial budgetary position, i.e. the required
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is negative (-
1.6% of GDP) clearly below the EU average (3.2% 
of GDP). The increase in the long-term cost of 
ageing is mainly driven by pension and health care 
expenditure (increasing by 2.6 p.p. and 1.3 p.p.
respectively in 2060 relative to 2010), while the 
ratio of long-term care expenditure to GDP 
increases by 0.4 p.p. 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
(9.8% of GDP). The difference between that report
and the current results (-9.9 p.p.) stems both from
the improvement of the initial budgetary position 
(6.2 p.p.) and the decrease in the long-term cost of 
ageing (4.0 p.p.) The extension of the projection
period from 2050 (in the 2006 report) to 2060
increases the sustainability gap by 0.3 p.p. 
The Hungarian government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 80.8% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 82% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary surplus is forecast to
decrease from the level of 3.1% in 2009 to 2.9 in
2010. Hungarian debt is above both the EU 
average and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht 
criteria which poses significant risks for the long-
term sustainability of its public finances. 
16.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Hungary appears to be at medium risk with regard
to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
The long-term budgetary impact of ageing is lower 
than the EU average. However pension 
expenditure as a share of GDP remains above the 
EU average. The budgetary position in 2009 would 
be sufficient to stabilise the current debt ratio but
would not contribute to offsetting the projected
long-term budgetary impact of ageing. Moreover, 
the current level of gross debt, which is above the 
Treaty reference value, adds to the sustainability
risk.
Achieving high primary surpluses and further 
reforms to the social security system would 
therefore contribute to limiting the medium risk to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.16.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Hungary) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.16.1: Summary table (Hungary) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 10.1 10.0 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.7 -1.3
Working age population (15-64) % of total 68.9 68.6 67.4 65.4 64.3 64.5 62.2 57.7 55.4 -13.5
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 23.2 24.2 26.3 30.3 33.3 34.1 40.1 50.8 57.6 34.5
Participation rate (15-64) 61.7 63.4 65.4 66.6 66.8 65.9 64.3 64.9 65.0 3.2
 - Older workers (55-64) 34.1 42.1 46.4 47.2 50.4 50.8 48.8 49.4 49.3 15.2
Unemployment rate (15-64) 7.4 11.2 7.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -1.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 1.4 0.1 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.1 0.8 1.0 -0.3
Expenditure projections
Pensions 10.9 11.3 10.9 11.0 10.9 11.0 12.2 13.2 13.8 3.0
Benefit ratio 38.9 42.3 41.6 41.3 40.1 38.8 37.7 36.6 35.8 -3.1
Health care 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.7 6.9 7.0 1.3
Long-term care 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4
Education 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.0 -0.4
Unemployment benefits 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1
Total age-related expenditure 21.6 21.8 21.2 21.3 21.5 21.7 23.2 24.7 25.7 4.1
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -0.3 3.1 2.9
Public debt 73.0 80.8 82.3 54.4 38.0 21.8 -5.2 -21.1 -26.3
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 3.3 0.7 4.0 2.6 1.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 3.5 0.7 4.1 2.5 1.2 0.4 0.0 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario -1.1 -1.9 0.4 0.4 -0.1 -1.6 1.5 0.0 3.5
Crisis scenario: lost decade 0.3 -1.6 0.4 1.5 0.9 -1.4 2.3 0.1 3.6
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios -0.1 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 1.4 0.2
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.3 -0.7 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.9
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.2
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 40.6 38.1
 (End year 2050) 9.8 -0.4 -6.2 -4.0
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
17. MALTA 
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17.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Malta has a sustainability gap (S2) of 
7.0% of GDP, which is above the EU average
(6.5% of GDP).  This means that to put public 
finances on a sustainable path, Malta should 
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 7.0% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Additionally, the 
social protection system (in particular public
pensions, health care and long-term care) would
have to be reformed to decelerate the projected
increase in age-related expenditure. 
The Maltese sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilize the debt ratio is positive 
(1.4% of GDP), below the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (5.7% of GDP) is
clearly above the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The
long-term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an 
increase in pension and health-care expenditure
(by 5.1 p.p. and 3.1 p.p. of GDP respectively in
2060 relative to 2010), while long-term care also
contributes less but still significantly to the long-
term cost of ageing increasing by 1.6 p.p. in 2060
relative to 2010. 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was -
0.3% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (7.3 p.p.) stems mainly from 
the increase in the long-term cost of ageing (4.6 
p.p.), while the initial budgetary position has 
deteriorated less markedly (1.6 p.p.). The 
extension of the projection period from 2050 (in 
the 2006 report) to 2060 increases the 
sustainability gap by 1.1 p.p. 
The Maltese government debt in 2009, the base 
year of the analysis, stood at 67.0% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 68% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
improve from -0.2% in 2009 to 0.7% in 2010.
Currently, Maltese debt is below the EU average 
but above the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht
criteria. 
17.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Malta appears to be at high risk with regard to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is well 
above the EU average, mainly as a result of a
relatively high increase in pension and health-care
expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming 
decades. The budgetary position in 2009 
compounds the budgetary impact of population
ageing on the sustainability gap.
High primary surpluses over the medium term and 
further reforms of the social security system aimed 
at curbing the substantial increase in age-related
expenditures would contribute to reducing risks to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.17.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Malta) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.17.1: Summary table (Malta) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0
Working age population (15-64) % of total 69.7 69.6 67.4 65.1 63.0 61.8 61.6 58.4 54.9 -14.8
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 19.4 21.2 26.7 31.2 35.9 39.1 41.7 49.8 59.1 39.7
Participation rate (15-64) 59.5 59.4 61.2 63.0 64.1 65.1 64.4 64.4 64.4 4.9
 - Older workers (55-64) 31.6 27.7 32.0 38.1 43.4 50.6 51.6 51.1 50.3 18.7
Unemployment rate (15-64) 6.4 7.7 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -0.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 2.0 1.1 2.7 2.7 1.9 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.0 -1.0
Expenditure projections
Pensions 7.2 8.3 9.1 9.3 9.1 9.3 10.5 12.0 13.4 6.2
Benefit ratio 42.3 42.5 42.3 39.8 37.0 37.4 39.9 41.0 40.0 -2.3
Health care 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.6 6.0 6.4 7.2 7.6 8.0 3.3
Long-term care 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.6 1.6
Education 5.0 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.7 4.0 -1.0
Unemployment benefits 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 18.2 19.2 20.1 20.5 20.9 21.7 23.8 25.8 28.4 10.2
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -1.6 -0.2 0.7
Public debt 64.1 67.0 68.9 85.3 97.1 114.0 173.7 277.3 432.5
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 9.2 0.0 9.2 5.1 3.1 1.6 -0.7 -0.1
Crisis scenario: lost decade 13.3 0.0 13.3 9.3 3.1 1.6 -0.7 -0.1
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 4.7 1.1 0.2 3.4 7.0 1.4 5.7 0.6 6.3
Crisis scenario: lost decade 8.8 1.3 0.2 7.4 11.2 1.5 9.7 1.0 7.3
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 7.0 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.5 1.8 -0.5
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.3 -0.7 -0.4 0.6 1.3 0.9
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 -1.0
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 35.6 33.5
 (End year 2050) -0.3 6.0 1.6 4.6
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
18. THE NETHERLANDS 
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18.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Netherlands has a sustainability gap 
(S2) of 6.9% of GDP, which is slightly above the 
EU average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to
put public finances on a sustainable path,
Netherlands should improve its structural primary 
balance in a durable manner by 6.9% of GDP. In
principle, this adjustment could take place via both 
an increase in revenues and cuts in expenditure. 
Additionally, the social protection system (in
particular public pensions and long-term care)
would have to be reformed to decelerate the 
projected increase in age-related expenditure. 
The Dutch sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(1.9% of GDP), below the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (5.0% of GDP) is
clearly above the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The
long-term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an 
increase in long-term care and pension expenditure 
(by 4.6 p.p. and 4.8 p.p. respectively in 2060
relative to 2010), while health care also contributes 
less but still significantly to the long-term cost of
ageing by increasing by 0.9 p.p. 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
1.3% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (5.6 p.p.) stems mainly from 
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(5.0 p.p.), while the component of the long-term
cost of ageing has increased less markedly (0.6 
p.p.). The extension of the projection period from
2050 (in the 2006 report) to 2060 does not affect 
the sustainability gap.
The Dutch government debt in 2009, the base year
of the analysis, stood at 57.0% of GDP and is 
forecast to increase to around 63% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease slightly from 0.0% in 2009 to -1.6% in
2010. Currently, Dutch debt is both below the EU
average and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht 
criteria, however the decrease of its structural 
primary balance may widen the sustainability gap 
of its public finances. 
18.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The Netherlands appears to be at high risk with 
regard to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. The long-term budgetary impact of
ageing is well above the EU average, mainly as a
result of a relatively high increase in pension and 
long-term care expenditure as a share of GDP over 
the coming decades. The budgetary position in 
2009 compounds the budgetary impact of
population ageing on the sustainability gap. 
High primary surpluses over the medium term and 
a further reform of the social security system
aimed at curbing the substantial increase in age-
related expenditures would contribute to reducing
risks to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. Reforms should however be pursued in a
manner that do not amplify the fallouts of the
current economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.18.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (The 
Netherlands) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.18.1: Summary table (The Netherlands) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 16.4 16.5 16.7 16.9 17.1 17.2 17.2 16.9 16.6 0.2
Working age population (15-64) % of total 67.4 67.2 65.6 64.5 62.6 60.2 57.5 58.4 57.8 -9.7
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 21.5 22.8 27.1 30.7 34.9 40.0 46.8 45.6 47.2 25.7
Participation rate (15-64) 78.7 78.8 79.4 79.5 79.5 79.7 81.0 80.4 80.2 1.6
 - Older workers (55-64) 53.3 53.4 55.3 56.1 56.2 55.8 57.5 57.8 57.6 4.2
Unemployment rate (15-64) 3.2 6.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 -0.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 1.7 0.9 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.3 -0.4
Expenditure projections
Pensions 6.6 6.5 7.2 7.8 8.4 9.3 10.3 10.3 10.5 4.0
Benefit ratio 43.8 41.8 41.6 41.1 40.6 40.4 40.4 40.7 40.5 -3.2
Health care 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.9 5.8 1.0
Long-term care 3.4 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.6 5.4 6.8 7.7 8.1 4.7
Education 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.4 -0.2
Unemployment benefits 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -0.1
Total age-related expenditure 20.5 20.5 21.5 22.6 23.9 25.6 28.5 29.4 29.9 9.4
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 1.7 0.0 -1.6
Public debt 58.2 57.0 63.1 75.5 93.9 121.0 202.2 312.1 450.3
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 6.7 2.7 9.4 4.0 0.9 4.6 -0.2 -1.4
Crisis scenario: lost decade 7.3 2.7 10.0 4.3 0.9 4.9 0.0 -1.4
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 5.2 1.6 0.0 3.7 6.9 1.9 5.0 0.6 6.5
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.8 1.6 0.0 4.1 7.5 2.0 5.6 0.6 6.9
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 6.9 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 1.1 -0.3
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.3 : 0.7
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.3 -0.3 0.5 1.1 0.9 -3.3
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 39.8 39.3
 (End year 2050) 1.3 7.0 5.0 0.6
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
19. AUSTRIA 
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19.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure Austria has a sustainability gap (S2) of 
4.7% of GDP, which is below the EU average 
(6.5% of GDP). This means that to put public 
finances on a sustainable path, Austria should
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 4.7% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via an increase in 
revenues or cuts in expenditure. Alternatively the
social protection system would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the planned increase in age-
related expenditure. 
The Austrian sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(1.6% of GDP), below the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (3.1% of GDP) is
close to the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The long-
term cost of ageing is driven by an increase in 
pension, health-care and long-term care
expenditure (by 1.0 p.p., 1.4 p.p. and 1.2 p.p.
respectively in 2060 relative to 2010), 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
0.3% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (4.4 p.p.) stems both from
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(2.5 p.p.) and the increase in the long-term cost of 
ageing (2.1 p.p.). The extension of the projection
period from 2050 (in the 2006 report) decreases 
the sustainability gap by 0.1 p.p.
The Austrian government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 70.4% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 75% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease from -0.2% in 2009 to -0.6% in 2010. 
Austrian debt is close to the EU average but
clearly above the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht
criteria which may also pose risks for the long-
term sustainability of its public finances. 
19.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Austria appears to be at medium risk with regard 
to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in
Austria is close to the EU average. The budgetary 
position in 2009 compounds the budgetary impact 
of population ageing on the sustainability gap.
Moreover, the current level of gross debt, which is
above the Treaty reference value, adds to the 
sustainability risk.  
In addition, there is a risk that current policy will
not be applicable for the long term as a decrease in
pensions' benefit ratio is forecast (from 55% in 
2007 to 39% in 2060). This decreasing benefit 
ratio may put some pressure on Austrian public
finances and may thus pose risks to the long-term
sustainability of public finances. 
Improving primary surpluses over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system aimed at curbing the increase in age-related 
expenditures would contribute to reducing risks to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.19.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Austria) 
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Table VII.19.1: Summary table (Austria) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.0 0.7
Working age population (15-64) % of total 67.5 67.5 67.2 66.3 64.6 62.2 59.2 58.3 57.2 -10.3
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 25.0 26.0 27.4 29.2 32.7 38.1 46.0 48.3 50.6 25.6
Participation rate (15-64) 74.8 75.3 75.8 75.9 75.7 76.4 77.9 77.5 77.6 2.8
 - Older workers (55-64) 40.0 40.8 45.7 49.6 51.1 52.1 56.1 56.0 55.4 15.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 4.4 7.1 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 -0.1
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 1.6 1.1 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 -0.1
Expenditure projections
Pensions 12.8 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.4 13.8 13.9 14.0 13.6 0.9
Benefit ratio 54.9 54.2 53.0 51.8 50.6 49.4 46.3 42.7 38.5 -16.4
Health care 6.5 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.8 8.1 8.0 1.5
Long-term care 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.5 1.2
Education 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3 -0.5
Unemployment benefits 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 26.0 25.7 25.8 26.2 26.9 27.7 28.6 29.3 29.0 3.1
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 0.8 -0.2 -0.6
Public debt 62.5 70.4 75.2 84.8 97.4 116.7 170.4 245.3 337.8
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 4.0 -0.7 3.3 1.0 1.4 1.2 -0.2 -0.6
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.3 -0.7 4.6 2.1 1.4 1.3 -0.1 -0.6
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 3.8 1.5 0.2 2.2 4.7 1.6 3.1 0.3 4.5
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.3 1.5 0.2 3.6 6.1 1.7 4.4 0.5 5.3
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 4.7 0.6 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 4.4 :
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.4 : 0.8
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.8
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 44.5 45.0
 (End year 2050) 0.3 4.8 2.5 2.1
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
20. POLAND 
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20.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected changes in age related 
expenditure Poland has a sustainability gap (S2) of
3.2% of GDP, which is significantly below the EU
average (6.5% of GDP). This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Poland
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 3.2% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via an increase in 
revenues or cuts in expenditure.  
The Polish sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(4.4% of GDP), above the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In contrast, the sustainability gap is 
mitigated by the required adjustment given the
long-term cost of ageing is negative (-1.2% of
GDP) and clearly below the EU average (3.2% of 
GDP). The negative long-term cost of ageing is
mainly driven by a decrease in pension
expenditure (by -2.1 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010), 
while health care and long-term care contribute to
the long-term cost of ageing positively (increasing
by 0.8% and 0.7% of GDP respectively). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
-0.2% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (3.4 p.p.) stems from both 
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(1.9 p.p.) and the increase in the long-term cost of 
ageing (1.5 p.p.). The extension of the projection
period from 2050 (in the 2006 report) decreases 
the sustainability gap by 0.1 p.p.
The Polish government debt in 2009, the base year 
of the analysis, stood at 53.6% of GDP and is 
forecast to increase to around 60% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
improve from -3.1% in 2009 to -2.8% in 2010. 
Polish debt is both below the EU average and the
60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria. 
However large continuing structural primary 
deficits may pose some risk for the long-term
sustainability of public finances. 
20.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Poland appears to be at medium risk with regard to 
the long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is among the
lowest in the EU but the budgetary position in 
2009 compounds the budgetary impact of
population ageing on the sustainability gap.
In addition, there is a risk that current policy will
not be applicable for the long terms as it involves a 
sharp decrease of the benefit ratio of pensions in
Poland until 2060, which may pose risks to the 
long term sustainability of public finances.  
Improving primary surpluses over the medium
term would contribute to reducing the risks to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.20.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Poland) 
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Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.20.1: Summary table (Poland) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.0 37.6 37.0 35.2 33.3 31.1 -7.0
Working age population (15-64) % of total 70.8 71.5 70.0 67.0 64.6 63.9 62.7 56.8 52.5 -18.3
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 19.0 19.0 21.9 27.2 32.9 36.0 41.3 55.7 69.0 50.0
Participation rate (15-64) 63.3 64.0 65.1 66.1 67.6 67.6 65.4 65.5 66.3 3.0
 - Older workers (55-64) 32.1 33.0 35.5 34.9 41.8 48.1 47.9 46.2 46.5 14.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 9.6 12.1 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 -3.7
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 4.9 3.2 3.1 2.5 2.5 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 -4.4
Expenditure projections
Pensions 11.6 10.8 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.4 9.2 9.1 8.8 -2.8
Benefit ratio 56.2 59.4 53.7 50.9 47.7 43.7 35.9 28.6 23.6 -32.6
Health care 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.0 1.0
Long-term care 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.7
Education 4.4 3.7 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.9 3.2 -1.2
Unemployment benefits 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1
Total age-related expenditure 20.5 19.1 17.6 17.8 18.0 17.9 17.7 17.9 18.1 -2.4
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -3.1 -3.1 -2.8
Public debt 47.2 53.6 59.7 80.4 93.6 108.9 155.7 225.5 318.4
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario -1.2 0.1 -1.1 -2.1 0.8 0.7 -0.6 -0.4
Crisis scenario: lost decade -1.5 0.1 -1.4 -2.2 0.8 0.7 -0.7 -0.4
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 2.9 4.2 0.0 -1.2 3.2 4.4 -1.2 0.3 1.1
Crisis scenario: lost decade 2.9 4.2 0.0 -1.4 3.1 4.5 -1.4 0.3 0.9
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 3.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.5 0.4
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.2 -0.9 0.2 0.5 2.1 0.9
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.4
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 34.4 33.1
 (End year 2050) -0.2 3.3 1.9 1.5
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
21. PORTUGAL 
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21.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure Portugal has a sustainability gap (S2)
of 5.5% of GDP, which is below the EU average 
(6.5% of GDP). This means that to put public 
finances on a sustainable path, Portugal should
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 5.5% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via an increase in 
revenues or cuts in expenditure. Alternatively the
social protection system would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the planned increase in age-
related expenditure. 
The Portuguese sustainability gap is compounded 
by the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(3.7% of GDP), above the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (1.9% of GDP) is
below the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The long-
term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an increase 
in public pension and health care expenditure (by
1.5 p.p. and 1.8 p.p. respectively in 2060 relative 
to 2010), while long-term care contributes to the 
long-term cost of ageing by a lesser amount
(increasing by 0.1 p.p.). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
10.5% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (4.9 p.p.) stems from the 
decrease in the long-term cost of ageing (-5.1 p.p.),
at the same time, the initial budgetary position has 
remained stable. The extension of the projection 
period from 2050 (in the 2006 report) increases the
sustainability gap by 0.1 p.p. 
The Portuguese government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 75.4% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 81% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecasted 
to improve from -2.4% in 2009 to -1.8% in 2010. 
Portuguese debt is above both the EU average and 
the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria 
which may together with the ongoing structural 
primary deficits pose risks for the long-term
sustainability of public finances. 
21.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Portugal appears to be at medium risk with regard
to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
While the long-term budgetary impact of ageing is 
somewhat higher than on average in the EU, 
enacted pension reforms have helped to contain the 
projected increase in pension expenditure over the 
coming decades. The budgetary position in 2009
compounds the budgetary impact of population 
ageing. Moreover, the current level of gross debt is
above the Treaty reference value.  
In addition to overall figures, there is a risk that 
current policy will not be applicable for the long 
term as the benefit ratio of pensions is forecast to
decrease. This might put some additional pressure 
on the long term sustainability of public finances. 
Improving primary surpluses over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system aimed at curbing the increase in age-related 
expenditures would contribute to reducing risks to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.21.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Portugal) 
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Table VII.21.1: Summary table (Portugal) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 10.6 10.7 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.5 11.4 11.3 0.7
Working age population (15-64) % of total 67.3 66.9 66.1 65.5 64.7 63.5 60.2 56.9 56.3 -10.9
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 25.6 26.6 28.6 30.7 33.2 36.6 44.6 53.0 54.8 29.1
Participation rate (15-64) 74.1 75.2 76.1 76.1 76.3 76.4 76.4 76.6 76.3 2.2
 - Older workers (55-64) 54.5 56.9 61.1 63.5 65.0 67.0 67.4 67.5 67.8 13.3
Unemployment rate (15-64) 8.1 9.8 6.9 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -1.9
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 0.4 0.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.2 1.4 1.0
Expenditure projections
Pensions 11.4 11.9 12.1 12.4 12.6 12.6 12.5 13.3 13.4 2.1
Benefit ratio 46.3 49.0 48.2 47.2 45.3 42.3 36.7 34.5 32.7 -13.6
Health care 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.1 1.9
Long-term care 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Education 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.3 -0.3
Unemployment benefits 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 -0.4
Total age-related expenditure 24.5 24.9 25.0 25.2 25.5 25.7 26.0 27.4 27.8 3.4
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -0.9 -2.4 -1.8
Public debt 66.4 75.4 81.5 113.6 134.2 156.1 203.9 282.9 389.9
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 2.8 0.1 2.9 1.5 1.8 0.1 -0.4 -0.2
Crisis scenario: lost decade 4.2 0.1 4.3 2.6 1.7 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 4.7 3.4 0.3 1.0 5.5 3.7 1.9 0.4 3.0
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.9 3.6 0.3 2.1 6.8 3.8 3.1 0.5 4.2
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 5.5 0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 3.0 0.3
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.2 -0.7 0.0 0.5 : 0.8
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 37.8 36.0
 (End year 2050) 10.5 5.4 0.0 -5.1
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
22. ROMANIA 
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22.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Romania has a sustainability gap
(S2) of 9.1% of GDP, which is significantly above
the EU average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that 
to put public finances on a sustainable path,
Romania should improve its structural primary 
balance in a durable manner by 9.1% of GDP. In
principle, this adjustment could take place via both 
an increase in revenues and cuts in expenditure. 
Alternatively, the social protection system (in 
particular public pensions and health care) would
have to be reformed to decelerate the projected
increase in age-related expenditure. 
The Romanian sustainability gap is compounded 
by the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(4.3% of GDP), above the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (4.9% of GDP) is also
above the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The long-
term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an increase 
in pension expenditure (by 7.4 p.p. in 2060 relative 
to 2010), while health care also contributes to the 
long-term cost of ageing (increasing by 1.3 p.p.). 
The Romanian government debt in 2009, the base 
year of the analysis, stood at 18.2% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 23% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
improve slightly from -3.7% in 2009 to -3.1% in
2010. Romanian debt is both below the EU 
average and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht 
criteria, however the continuing structural primary 
deficits may widen the sustainability gap of its 
public finances. 
22.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Romania appears to be at high risk with regard to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is above the
EU average according to the projections made in
2009. The budgetary position in 2009 compounds 
the budgetary impact of population ageing on the
sustainability gap.
Improving the primary balance over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system would contribute to reducing risks to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.22.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Romania) 
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Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.22.1: Summary table (Romania) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 21.6 21.3 21.1 20.8 20.5 20.0 19.2 18.1 16.9 -4.6
Working age population (15-64) % of total 69.8 70.0 69.4 67.9 66.7 66.8 62.6 57.3 53.6 -16.2
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 21.3 21.3 22.5 25.7 29.1 30.3 40.7 54.0 65.3 44.0
Participation rate (15-64) 63.0 63.9 64.7 64.8 64.2 62.4 60.8 60.5 61.3 -1.7
 - Older workers (55-64) 42.4 44.6 46.3 47.1 50.9 48.2 45.6 44.2 45.4 3.1
Unemployment rate (15-64) 6.4 7.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 -0.4
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 5.1 3.2 3.9 2.9 2.2 1.6 1.1 0.3 0.3 -4.7
Expenditure projections
Pensions 6.6 8.4 8.5 8.8 9.4 10.4 12.6 14.8 15.8 9.2
Benefit ratio 29.4 40.0 41.4 42.2 42.5 42.5 39.0 36.6 36.6 7.2
Health care 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.7 4.9 1.4
Long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 -0.5
Unemployment benefits 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 13.1 14.7 14.8 15.1 15.8 17.0 19.3 22.0 23.2 10.1
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -7.2 -3.7 -3.1
Public debt 13.6 18.2 22.7 66.3 91.3 125.1 220.6 390.4 633.8
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 8.5 0.0 8.5 7.4 1.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1
Crisis scenario: lost decade 9.6 0.0 9.6 8.5 1.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 6.9 4.1 -0.4 3.2 9.1 4.3 4.9 0.8 5.4
Crisis scenario: lost decade 7.6 4.2 -0.4 3.8 9.9 4.3 5.6 0.9 6.0
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 9.1 0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.5 0.3 -0.7
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 2.1 0.7
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 29.5 28.9
 (End year 2050) : 8.7 : :
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
23. SLOVENIA 
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23.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Slovenia has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 12.2% of GDP, which is clearly above the EU
average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to put 
public finances on a sustainable path, Slovenia 
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 12.2% of GDP. In principle, 
this adjustment could take place via both an
increase in revenues and cuts in expenditure.
Additionally, the social protection system (in
particular public pensions and health and long-
term care) would have to be reformed to decelerate 
the projected increase in age-related expenditure. 
The Slovenian sustainability gap is compounded 
by the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(3.9% of GDP), above the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (8.3% of GDP) is
clearly above the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The
long-term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an 
increase in pension expenditure (by 8.5 p.p. in
2060 relative to 2010), while health care and long-
term care also contribute less but still significantly
to the long-term cost of ageing (both increasing by
1.7p.p.). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
7.3% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (4.9 p.p.) stems mainly from 
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(3.8 p.p.), while the component of the long-term
cost of ageing has increased less markedly (0.6 
p.p.). The extension of the projection period from
2050 (in the 2006 report) to 2060 increases the 
sustainability gap by 0.6 p.p. 
The Slovenian government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 29.3% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 35% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease slightly from -3.3% in 2009 to -3.4% in
2010. Slovenian debt is both below the EU average
and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria, 
however the decrease of its structural primary 
balance may widen the sustainability gap of its
public finances.  
23.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Slovenia appears to be at high risk with regard to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is well 
above the EU average, mainly as a result of a
relatively high increase in pension expenditure as a 
share of GDP over the coming decades. The
budgetary position in 2009 compounds the 
budgetary impact of population ageing on the 
sustainability gap.
High primary surpluses over the medium term and 
a further pension reform aimed at curbing the 
substantial increase in age-related expenditures 
would contribute to reducing risks to the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. Reforms should 
however be pursued in a manner that do not
amplify the fallouts of the current economic and 
financial crisis. 
Graph VII.23.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Slovenia) 
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Table VII.23.1: Summary table (Slovenia) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 -0.2
Working age population (15-64) % of total 70.1 69.5 68.1 65.4 63.5 61.9 58.9 54.7 53.8 -16.4
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 22.7 23.9 26.2 31.2 36.2 40.8 49.4 59.4 62.2 39.5
Participation rate (15-64) 71.4 71.8 72.5 73.4 72.6 71.7 70.8 71.6 71.9 0.6
 - Older workers (55-64) 34.5 36.7 42.9 48.8 49.5 49.5 49.3 48.3 49.1 14.6
Unemployment rate (15-64) 4.9 7.4 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 -0.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 3.9 2.2 3.2 2.6 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.1 -2.8
Expenditure projections
Pensions 9.9 10.1 10.6 11.1 12.0 13.3 16.1 18.2 18.6 8.8
Benefit ratio 40.9 40.7 39.9 39.0 38.2 38.1 38.4 38.6 38.6 -2.3
Health care 6.6 6.8 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.8 8.2 8.4 8.5 1.9
Long-term care 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.6 2.9 1.8
Education 5.1 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.6 0.4
Unemployment benefits 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 22.9 23.1 24.0 24.9 26.2 28.0 31.7 34.8 35.8 12.8
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -1.3 -3.3 -3.4
Public debt 22.8 29.3 34.9 74.0 108.6 158.8 311.1 540.2 831.6
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 12.5 0.1 12.7 8.5 1.7 1.7 0.7 -0.1
Crisis scenario: lost decade 15.8 0.1 15.9 11.7 1.6 1.8 0.8 -0.2
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 9.2 3.8 -0.3 5.7 12.2 3.9 8.3 1.1 8.4
Crisis scenario: lost decade 11.8 3.9 -0.3 8.2 15.1 4.0 11.1 1.4 10.5
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 12.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 1.0 :
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 -1.1
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 38.0 38.4
 (End year 2050) 7.3 11.6 3.8 0.6
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
24. SLOVAKIA 
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24.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Slovakia has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 7.4% of GDP, which is above the EU average
(6.5% of GDP).  This means that to put public 
finances on a sustainable path, Slovakia should
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 7.4% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Alternatively,
the social protection system (in particular public
pensions and health care) would have to be 
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Slovak sustainability gap is compounded by
the initial budgetary position, i.e. the required 
adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is positive 
(4.5% of GDP), above the EU average (3.3% of 
GDP). In parallel, the required adjustment given
the long-term cost of ageing (2.9% of GDP) is
slightly below the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The 
long-term cost of ageing is mainly driven by an 
increase in pension expenditure (by 3.6 p.p. in
2060 relative to 2010), while health care also
contributes to the long-term cost of ageing 
(increasing by 2.1 p.p.). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
3.0% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (4.4 p.p.) stems from the 
deterioration of the initial budgetary position (3.7
p.p.), while the component of the long-term cost of 
ageing has increased less markedly (0.2 p.p.). The
extension of the projection period from 2050 (in 
the 2006 report) to 2060 increases the 
sustainability gap by 0.5 p.p. 
The Slovak government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 32.3% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 36% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
improve slightly from -3.7% in 2009 to -3.3% in
2010. Slovak debt is both below the EU average 
and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria, 
however the continuing structural primary deficits
may widen the sustainability gap of its public 
finances. 
24.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Slovakia appears to be at high risk with regard to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing, which is
slightly below the EU average, is mainly due to a 
relatively high increase in pension expenditure 
during the coming decades. The budgetary position 
in 2009 compounds the budgetary impact of
population ageing. 
Improving the primary balance over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system would contribute to reducing risks to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.24.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Slovakia) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
Chapter VII
Sustainability assessment per Member State, Slovakia
139 
Table VII.24.1: Summary table (Slovakia) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.5 -0.8
Working age population (15-64) % of total 72.0 72.5 71.5 69.0 67.0 65.9 63.4 57.0 52.7 -19.3
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 16.5 16.9 19.2 23.8 28.5 32.3 40.0 55.5 68.5 52.0
Participation rate (15-64) 68.8 70.3 71.8 72.9 73.4 72.8 70.5 70.4 71.2 2.4
 - Older workers (55-64) 39.4 47.0 49.6 50.3 53.4 55.1 53.8 52.6 52.8 13.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 11.1 12.1 8.6 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 -4.9
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 5.6 3.9 4.2 3.4 2.3 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.5 -5.1
Expenditure projections
Pensions 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.9 7.3 8.3 9.4 10.2 3.4
Benefit ratio 45.2 45.8 44.5 43.3 42.2 41.0 37.9 34.9 33.1 -12.0
Health care 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.7 6.0 6.2 6.7 7.1 7.2 2.3
Long-term care 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4
Education 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 -0.8
Unemployment benefits 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1
Total age-related expenditure 15.2 14.9 14.5 14.5 15.4 16.1 17.5 19.2 20.4 5.2
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -3.5 -3.7 -3.3
Public debt 27.6 32.2 36.3 64.9 87.0 115.5 207.5 354.6 561.2
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 5.5 0.0 5.5 3.6 2.1 0.4 -0.6 -0.4
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.4 0.0 5.4 3.5 2.0 0.4 -0.5 -0.4
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 5.7 4.3 -0.3 1.6 7.4 4.5 2.9 0.7 4.0
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.8 4.4 -0.3 1.7 7.4 4.6 2.8 0.7 3.9
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 7.4 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.4
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.4 1.0 0.6
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 29.4 32.1
 (End year 2050) 3.0 6.9 3.7 0.2
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
25. FINLAND 
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25.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Finland has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 4.0% of GDP, which is significantly below the
EU average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to
put public finances on a sustainable path, Finland
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 4.0% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Alternatively,
the social protection system would have to be
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Finnish sustainability gap is mainly due to the 
required adjustment given the long-term cost of 
ageing (4.5% of GDP), which is above the EU 
average (3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the
sustainability gap is mitigated by the initial
budgetary position, i.e. the required adjustment to
stabilise the debt ratio is negative (-0.5% of GDP) 
clearly below the EU average (3.2% of GDP). The 
increase in the long-term cost of ageing is mainly
driven by pension and long-term care expenditure
(increasing by 2.6 p.p. and 2.5 p.p. respectively in
2060 relative to 2010), while the ratio of health 
care expenditure to GDP increases by 0.8 p.p.  
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
-0.9% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (4.9 p.p.) stems mainly from 
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(4.6 p.p.), while the component of the long-term
cost of ageing has increased by 0.1 p.p. The
extension of the projection period from 2050 (in 
the 2006 report) to 2060 increases the 
sustainability gap by 0.2 p.p. 
The Finnish government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 39.7% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 46% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease slightly from 2.1% in 2009 to 0.8% in
2010. Finnish debt is both below the EU average 
and the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria.  
25.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Finland appears to be at low risk with regard to the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. While 
the long-term budgetary impact of ageing is higher 
than on average in the EU, the budgetary position
in 2009 with a structural surplus together with
large assets accumulated in the public pension 
system significantly offset the long-term budgetary
impact of ageing.  
Improving primary surpluses over the medium
term and further reforms to the social security
system aimed at curbing the increase in age-related 
expenditures would contribute to reducing risks to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Reforms should however be pursued in a manner
that do not amplify the fallouts of the current
economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.25.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Finland) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.25.1: Summary table (Finland) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 0.1
Working age population (15-64) % of total 66.5 66.4 63.4 61.0 59.3 58.2 58.2 57.5 56.4 -10.0
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 24.8 25.7 31.7 36.8 40.6 43.9 45.1 46.6 49.3 24.5
Participation rate (15-64) 75.8 75.3 77.0 78.4 78.5 78.6 78.8 79.1 79.1 3.3
 - Older workers (55-64) 59.4 57.9 61.9 66.5 67.0 66.1 67.8 68.5 67.7 8.3
Unemployment rate (15-64) 6.9 9.3 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 -1.1
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 2.4 1.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 -0.9
Expenditure projections
Pensions 10.0 10.7 11.8 12.6 13.4 13.9 13.6 13.3 13.4 3.3
Benefit ratio 49.1 51.2 52.0 52.1 52.0 51.7 50.2 48.3 46.9 -2.3
Health care 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.5 1.0
Long-term care 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.9 4.2 4.4 2.6
Education 5.7 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.4 -0.3
Unemployment benefits 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -0.2
Total age-related expenditure 24.2 24.7 26.0 27.2 28.5 29.7 30.4 30.2 30.5 6.3
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 4.3 2.1 0.8
Public debt 33.4 39.7 45.7 35.5 44.4 61.3 111.1 172.6 248.7
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 5.4 0.5 5.9 2.6 0.8 2.5 0.0 -1.5
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.7 0.5 6.1 2.8 0.8 2.6 0.0 -1.5
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 2.6 -0.8 -0.3 3.7 4.0 -0.5 4.5 0.3 5.5
Crisis scenario: lost decade 3.1 -0.8 -0.3 4.2 4.5 -0.4 4.9 0.3 5.8
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 4.0 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 0.9 -0.2
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.3 -0.5 0.2 0.5 : 0.8
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 -1.9
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 42.8 44.5
 (End year 2050) -0.9 3.8 4.6 0.1
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
26. SWEDEN 
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26.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  Sweden has a sustainability gap (S2) 
of 1.8% of GDP, which is significantly below the
EU average (6.5% of GDP).  This means that to
put public finances on a sustainable path, Sweden
should improve its structural primary balance in a 
durable manner by 1.8% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Alternatively,
the social protection system would have to be
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The Swedish sustainability gap is mainly due to 
required adjustment given the long-term cost of 
ageing (1.6% of GDP), which is below the EU 
average (3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the initial
budgetary position, i.e. the required adjustment to
stabilise the debt ratio is positive (0.2% of GDP)
and clearly below the EU average (3.2% of GDP). 
The increase in the long-term cost of ageing is 
mainly driven by long-term care expenditure 
(increasing by 2.2 p.p. in 2060 relative to 2010),
while the ratio of health care expenditure to GDP 
increases by 0.7 p.p. At the same time, the GDP 
share of pension expenditure is expected to fall by 
0.2 p.p. 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
-1.1% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (2.9 p.p.) stems mainly from 
the deterioration of the initial budgetary position 
(3.3 p.p.), while the component of the long-term
cost of ageing has decreased by 0.8 p.p. The 
extension of the projection period from 2050 (in 
the 2006 report) to 2060 increases the 
sustainability gap by 0.5 p.p. 
The Swedish government debt in 2009, the base
year of the analysis, stood at 44.0% of GDP and is
forecast to increase to around 48% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease from 0.9% in 2009 to -0.5% in 2010. 
Swedish debt is both below the EU average and 
the 60% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria.  
26.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Sweden appears to be at low risk with regard to the
long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is lower 
than the EU average. The budgetary position in
2009 with a primary surplus contributes to the 
reduction of gross debt and a considerable amount 
of public assets will help finance part of the 
increase in pension expenditure.  
Maintaining sound government finances with
continued surpluses would contribute to limiting
risks to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. Reforms should however be pursued in a
manner that do not amplify the fallouts of the
current economic and financial crisis. 
Graph VII.26.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (Sweden) 
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Note on interpretation: See Graph VII.1.1 for Belgium.
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.26.1: Summary table (Sweden) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 9.1 9.3 9.6 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.5 10.7 10.9 1.8
Working age population (15-64) % of total 65.6 65.3 63.1 61.8 60.9 60.2 59.5 59.0 56.9 -8.7
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 26.4 27.8 31.5 33.7 35.5 37.4 40.8 41.9 46.7 20.3
Participation rate (15-64) 79.2 79.9 81.9 82.2 82.0 81.9 82.0 82.4 82.5 3.3
 - Older workers (55-64) 73.2 73.1 75.0 75.5 75.9 75.5 76.0 77.1 76.6 3.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 6.1 10.4 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 -0.2
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 2.6 0.4 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7 -0.9
Expenditure projections
Pensions 9.5 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.0 9.4 -0.1
Benefit ratio 49.3 48.1 44.7 41.0 38.6 36.6 33.5 31.4 30.1 -19.1
Health care 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.0 0.8
Long-term care 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.4 5.0 5.3 5.8 2.3
Education 6.0 5.8 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.8 -0.3
Unemployment benefits 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 -0.1
Total age-related expenditure 27.2 27.1 26.7 26.9 27.5 28.2 28.8 28.8 29.7 2.6
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance 3.4 0.9 -0.5
Public debt 38.0 44.0 47.2 31.4 29.9 32.2 45.7 64.0 93.1
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 2.4 0.3 2.7 -0.2 0.7 2.2 0.0 -0.8
Crisis scenario: lost decade 4.0 0.3 4.3 0.4 0.6 2.8 0.5 -0.8
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 0.8 1.8 0.2 1.6 0.1 3.1
Crisis scenario: lost decade 1.9 0.0 -0.3 2.1 3.4 0.2 3.1 0.2 4.4
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 1.8 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 1.5 -0.1
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.3 : 0.7
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.8 0.6 -1.7
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 47.9 49.8
 (End year 2050) -1.1 1.4 3.3 -0.8
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
27. UNITED KINGDOM 
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27.1. OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
The sustainability analysis shows that on the basis 
of the current budgetary position of 2009, based on
the 2009 commissions services' spring forecast, 
and the projected increases in age related 
expenditure,  the United Kingdom has a 
sustainability gap (S2) of 12.4% of GDP, which is 
clearly above the EU average (6.5% of GDP). 
This means that to put public finances on a
sustainable path, the United Kingdom should
improve its structural primary balance in a durable 
manner by 12.4% of GDP. In principle, this
adjustment could take place via both an increase in 
revenues and cuts in expenditure. Alternatively,
the social protection system would have to be
reformed to decelerate the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure. 
The sustainability gap in the United Kingdom is
mainly due to the initial budgetary position, i.e. the 
required adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio is
positive (8.8% of GDP), clearly above the EU 
average (3.3% of GDP). In parallel, the required 
adjustment given the long-term cost of ageing 
(3.6% of GDP) is above the EU average (3.2% of
GDP). The increase in the long-term cost of ageing 
is mainly driven by pension and health-care
expenditure (increasing by 2.5 p.p. and 1.8 p.p.
respectively in 2060 relative to 2010). 
In the 2006 Sustainability Report, the S2 gap was 
4.9% of GDP. The difference between that report
and the current results (7.5 p.p.) stems from the 
deterioration of the initial budgetary position (7.0
p.p.), while the component of the long-term cost of 
ageing has actually decreased (-0.5 p.p.). The 
extension of the projection period from 2050 (in 
the 2006 report) to 2060 increases the 
sustainability gap by 0.9 p.p. 
The UK's government debt in 2009, the base year
of the analysis, stood at 68.4% of GDP and is 
forecast to increase to around 82% of GDP in 
2010. The structural primary balance is forecast to
decrease slightly from -7.8% in 2009 to -9.2% in
2010. Currently, UK's debt is slightly below the 
EU average but above the 60% ceiling set by the 
Maastricht criteria, however the dramatic size of 
its structural primary deficit poses an additional
risk to the sustainability of public finances. 
27.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The United Kingdom appears to be at high risk
with regard to the long-term sustainability of
public finances. Although the contribution of an
ageing population is not amongst the most 
problematic, the UK's budgetary position poses 
severe risks to the sustainability of public finances. 
Reducing the primary deficit, would contribute to
reducing the high risks to the long-term
sustainability of public finances.  
Graph VII.27.1: Determinants of fiscal sustainability (United 
Kingdom)
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Data on assets: not available 
Source: Commission services.
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Table VII.27.1: Summary table (United Kingdom) 
Underlying assumptions 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060 Change 2007 - 2060
Population (millions) 60.9 62.0 63.8 65.7 67.5 69.2 72.0 74.5 76.7 15.8
Working age population (15-64) % of total 66.4 66.3 65.1 64.0 63.1 61.8 60.8 60.5 58.7 -7.7
Old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64) 24.1 24.7 27.1 28.6 30.4 33.2 36.9 38.0 42.1 18.0
Participation rate (15-64) 75.6 75.7 76.9 77.2 77.0 77.5 78.5 78.6 78.7 3.1
 - Older workers (55-64) 59.7 58.6 62.6 64.1 64.7 65.8 70.3 71.3 71.1 11.4
Unemployment rate (15-64) 5.3 9.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 0.1
Real potential GDP (growth rate) 2.0 0.9 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 -0.2
Expenditure projections
Pensions 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.1 9.3 2.7
Benefit ratio 34.6 34.6 34.5 34.9 35.0 34.5 34.2 35.8 37.1 2.5
Health care 7.5 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.4 8.9 9.2 9.4 1.9
Long-term care 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 0.5
Education 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.8 -0.1
Unemployment benefits 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0
Total age-related expenditure 18.9 19.2 19.4 19.8 20.3 21.1 22.1 22.4 24.0 5.1
2008 2009 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 2060
Structural primary balance -3.3 -7.8 -9.2
Public debt 52.0 68.4 81.7 159.8 212.7 271.3 406.1 559.9 759.2
Cost of ageing
Net age-
related 
expenditure
Pension
taxation
Gross age-
related 
expenditure
Pensions Health care Long-termcare
Unempl. and
Education
Property
income
Baseline scenario 4.8 0.0 4.8 2.5 1.8 0.5 0.0 -0.3
Crisis scenario: lost decade 5.7 0.0 5.7 3.2 1.7 0.5 0.2 -0.3
Sustainability Indicators
(End year 2060) S1 IBP DR LTC S2 IBP LTC Cost of delay RPB
Baseline scenario 10.8 8.6 0.2 2.0 12.4 8.8 3.6 0.7 4.5
Crisis scenario: lost decade 11.7 8.8 0.2 2.7 13.3 8.9 4.4 0.8 5.2
Sensitivity to changes in assumptions S2
Baseline Higher life expectancy
Higher 
labour 
productivity
Older 
workers
Total
Employment Zero migration Interest rate
AWG scenarios 12.4 0.7 0.0 -0.1 0.0 3.1 -0.1
Pure Ageing
Constant
Health 
Status
Death-
related Costs
Income
Elasticity
EU12 Cost 
Convergence
Labour 
Intensity
Scenarios for health-care 0.2 -0.7 -0.4 0.5 : 0.6
Pure Ageing ConstantDisability
Improved 
Disability
Decrease in 
Informal
Fast growth in 
unit costs
Slow growth in 
unit costs
Scenarios for long-term care 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4
Comparison with SR 2006 S2 2006 S2 2009 Tax burden 2008 Average 2000-07
IBP LTC 38.5 37.5
 (End year 2050) 4.9 11.4 7.0 -0.5
S2
Change in age-related expenditure 2010 - 2060 (% points)
Difference from the baseline scenario (% points)
Difference due to 
S1
Source:  Commission services.
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0. Notations  
t is the index for the year. 
0t the last year before the long-term projection. 
tD  (adjusted) gross debt relative to GDP. 
tPB structural primary balance relative to GDP.  
tPBΔ
tPBΔ
change in structural primary balance compared to the base year  relative to 
GDP. In addition change in structural primary balance equals a sum of a change in structural primary 
balance due to a change in age related expenditure and a change in property income 
. 
tt PBPBPB Δ+= 0
tt PIageingPB Δ+Δ= )(
tageingPB )(Δ change in structural primary balance due to development in age related expenditure 
compared to the base year  relative to GDP, i.e.  does not reflect development in 
property  income flows over the projection horizon. 
tageingPB )(Δ
tPI  property income relative to GDP. 
tPIΔ  change in property income compared to the base year  relative to GDP. 
r differential between the nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP growth rate i.e. 
G
Rr
+
+
=+
1
11
where R and G are respectively the nominal interest rate (or discount rate) and the nominal growth rate. 
1. Deriving the S1 and S2 indicator under the assumption of constant growth rate/interest rate 
differential(35) 
i. The inter-temporal budget constraint and the S2 indicator  
There is no agreed definition on what constitutes a sustainable position for the public finances. One can 
however impose that the debt (relative to GDP) remains bounded at any time in the future so that it does 
not follow an explosive path. This implies (see proof in appendix) that the discounted value of future 
structural primary balances should cover the current level of debt, i.e.:  
0
)1(10 0
0
=
+
− ∑∞
+=
−
tt
tt
t
t r
PBD       (1)  
This condition is referred to as the inter-temporal budget constraint or the solvency condition. Given 
an initial debt, an interest-growth differential assumption and a future path of the structural primary 
(35) It is also supposed to be strictly positive. 
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balance, condition (1) may not be fulfilled. The S2 indicator is thus the change in the structural primary 
balance for every future year that ensures that condition (1) is true. In order to decompose the change in 
the primary balance to two parts corresponding to population ageing and the change in property income 
received by the general government r,  formula (2)  substitutes for .  tPBΔ tt PIageingPB Δ+Δ )(
4444 3444 2144444 344444 21
E
tt
tt
t
D
tt
tt
t
tt r
ageingPBr
r
PIrPBrDS ∑∑ ∞
+=
−
∞
+=
− +
Δ
−
+
Δ
−−=
11
02
0
0
0
00 )1(
)(
)1(
     (2)  
S2 is a sum of two different terms. The first term (D) is a condition concerning the initial budgetary 
position and a present value of future income flows from property income: if the structural primary 
balance (relative to GDP) remains unchanged in the future, the intertemporal budget constraint condition 
simply says that the structural primary balance should be equal to "apparent real" interest paid on the 
current level of debt adjusted by the present value of future property income flows. In that case, the level 
of debt would remain stable as a GDP. Indeed, debt relative to GDP increases by the difference between 
nominal interest rate and the nominal growth rate. If the structural primary balance compensates for this 
increase, the debt relative to GDP will remain stable. (D) is the distance between current structural 
budgetary primary balance and the debt-stabilizing primary balance.  
The second term (E) is a condition concerning future developments in the property income adjusted 
structural primary balance: the bigger the decrease of the structural primary balance, the higher the 
immediate raise in the structural primary balance should be to fully compensate those changes. (E) is a 
synthetic measure of the time-varying future changes in the property income adjusted primary balance 
expressed as a constant change in the primary balance as a share of GDP. 
ii. The S1 indicator 
The S1 indicator is the change in the structural primary balance for every future year that is required to 
reach a debt ratio in 2060 of 60% of GDP. The calculations below are valid for any date T in the future 
and for any level of debt . TD
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)1(    (3) 
As for S2, the S1 indicator is a sum of several terms. Contrary to S2, S1 also assumes that debt reaches a 
certain level of debt; the first term only ensures that debt as a share of GDP will remain at its starting 
level at a certain point in time. Additional effort measured by the second term (B) is therefore necessary 
to ensure that the debt will reach 60% of GDP in 2060. It tends to be large if the desired level of debt is 
small, the period of time given to reach this debt level is short or the initial debt is large. For countries 
with a lower initial level of debt, the term (B) is negative and reduces the sustainability gap. 
The last term (C) is a condition concerning future developments of the structural primary balance due to 
age related expenditure. It is slightly different from the term (E) in the S2 indicator because S1 only takes 
into account changes in the structural primary balance up to 2060, which in most cases, underestimates 
the cost of ageing. 
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iii. Comparison of S1 and S2 
The two indicators are in fact very close and the S1 indicator can be seen as a finite version of the 
intertemporal budget constraint. Indeed, if the debt requirement is set at a very distant date in the future, 
the two indicators S1 and S2 will be very close. 
Given that     ;         ;     DPBrDA tt =−= 00 0⎯⎯ →⎯
⎯→⎯∞TB E
r
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10
0)1(
 (4) 21 ),( SDTS
T
T ⎯⎯ →⎯
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In practice, given the not so distant requirement (2060) and the low differential between interest and 
growth rates, S1 and S2 are different.  
Table 1 sums up the calculations of S1 and S2.  
Table 1. comparison of S1 and S2 
Current budgetary position and 
the present value of future 
property income flows 
 Debt 
requirement in 
2060 
Long-term changes in the primary 
balance due to change in age related 
expenditure 
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Two different reasons may lead S1 to be greater than S2:    
- The debt requirement will increase S1 if the initial level of debt is above 60% and decrease S1 
otherwise: nothing similar is imposed in the calculations of S2. Therefore high-debt countries, i.e. 
countries whose debt is above 60% in 2005 or at the end of the programme period, may have a higher S1 
than S2. For instance, the debt requirement will increase S1 by around ¾% point of GDP, for a country 
with an initial adjusted gross debt level of 100%(36).  
- The other difference between the two indicators comes from the horizon over which future changes in 
the primary balance are taken into account: over the period up to 2060 in the case of S1 and over infinite 
horizon in the case of S2. In EU countries, the overall budgetary impact of ageing is usually increasing 
over the next decades so that the maximum budgetary impact happens towards the end of the period. In 
that case, the change in the primary balance is higher in 2060 than it is on average over the period 2010-
(36) If the difference between the interest rate and growth rate is 1.5%. 
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2060: the impact of changes in primary balances is then larger in S2 than in S1(37). However, some 
countries have enacted a large pension reform that is progressively implemented so that the increase in 
public expenditure reaches its maximum in the middle of the period before being significantly reduced 
afterwards. Those countries may exhibit a higher S1 than S2.  
To sum up, S2 should be in most cases greater than S1 except for countries where the initial level of 
debt is substantially higher than 60% and/or the increase in expenditure due to ageing is lower in 
2060 than on average over the period up to 2060.  
iv. The required primary balance 
Instead of presenting public finance imbalances as a gap towards a sustainable situation, it is also possible 
to present the resulting target in terms of primary balance (the required primary balance) that would result 
from a budgetary consolidation in the medium-term that ensures sustainability. The required primary 
balance can be calculated for both indicators (though the Commission regularly calculates the required 
primary balance for the S2 indicator). 
∑∞
+=
−+
Δ
−=+=
1
2
0
0000 )1(tt tt
t
ttt r
PBrrDSPBRPB  (6) 
Formula (6) shows that the RPB is a more stable indicator than the sustainability indicator. Indeed, it only 
depends on the current level of debt, the projected budgetary change over the long-term and the interest 
rate/growth rate differential. These data typically change infrequently, e.g.  if a pension reform is 
implemented or if the future outlook on demography, potential growth or interest rate are changed. By 
contrast, sustainability gap are also sensitive to changes in the current structural primary balance, which 
are more common. 
2. Deriving the S1 and S2 indicator under the assumption of time-varying growth rat/interest rate 
differential 
The interest-growth rate differential has so far been assumed constant. This is not the case in the current 
EU framework to assess public finance sustainability. The real interest rate is constant for all EU25 
countries and equal to 3% while GDP growth projections are country-specific.  
Lets introduce )1)...(1)(1( 1; jiiji rrr +++= +α   if ji ≤ and 1 otherwise. 
The dynamics of debt is: ; ∑
+=
++ −=
t
ti
tiitttt PBDD
1
;1;1
0
00
αα
The inter-temporal budgetary constraint is: ∑∞
+= +
=
1 ,10 0
0
ti it
i
t
PBD
α
(37) Formally (E) can be written as a weighted average of (C) and the change in primary balance in 2060 (see annex). 
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The S2 indicator is: 
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In the case where the interest rate/growth rate differential and the structural primary balance are constant 
after a certain date (here 2060): 
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Box 1. Proofs 
Equation 1 
Let’s suppose the debt (relative to GDP) remains bounded at any time in the future.  
It means that M∃ such as MrPBrDD
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Equation 2 
The S2 indicator is the change in the structural primary balance compared with the base year for every 
future year that ensures that condition (1) is fulfilled.  
Mathematically, it can be written: ∑∞
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Equation 3 
The calculations are made for any date T in the future and for any target level of debt in the future. The 
dynamics of the debt can be written: 
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Equation 5 
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3. Deriving the cost of a delay indicator 
It provides an estimate of the cost of delay in making a complete adjustment according to the old S1 and 
the S2 indicators. It further assumed a constant interest rate-growth rate differential. The cost of a delay 
with non-constant interest rate for the currently used indicators, S1 and S2, are given here.  
S1 indicator:
The expression for the cost of delay using the S1 indicator is:
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S2 indicator: 
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If the adjustment is postponed in 5 years then, ∑∑ ∞
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Relationships between the two indicators: 
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The cost of the delay is proportional to the initial tax gap indicator. If r is constant, the former formula is 
significantly reduced: delayrSS )1(2
'
2 +=
4. Deriving the equivalence between sustainability indicators – a 'flow' measure - and implicit 
liabilities/debt – a 'stock' measure 
Section II.3.2 showed that the sustainability indicators can also be expressed as the stock of net implicit 
liabilities, or, net implicit debt under certain assumptions. In particular, if for both the sustainability gap 
measure and the net implicit debt measure it is assumed that they: (i) have the same starting point, i.e. the 
structural primary balance of general government; (ii) have the same discount rate; (iii) they have the 
same coverage of future government commitments (i.e. age-related expenditures evolving in line with 
demographic developments); and, (iv) they take into account that government's ability to receive the same 
revenues as a share of GDP as today, the S2 sustainability indicator less the current level of debt can be 
expressed as the current stock of net implicit debt. Specifically, one can define the net implicit liabilities 
of the general government, , as the discounted future structural primary balances, or equivalently the 
net present value of future primary deficits: =
0t
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financed future public spending. 
In this case, the S2 can be rewritten as  
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One can express the level of implicit debt as a function of S2 and current level of debt, showing that those 
two measures are indeed equivalent. 
00
2
tt Dr
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This definition of net implicit debt covers all future imbalances linked to age-related social spending on 
pensions, health-care, long-term care, education and unemployment. It is however not limited to those 
five expenditure items. The starting point is defined for the total general government sector, which also 
includes other items. If the current structural primary balance is lower than the debt-stabilizing structural 
primary balance, it is also included in this definition of the implicit debt. By contrast, if the current 
structural primary balance is larger than the debt-stabilizing primary balance, it means that the general 
government is in the process of accumulating assets and/or reducing debt. 
155 
European Commission 
Sustainability Report - 2009 
156 
In the calculation of S2 sustainability gap, explicit debt and net implicit debt are given equal importance. 
It should be borne in mind that the value of net implicit debt depends on the long-term projections and 
strongly on the discount rate. It is therefore not as "observable" as the current level of debt is. 
It should be noted that implicit debt is even more sensitive to the interest rate than the sustainability 
indicator. Indeed, sustainability indicators are bounded, because the impact ageing reaches a maximum 
(at the latest in 2060, after which the primary deficit is kept constant). The intuition behind the result is 
straightforward. If a country is expected to experience a maximum increase of 5% of GDP of public 
spending, current adjustment to cover this increase is necessary less than 5%, as the interest rate/growth 
rate differential is positive. In general, the lower the interest rate, the higher the overall increase will be. 
By contrast, implicit debt is not bounded. In the extreme where the interest rate is very close to the growth 
rate (or equivalently r is close to zero), the implicit debt can be very large. Changing the assumptions for 
the interest rate can therefore give rise to a larger variation in the 'stock' measure (implicit debt) measure 
compared with the 'flow' measure (sustainability indicators). 
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1.1.1. Taxation of pensions 
In assessing the sustainability gap(s), most 
government revenues are assumed to stay constant 
as a share of GDP. Two components of revenues 
are explicitly modelled however. These are 
property income and direct tax revenues from 
pensions in Member States where this is possible. 
An ageing population is likely to affect the tax 
revenues received by government as pension 
income is not distributed and therefore taxed in the 
same way as other income and as it may not be 
taxed in the same way either. Across the Member 
States there is a range of tax arrangements for 
pensions, and a number of countries are in a 
transition period where the tax treatment of 
pension funds in changing.  
For public schemes, an ageing population can have 
an ambivalent effect on the receipts from tax 
revenues. On the one hand, the government 
receives tax from pensions drawn. On the other 
hand, pensions received are usually lower than 
wages (leading to a benefit ratio of less then 1), 
meaning that pensions will be taxed at lower 
marginal – and average – rates of tax in 
progressive systems. The change in both these 
components is considered.  
For countries with a significant private system, tax 
revenues are affected both in terms of their size 
and their timing. Over their working life, 
individuals first become net contributors to a 
private pension system while they later become net 
receivers of pension income. In terms of the tax 
incidence of the part of their income that is saved 
in the form of the pension, a typical EET 
system (38) effectively leads to a deferral of the 
payment of tax from the time when individuals 
earn their income to the time when the consumed 
it. In addition, the overall tax paid in an EET 
system may be lower as pension contributions 
grow (which may occur as individuals anticipate 
having to save more to ensure that their now 
longer retirement years are adequately funded), as 
(38) An EET system is one where contributions to the pension 
fund out of wages are exempt from income tax, capital 
gains by the fund are exempt from tax, but pensions drawn 
are taxed as income. Such a system operates in many EU 
countries for example in Germany (Riester plan). 
the marginal tax they are exempt from in the years 
they contribute is higher than rate they pay when 
they draw their pensions. Moreover, there may 
also be an overall fall in revenue if private pension 
saving crowds out other saving, which is normally 
undertaken out of taxed income. 
Given the differences between the pension and tax 
systems in the Member States, the data available 
and the countervailing effects of ageing on the 
pension system, the projections in this report 
model the evolution of the tax received from 
pensions using a simple model that can 
accommodate a range of differences. The model is 
based on the average personal income tax rate on 
pensions observed in recent years, the elasticity of 
income tax and the evolution of the average 
(public and private) pensions taken from the 
Ageing Report. The average tax rate is modelled to 
evolve according to:                   Error! Bookmark 
not 
defined.
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where T is the average income tax paid by 
pensioners, P the average pension, W the average 
wage in the economy and ε the elasticity of 
personal income tax.   
The average income tax paid by pensioners is set 
to zero for countries where pensions are not (or are 
only minimally) taxed. The average pension used 
may be public, private or both, depending on the 
system in place in a given Member State and on 
the data available. Data on private pension 
projections and on their tax treatment are not 
available in all countries that have a significant 
private component to their pension system.  
For countries where a significant change in the 
pension or tax system is envisaged, there is no 
explicit modelling of tax revenues from pensions. 
This is the case, for example, for Hungary where a 
new pension formula and a new system of pension 
taxation will be introduced in 2013.  
The model generates constant revenues from 
pensions if there is no expected change in the 
benefit ratio. This is also the case for countries 
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with flat tax system (ε=1) (39). The model only 
forecasts significant changes in revenues from 
pension taxation for Member States where the 
benefit ratio ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
W
P is expected to change 
significantly and the personal income tax system is 
reasonably progressive (ε is greater than 1). 
The analysis is not undertaken for Germany, 
Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia and the United 
Kingdom, and only the public pensions are 
modelled in Belgium, the Czech Republic and 
Romania. For most remaining countries, the effects 
are small (within 0.7% of GDP), with the 
exception of Denmark, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands which are expecting to see an increase 
in tax revenues of 1.2, 1.9 and 2.7% of GDP 
respectively, between 2010 and 2060. Austria is 
the only country for which a decrease in tax 
revenues is anticipated.  
1.1.2. Property income  
Property income is the income received by the 
owner of an asset (whether financial or physical) in 
return for providing funds for other agents. 
Governments will typically both make and receive 
such payments. They pay interest on their debt and 
receive rent for the assets they own. Government 
receipts from other sources are, broadly speaking, 
a function of the tax bases and the rates chosen by 
the government. Property income differs in that it 
is determined by the market rather than policy. For 
this reason, in assessing the sustainability gaps, 
property income received by governments is 
explicitly modelled in a way that is different to 
other receipts, albeit using simplified assumptions. 
Property income received by the Member States is 
mainly composed of interest received from 
deposits, bonds and loans; dividends received from 
shares and withdrawals from the income of quasi-
corporations; and rents on land and subsoil assets. 
Projecting these forward in a detailed way requires 
forecasting the return on these assets, their future 
value and the purchases and sales of these assets. 
In order to model the progression of property 
income, it is assumed that there is no stock-flow 
(39) For example Estonia has an estimated elasticity of 1.1 
owing to the flat income tax system. 
adjustment, meaning that government debt is only 
driven by the general government balance and 
there is no net sale or purchase of financial assets 
in the future. Rather than staying constant as a 
share of GDP, the default position is therefore for 
these assets stay constant in nominal terms rather 
than as a share of GDP. The implication is that 
where the government receives property income, 
this income is used to reimburse debt through its 
contribution to the general government balance, 
rather than to purchase other assets. When short-
term assets (such as bonds) mature, they are 
therefore implicitly assumed to be replaced with 
other bonds of the same nominal value. 
The stock of assets which generate income for 
Member States' governments is not always known. 
By making the no stock-flow adjustment 
assumption, the evolution of property income can 
be modelled just using assumptions about the rate 
of return on assets in the future relative to now. In 
modelling the rate of return, a distinction is made 
between income received from bonds, equity and 
rents.  
For bonds, the rate of return of 5% is applied from 
2012 on; before, the yield of a 10-year government 
bond is used. As data on the return from equities 
are only available on distributed returns, so that the 
value reported in national accounts in the starting 
year may only be a fraction of the overall return on 
equity; the remaining fraction would be 
representing a valuation effect. As a simplifying 
assumption, the dividend-to-GDP ratio is assumed 
to be constant over time, thereby assuming 
continuing valuation effects. For rent from land 
and subsoil assets, it is assumed that the ratio of 
rents-to-GDP will remain constant over time, 
except in the cases of Denmark and the 
Netherlands, where the (substantial) stock of 
subsoil assets is assumed to be exhausted by 2050 
and the level of rent to GDP is modelled to return 
into line with the average of other Member States. 
Given these assumptions, the projected path of 
property income over time only depends on the 
stock of bonds held at the start of the projection 
period given the level of income received from 
property. The higher are bond holdings, the steeper 
the decline in property income over time. 
Table A.2.1 shows the evolution of property 
income used in the estimation of the sustainability 
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Table A.II.1.1: Property income (% of GDP) 
change
2007 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2010-60
BE 0.62 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.44 -0.15
BG 1.49 1.42 1.32 1.25 1.21 1.19 1.17 -0.25
CZ 0.83 0.74 0.63 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.44 -0.30
DK 1.74 1.61 1.39 1.10 0.89 0.71 0.64 -0.97
DE 0.74 0.71 0.66 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.50 -0.21
EE 1.53 1.43 1.24 1.17 1.14 1.12 1.10 -0.33
IE 1.06 1.02 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.88 -0.15
EL 0.92 0.87 0.79 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.65 -0.22
ES 1.02 0.95 0.83 0.73 0.67 0.64 0.61 -0.35
FR 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.58 -0.18
IT 0.61 0.59 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.44 -0.15
CY 0.72 0.62 0.42 0.28 0.21 0.16 0.14 -0.48
LV 0.70 0.64 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.48 -0.17
LT 0.57 0.51 0.42 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.31 -0.19
LU 1.64 1.46 1.13 0.95 0.83 0.75 0.69 -0.76
HU 0.91 0.88 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.70 -0.18
MT 1.35 1.33 1.28 1.25 1.23 1.21 1.20 -0.13
NL 2.58 2.44 2.13 1.79 1.48 1.21 1.16 -1.29
AT 1.47 1.38 1.22 1.05 0.93 0.84 0.78 -0.59
PL 1.31 1.19 0.98 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.79 -0.40
PT 0.73 0.70 0.64 0.57 0.52 0.49 0.47 -0.23
RO 0.95 0.91 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.76 -0.15
SI 0.72 0.68 0.62 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.53 -0.15
SK 1.52 1.40 1.22 1.13 1.09 1.06 1.04 -0.36
FI 4.43 4.15 3.76 3.34 3.04 2.83 2.68 -1.46
SE 2.50 2.36 2.16 1.92 1.76 1.65 1.57 -0.79
UK 0.72 0.67 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.40 0.37 -0.29
Source: Commission service 
In the Finish case, this is driven by the high level
of bond holdings by the government, which
contribute about half of the country's significant
receipts from property. 
gaps. It shows that this income is expected to fall
over time for all Member States, with the most 
significant falls being for Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Finland.  
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The crisis-related  scal expansions and the ageing of European Union’s population raise questions 
about the sustainability of the Member States’ public  nances. As the share of working age people 
in the population falls and the share of the old increases, economies are faced with lower economic 
growth and higher costs associated with providing services for the ageing population. This results 
in pressure on the public  nances; bold measures will be necessary to ensure that they return to a 
sustainable footing before the full effect of ageing is felt.
Sustainability relates to the ability of a government to assume the  nancial burden of its debt 
currently and in the future. While there is no one clear-cut de nition of a sustainable  scal position,
this chapter de nes two sustainability gap indicators which are most widely used in the EU to 
measure the sustainability challenges that Member States face. These are:
The S1 indicator shows the durable adjustment to the current primary balance required to reach a 
target debt of 60% of GDP in 2060, including paying for any additional expenditure arising from an 
ageing population.
The S2 indicator shows the durable adjustment of the current primary balance required to ful l the 
in nite horizon intertemporal budget constraints, including paying for any additional expenditure 
arising from an ageing population.
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